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
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**Prince Frederick William, the Hero of Worth, cheered by his
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MODERN GERMANY

The German Empire
1870-1912

Edited by
PROF. CHARLES F. HORNE, Ph. D.
of the College of the City of New York
and

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PART I
THE WAR WITH FRANCE
CHAPTER I
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

A WEAK government at the head of our neighboring state," said Moltke, "must be regarded in the light of a standing menace to peace. A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to establish his rights by political and military successes. Only for a time did the victories won by French arms in distant countries give general satisfaction; the triumphs of the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge, and the French demanded revenge for Austria's defeat. The liberal spirit of the epoch was opposed to the autocratic government of the emperor; he was forced to make concessions, his civil authority was weakened, and one fine day the nation was informed by its representatives that it desired war with Germany."

Prussia on its side had long foreseen the coming attack. King William announced that "the North German Confederation has labored to improve the national forces, not so as to imperil, but to afford a greater protection to, universal peace." Yet every precaution was taken. Moltke has described how year after year he and his staff reviewed and rearranged their plans for a swift campaign against France in case of need. "The orders for marching and traveling by rail or boat were worked out for each division of the army, together with the most minute directions as to their different starting points, the day and hour of departure, the duration of the journey, the refreshment stations and place of destination." In short, "when war was declared, it needed only the royal signature to set the entire apparatus in motion with undisturbed precision."

The war which France thus desired, and which Prussia knew she would be driven to, found its immediate origin in a mere diplomatic squabble. Spanish affairs furnished Napoleon with the cause for quarrel he had been seeking. Spain now had a monarchical constitution without a monarch, and the numerous republicans made every effort, by speeches in the cortés and insurrections in the provinces, to render a monarchy impossible. They were assisted by circumstances, since no one seemed willing to accept

the crown of a country which was politically crippled by faction and financially ruined. The minister of war, Count Prim—the real ruler of the country—made every effort to find a suitable person, but for a long time in vain. The former regent, Espartero; the Coburg prince, Don Fernando, father of the king of Portugal; King Louis of Portugal, the duke of Aosta, Victor Emmanuel's son; Prince Thomas of Genoa, nephew of the king of Italy—all in turn refused. The duke of Montpensier, who had married the sister of the ex-queen, Isabella, would have accepted, but that very relationship raised up many opponents among the monarchists, who would have preferred as their king Prince Alfonso, Isabella's son, if they were to have any Bourbon. Isabella took her measures with a view to the selection of her son for the vacant throne. At the advice of her friend, Empress Eugénie, she signed a formal abdication on the 25th of June, 1870, making over all her political rights to Alfonso. But for the moment the Spanish government was in favor of some other prince.

Among those who had refused the throne in 1869 was Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who, as a Roman Catholic, as the husband of a Portuguese princess, as a kinsman of Napoleon and a blood relation of the Prus-

sian king, seemed a desirable candidate. In the year 1870 the Spanish government resolved to make another attempt to secure him as their sovereign, and in June of that year a deputation was sent to Sigmaringen for that purpose. This time the prince accepted. The deputation returned to Madrid, a council of ministers was held, and on the 2nd of July it was resolved to make Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern a formal tender of the Spanish throne, and proclaim his candidature publicly. July 3 the telegraph conveyed this news to all the European capitals.

That Emperor Alexander of Russia, on the way to Ems, became his uncle's guest at Berlin for a few days in May of 1870 occasioned no remark, since the intimate personal relations of the two monarchs were well known. Neither was the fact that on the 2nd of June King William returned his nephew's visit at Ems of itself calculated to excite comment, since courtesy might seem to require it; but that the king was attended by his chancellor, Count Bismarck, and that the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Oubril, was also present were facts that gave the visit a political character, which the courts of Paris and Vienna were not slow to remark. Count Bismarck, who with such unerring certainty interpreted the meaning of events and penetrated the plans of statesmen, well knew what Prussia

had to expect from France in consequence of the duke of Gramont's appointment as minister of foreign affairs, and could approximately foresee what use that blundering and awkward diplomat would make of such an occurrence as the candidacy of a Hohenzollern prince for the Spanish crown.

As a statesman at once audacious, prudent and far-seeing, in the conferences at Ems the Prussian chancellor provided for the protection of Prussia's rear, in case of war with France, by stipulating that in the event of victory the Peace of Paris of 1856 should be revised in Russia's interest. After this agreement had been concluded the king and his chancellor returned to Berlin. On the 8th of June Bismarck left the capital for a prolonged sojourn at Varzin; and on the 20th, after the departure of the Russian emperor, the king, unattended by any of his ministers, repaired to Ems to take the baths.

The Madrid telegram of July 3 acquainted Paris with the fact that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was the destined king of Spain; and in its issue of the 4th Gramont's organ, the *Constitutionnel*, in an article composed or inspired by him, while acknowledging the right of Spain to regulate its destiny according to its own pleasure, professed itself

amazed beyond expression that France should be expected to look on and see the scepter of Charles V wielded by a Hohenzollern. To the French government Prince Leopold's candidacy was no novelty. Like the cabinets of the other great powers, the French ministers had been for some weeks informed of the negotiations between him and the Spanish government, and they merely assumed an appearance of ignorance in order to pose before the country as innocent lambkins taken by surprise and overreached by cunning, and give the more effective vent to their righteous indignation at this unscrupulous game of intrigue.

It is plain that it was in the power of the French government to settle the Hohenzollern-Spanish question in a peaceful or a warlike manner, according to its own choice. If it chose the former it was only necessary for Gramont to follow the regular diplomatic method—enter into negotiations with Prussia, and request the coöperation of the other powers, and success was assured; for it is scarcely credible that Bismarck, who three years before had been unwilling to engage in war where war would have been so popular, as in the Luxemburg affair, would, in a matter in no way involving German interests—for, being merely personal to a prince who, although a Hohenzollern, nevertheless did

not belong to the Prussian branch, it could not well be exalted to the dignity of a national question—disregard the emphatic disapprobation and the real or feigned anxiety of the French government and force the issue of war. But Gramont, who, without a spark of the genius of his would-be prototype, imagined himself a French Bismarck, did not wish for a peaceful solution. His mind was full of the advice given him by his friend Beust, to select as the pretext for war a purely dynastic question instead of a national one, and so he at once brought the whole affair before the tribune of the French legislature, indulging at the same time in such hostile threats that war became unavoidable. Without any sort of tact Prussia and the Prussian sovereign were treated in an absolutely insulting manner.

The conduct of France toward Prussia in the year 1870 resembled, both in general and in detail, the conduct of the same country in 1805 and 1806; but there was this difference in the way in which this treatment was received, that whereas King Frederick William III endured a long series of insults before unsheathing the sword, his son took up the gauntlet the moment it was thrown down. The intention of the French government was to inflict on him the same humiliation which had been inflicted on his father. "Submission or war!" was the cry

in the Tuileries; and if Prussia had submitted to the first insult, another would soon have followed, and then still others, until, like his father, King William might have been compelled at last to go to war under circumstances far less favorable. War there must be, for the object of De Gramont's policy was conquest. His plan was to acquire for France Belgium and Luxemburg, or the left bank of the Rhine, or rather both, for the conquest of the one would have been followed by that of the other. If his plan succeeded, then the subject of so much speech and thought would be at length accomplished, and the Rhine would flow past French territory from Basel to the German Ocean. Prussia had rejected all the proposed treaties with this end in view, so now the attempt must be made to secure the coveted increase of territory by war instead of through alliance.

Although the Spanish ministers and ambassadors gave the most definite assurances that in this whole transaction they had never had any dealings with the Prussian government, but only with Prince Leopold; although every one was aware that that prince occupied a thoroughly independent position, and that, in such a matter as the acceptance of the Spanish throne, the king of Prussia had no power over him either to command or to forbid; although Prussia could

in no case derive any tangible advantage from the occupation of the Spanish throne by a German prince, or at most the merely negative one that this would relegate to the realm of impossibilities such a Spanish-French alliance as had been planned by Isabella and Napoleon in 1868; nevertheless, from the beginning the French government persisted in pushing the person of the Prussian king into the foreground, and making him responsible for the whole transaction. They acted as though it were a purely Prussian and dynastic intrigue, and by that means shut out all possibility of a peaceful settlement.

Events followed one another with unprecedented rapidity. July 4 Gramont addressed an interrogation to State Secretary Thile through the French *chargé d'affaires* at Berlin, and received the reply that Prussia had nothing to do with Spanish affairs. On the same day he commissioned the Prussian ambassador at Paris, Baron von Werther, who was on the point of departure for Ems, to tell the king that the French government expected him to cause Prince Leopold to refuse the Spanish crown, and that France would regard his failure to do so as a sufficient *casus belli*. On the 6th of the same month, in the French parliament, without waiting for an answer from Ems, Gramont an-

swered an interpellation of the preceding day as follows: "We do not think that respect for the rights of a neighboring people obliges us to permit a foreign government, by setting one of its princes on the throne of Charles V, to destroy the European balance of power, and endanger the interest and honor of France. Relying upon the wisdom of the German people and the friendship of the Spanish, we hope that this eventuality may be avoided. If not, then it will be our part, strong in your support and that of the nation, to fulfill our duty without hesitation or delay." At the same time preparations for war were made both by sea and land, while the French press assumed such a tone toward Prussia that an ignorant observer might have fancied a second Jena had already taken place.

The French ambassador in Berlin, Count Benedetti, was at that time at Wildbad, in the Black Forest. July 7 he received a telegram directing him to set out for Ems without delay. On the 9th he had his first audience with the king, and required him, in the name of his government, to command Prince Leopold to withdraw his acceptance of the Spanish crown. The king replied that he had not commanded the prince to accept the crown, and could not command him to withdraw his acceptance. This

answer was regarded by the French government as a mere subterfuge, and the responsibility of the king still insisted upon. July 12 a telegram from the castle of Sigmaringen was published announcing the withdrawal of Prince Leopold from the candidacy for the Spanish throne. This seemed to bring the conflict to an end and remove every plausible excuse for a quarrel. Gramont himself had already said to the English ambassador that Prince Leopold's voluntary withdrawal would afford the simplest and most satisfactory solution of the dispute; and on the receipt of the Sigmaringen telegram Ollivier, the minister of justice, had at once stated in parliamentary circles that the episode was finished.

But that would have prevented the war by which lost prestige was to be regained; consequently Gramont went one step farther, although he must have perceived at the time that if France were not satisfied with the prince's withdrawal, and advanced still farther claims, she would by that very fact take the whole responsibility of war upon herself, and subject herself to the accusation of having all along had war as her aim. The question had ceased to be purely dynastic, and was fast becoming national, threatening to set half Europe in flames.

Gramont proceeded in his dictatorial career

with total indifference to any such considerations as the above. On the 12th of July he said to the Prussian ambassador, who had just returned from Ems, that Prince Leopold's withdrawal was a matter of secondary importance; the essential point was to remove the misunderstanding which had arisen in consequence of his candidacy, and quiet the excitement among the French people. For this purpose the king of Prussia must address to the emperor a letter intended for publication, to the effect that when the king empowered Prince Leopold to accept the Spanish throne he had no intention of infringing upon the interests or injuring the dignity of the French nation, and that he now consented to the prince's resignation in the wish and hope that all occasion for disagreement between the two governments was at length removed. Baron von Werther had sufficient tact not to telegraph such a demand directly to the king, as Gramont wished, but not enough to decline the commission altogether and leave Gramont to find some other means of communication. He dispatched an official report to Count Bismarck, but received, instead of an official answer, an immediate leave of absence. After his conversation with the Prussian ambassador, Gramont telegraphed Benedetti to demand the king's express approval of Prince

Leopold's refusal to be a candidate, and the assurance that he would never sanction a repetition of his candidacy.

Benedetti acquitted himself of his commission with great lack of tact on the public promenade at Ems on the morning of the 13th. The king replied that his approval of the prince's withdrawal could proceed from him merely in his capacity as a private individual and not as king of Prussia, and that in the interest of his country he must most decidedly refuse to bind his future action in that or any other matter. A few hours later Benedetti requested a new audience on the same subject, and was informed that the king had already pronounced his ultimatum; if the ambassador were not content, he must apply to the Prussian minister of foreign affairs. The occurrences at Ems were communicated to the Prussian ambassadors at foreign courts on the evening of the same day, and an extra of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Bismarck's organ, brought the matter to the knowledge of the German people.

The firm and manly attitude of the king was very unfavorable for the plans of the French war party. The news from Benedetti produced great excitement and bewilderment in Paris. One party thought that the conflict was peacefully settled; the other party, who had already

gone too far, did not wish to retrace their steps, preferring to plunge the dynasty and the country into a rash and venturesome war, rather than allow it to be said that they had again put forward demands on Prussia, and been again refused—in fine, that they and not the king of Prussia had been humiliated. Napoleon wavered between the two. It appeared to him a very serious matter to go to war with the compact power of the North German Confederation, perhaps even with all Germany, for so slight a cause. For a long time he could come to no conclusion, but listened to both sides, and brooded in silence, as was his wont.

There was a short time when peace seemed as good as concluded; but in the night of the 14th the decisive cabinet council was held in St. Cloud. Gramont and Lebœuf, who were eager for war, together with the Empress Eugénie, brought strong pressure to bear upon the undecided emperor, urging him to submit no longer to these perpetual rebuffs and humiliations from Prussia, but, by a declaration of war, to consolidate his throne, founded solely on the respect of the French people, and in league with the great Roman Catholic nations reduce heretical Germany to submission. It was with manifest reluctance that the emperor, against his better judgment, finally yielded to their representa-

tions. Thereupon the empress triumphantly exclaimed: "This is my war! With God's help we will subdue the Protestant Prussians!"

In the senate and the lower house, on the following day, official documents were read by Gramont and Ollivier respectively—the latter, although no enemy to Prussia, and disinclined toward war, was carried along by his colleagues—in which the circumstances of the case and the occurrences at Ems were completely misrepresented. Count Benedetti had been insulted and shown the door, according to this account, while a telegram of a nature derogatory to the dignity of France had been sent to foreign states. It was furthermore stated that Prussia had begun to make her preparations for war on the night of the 13th, and accordingly the government had called out the reserves, and would proceed to adopt further measures. At the same time a vote of credit was demanded for the army and navy, and a bill brought forward with reference to calling the *garde mobile* into active service and for the enlistment of volunteers. The senate adopted the government measures by a unanimous vote; the legislative body granted the credit for the army by a majority of 245 to 10, and passed the rest without a dissentient voice.

It was in vain that a few members of the op-

position, who saw through the web of ministerial lies, averred that the king of Prussia had done everything that could have been expected, and that no real insult had been offered. It was in vain that they demanded by way of proof the production of the dispatches which were deemed so insulting to France. It was in vain that Thiers, who for years had goaded on the vanity of the French people and incited them to war, declared the occasion awkwardly chosen, and affirmed that the military preparations were not yet complete. The ministers and the Bonapartist majority overruled these isolated monitors. On the evening of the 15th the streets of Paris were full of tattered crowds crying, "To Berlin! to Berlin!" while the official press spoke of the defeat of Prussia and the appropriation of the left bank of the Rhine as foregone conclusions. The formal declaration of war was handed to the Prussian government by the French *chargé d'affaires* on the 19th of July.

The conduct of France in this whole matter had been arrogant and false, inspired by lust of rule and lust of conquest. In consideration of the vote of July 15 it is impossible to say that only the emperor wished for war. When a unanimous senate and 245 out of 255 members of the house of representatives approve the war

measures of the government, it may be said that the whole country, through its representatives, is responsible for that war.

In Germany the gauntlet was taken up not only without hesitation but almost with enthusiasm. There was no more talk of a mere dynastic struggle. The fact that Gramont, not satisfied by Prince Leopold's withdrawal—although it was self-evident that he had withdrawn only at the request of the king of Prussia—demanded an apologetic letter for publication to the world, and a formal promise that the whole House of Hohenzollern should forever hold itself aloof from Spanish affairs, could not fail to convince every one that the Hohenzollern candidacy was a mere side issue, and that it was the fixed intention of the French government, by fair means or by foul, to find some pretext for war, in order to interfere in German affairs, disturb the process of unification and appropriate German territory. The German people felt that the humiliation which France had sought to put upon the Prussian king was humiliation aimed at all Germany. They regarded this war as a national one, cherished the hope that the work of 1866 might be completed, at the same time that the disgrace of one hundred years' standing should be thoroughly avenged. The establishment of German unity, which had been the aim

of 1866, had failed at that time, owing to French interference. By this new war France sought to make that interference permanent and her influence supreme; while the German people, on their part, were resolved to utilize the war thus forced upon them for the completion of their longed-for unity.

As in 1866 the Schleswig-Holstein question, the occasion of the Austro-Prussian War, expanded into a German one, so in 1870 the question of German unity, which was the real occasion of the war, began with the first faint hope of victory to develop into a thought of the possible restoration of Alsace and Lorraine. After the initial triumphs had been won, this expanded into an irresistible demand for the reclamation of those long-lost provinces. A war where so much of importance was involved, both in that which was to be guarded and that which was to be achieved, won ever greater popularity the more conscious the German people became of the critical nature of the stopping place which the process of unification had reached. Thanks to the South German governments, and the position of the South German fraction in the customs parliament, the hopes which had been founded on that institution remained unfulfilled. It now seemed improbable that the customs parliament could ever be developed into a real German par-

liament, unless external events should give some unexpected impulse.

The political situation in Bavaria and Württemberg was such that the accession of those states to the North German Confederation was removed an incalculable distance into the future, and even the most sanguine scarcely hoped to live to witness it. There was rather a probability of retrogression, for the Bavarian and Württemberg clericals and radicals seemed about to get the better of their respective governments, with the result of canceling the treaties with Prussia, and bringing on the stage a wonderful medley of political institutions drawn from the states of the Church, the Confederation of the Rhine, and the wildest speculations of radical republicanism. These men, genuine Prussian haters, would have converted their proposed southern confederation into the foe of North Germany rather than its ally, leaning on the one side on the willing arm of France and on the other finding support in Austria. Such was the condition of affairs in Germany when Gramont manufactured a *casus belli* of a description calculated to remove the hindrances in the way of German unity, as it were in a night, so that the whole nation, from the Danish border to the Alps, could sing with patriotic enthusiasm the "Watch on the Rhine."

They did not stop at singing; decisive measures followed quick and fast. July 12 Bismarck and Moltke arrived in Berlin and held a conference with the other ministers. The next day Bismarck said to the English ambassador that the king had already shown too much moderation rather than too little, and that it was now Prussia's part to require from France a withdrawal of her threatening language and an explanation of her military preparations. On the 15th the king left Ems and returned to Berlin. His journey was one triumphal procession. Wherever the train stopped the king received and replied to patriotic addresses. The crown prince, Bismarck, Moltke and Roon came as far as Brandenburg to meet him, while in Berlin a countless crowd awaited his arrival. Shortly before nine o'clock he reached the capital, and learned for the first time that in Paris both chambers had already pronounced for war. That same evening the mobilization of the army was determined on, and on the 16th precautionary measures were ordered on the North Sea coast, and a special session of the *Bundesrat* was summoned.

On the 19th King William opened the North German *Reichstag* with a speech full of boldness, patriotism and confidence: "If in former centuries Germany bore in silence infractions of her rights and insults to her honor, she bore them

only because in her disintegration she was ignorant of her strength. Today, when the bond of legal and moral union forged in the wars for freedom binds the German race ever closer; to-day, when Germany's armor offers the foe no longer an unguarded spot, she carries in herself both the will and the power to repel renewed French violence. The more conscious the allied governments are that they have done all which dignity and honor allow to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, and the plainer it becomes to all that the sword has been forced into our hands, the more confidently do we appeal, supported by the unanimous sentiment of the German governments, both North and South, to the patriotism and devotion of the German people for the defense of Germany's honor and independence."

July 21 the *Reichstag* unanimously voted the 120,000,000 thalers asked for by the government. On the 29th Bismarck published the various French propositions of 1866 and 1867, thereby revealing to Germany and the world at large the plans of conquest cherished by Napoleon's government. This information had already been imparted to the South German governments, and they accordingly understood that in the eyes of a power so false as France neutrality on their part would offer no guarantee for the preservation

of their territorial integrity, but that on the conclusion of peace they might become the victims of any bargain that was made. This confirmed them in their resolution honorably to fulfill their treaty obligations. On the 16th of July King Louis of Bavaria issued the command for the mobilization of the army; and on the 19th the lower house, hearkening to the voice of truth and honor, and deaf to the persuasions of Dr. Jörg and his committee—consisting for the most part of ultramontanes—with their proposition of an armed neutrality, appropriated, by a majority of 101 to 47, the sum of 18,200,000 florins for the purpose of equipping and maintaining the army. This passed the upper house by a unanimous vote.

After Bavaria had set such an example the democrats and *Grossdeutsche* in Württemberg could venture upon no opposition. For the moment almost the whole country forgot its hatred of Prussia, and gave its approval to the resolutions adopted in a popular assembly at Stuttgart on the 16th of July, calling on the government to take part in the national war. King Charles returned from Switzerland on the 17th, and at once issued the command to mobilize the army. The chambers met on the 21st, and on the 22nd the war credit asked by the government was voted by both houses, unanimously in the upper

and with only one dissentient voice in the lower. At the same time the king named a Prussian lieutenant general, von Prittwitz, who had directed the construction of the fortress of Ulm some twenty years before, governor of that place; and another Prussian lieutenant general, von Oberwitz, formerly military plenipotentiary at Stuttgart, commander-in-chief of the Württemberg forces.

In Hesse the war credit, which Minister von Dalwigk, much against his will, had to ask from the chamber, was granted unanimously. In Baden the grand duke, conscious of the harmony existing between himself and his people in the national question, ordered the mobilization of the army on the 16th; and on the 22nd the French ambassador received his passports. Communication between Kehl and Strasburg was severed on the 16th by the demolition of the floating bridge and the removal of the rails from the railroad bridge. On the 22nd every possibility of an invasion by rail was put an end to by the blowing up of a pier of the latter bridge. The day before, on the unfounded rumor that explosive bullets had been distributed to the Badish troops, the Badish ambassador in Paris had been informed by a functionary of the French ministry that if this report proved true France would resort to reprisals,

would regard Baden as excluded from the privileges of the law of nations, and lay waste the country as in Mèlac's time, not even sparing the women.

Both South and North were eager for war. Every one was infected with the national enthusiasm, and an amicable emulation and self-sacrificing devotion pervaded all classes, such as had never been seen before in Germany. "Now or never!" was the watchword of the whole country. The repulse of the foe who had brought on the war by his insulting arrogance was the immediate aim. If this were successfully accomplished it must certainly be followed by the political union of divided Germany, and in the center of Europe would stand a people feared on account of its compact and massive strength, as well as respected for its intellectual attainments. It was the thought that this high aim might now be achieved at one leap which lent such wonderful power to the German movement of 1870, arming the warriors with incredible valor and endurance, and setting victory before their eyes as absolutely enjoined upon them by duty and necessity.

Volunteers hurried from all sides, even from distant lands, to take their places in the army. Young men gave up the most advantageous positions in business or professions, the lecture

rooms of universities were vacated by lecturers and listeners, all inspired by the same motive, the rescue of the Fatherland. "Germany first!" was the proud cry with which the soldier grasped his gun, and the watchword of those who stayed behind to heal the wounded. Never and nowhere was such extensive and patriotic provision made for the wounded, for the widowed and orphaned, for the families of reserve and *Landwehr* soldiers, by the state, municipalities and private individuals, as in this war. From beginning to end the whole German people took part in the good work without cessation or intermission. Private persons, furthermore, subscribed large sums to reward individual acts of bravery, and the king of Prussia renewed (July 19) for the whole army the Order of the Iron Cross, which had originally been founded by his father.

The excellence of the military arrangements, the precision of Moltke's plan of campaign, which did not overlook the smallest trifle, and, in coöperation with these, Roon's energetic administration of the war department, rendered it possible to put large masses in the field at once, so that the mobilization, which was ordered on the 16th, was completed on the 26th; and eight days later the German armies were in position on the left bank of the Rhine. The strength of

these armies was as follows: the North German Confederation, including Hesse, put into the field 385,600 infantry, 48,000 cavalry and 1,284 guns; Bavaria, 50,000 infantry, 5,500 cavalry and 192 guns; Württemberg, 15,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 54 guns; Baden, 11,700 infantry, 1,800 cavalry and 54 guns. The total field army numbered, therefore, 462,300 infantry, 56,800 cavalry and 1,584 guns. In addition to this the garrisons, together with the troops intended to fill up gaps, numbered 297,500 infantry, 25,890 cavalry, 40,500 garrison artillery and 462 field guns. Consequently Germany had, according to reckoning, a total army, including field, fortress and reserve troops, of 882,900 men and 2,046 guns. But this number is in reality too low, for every state did more than was prescribed in the plan of mobilization. In the month of August, 1870, the actual effective strength was: for the North German Confederation 982,064 men and 209,403 horses; for Bavaria, 128,964 men and 24,056 horses; for Württemberg, 37,180 men and 8,876 horses; for Baden, 35,181 men and 8,038 horses; giving a grand total of 1,183,389 men of all arms and 250,373 horses.

As was the case in the invasion of Bohemia in 1866, the whole German army was divided into three parts, whose separate operations were regulated in accordance with one common plan.

The crown prince of Prussia was once more on the left wing, and Prince Frederick Charles in the center, while General Steinmetz (in 1866 General von Herwarth) was on the right. Lieutenant General von Blumenthal, Major General von Stiehle and Major General von Sperling were the respective chiefs of staff. The first army, under General Steinmetz, comprised the 7th and 8th army corps, numbering 61,000 men, with 180 guns. The second, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, consisted of six army corps—3rd, 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th and the Guard corps—and numbered 206,000 men, with 534 guns. The third, under the crown prince of Prussia, embraced five army corps—the 5th and 11th Prussian, the 1st and 2nd Bavarian and the two divisions of Württembergers and Badeners—amounting in all to 180,000 men, with 480 guns. This third army was in so far the most interesting that South German and North German troops were there united. It represented the unity of armed Germany, and the popular crown prince of Prussia was wisely chosen to command it. On his way to the army the prince visited the courts of Munich, Stuttgart and Karlsruhe, everywhere meeting with an enthusiastic reception.

On the supposition that the French army could not be mobilized with sufficient rapidity to

assume the offensive and cross the Rhine, Moltke's plan was that the first army should advance from Coblentz, its place of rendezvous, toward the Saar, at Saarbrücken; the second, from Bingen and Mainz toward the same river, at Saarbrücken and Saargemünd; and the third army, from Mannheim and Rastatt toward the Lauter, in the northeast corner of Alsace. The crown prince, whose army was at the outset closest to the French frontier, was to begin the campaign by driving the French left wing back across the Vosges and advancing as far as the Moselle. At the same time Prince Frederick Charles and Steinmetz were to push the French forces which should assemble before Metz back as far as that fortress, cut off their retreat to Châlons and Paris, oblige them to give battle at Metz, shut them up in that fortress or drive them northward toward the Belgian boundary, and so open the way to Paris for the third army and any other troops which might then be available. The plan was equally delicate and audacious; but, notwithstanding its delicacy and audacity, the military operations of the campaign were able actually to follow the course thus laid out.

Besides these three armies, with their thirteen army corps, there was at the beginning of the war a first reserve, composed of three and a half ad-

ditional army corps, containing 112,000 men. Of these the 1st and 2nd corps, which had been stationed on the north coast, to oppose any attack from French and Danish landing columns, were ordered to the front at Metz as soon as the first victories were won. The 6th army corps, which had been detailed to cover Silesia, on account of Austria's preparations for war, joined the crown prince's army in the month of August; and in September the 17th division was ordered to the front, where it later found an opportunity to distinguish itself by its conduct on the Loire. The provinces bordering on the theater of war and the coast districts of the North and Baltic Seas were put under martial law, and five governors general placed in command, of whom General Vogel von Falckenstein, who had so honorably distinguished himself by his conduct of the campaign on the Main in the year 1866, was appointed governor of Prussia (province), Pomerania, Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein, with his headquarters in Hanover. The 17th division, as well as the *Landwehr* division, which had been assigned to the defense of the coast, was placed under the command of the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

The commanders of the three great armies left Berlin on the 26th to join their troops at the appointed rendezvous. The king, accompanied

by Count Bismarck and Generals Moltke and Roon, left the capital on the 31st to assume the chief command over all the German forces. On the morning of August 2 he reached Mainz, where the general headquarters were established, and whence a proclamation was issued to the German army. At Mainz and in the three great armies all the strength of Germany was centered, and hence anxiety mingled with confidence as the whole German nation eagerly watched for news of the first encounter with the foe.

One of the peculiarities of French diplomacy at this crisis was that, while it had it in its power to delay the commencement of hostilities until France was ready to strike, it nevertheless declared war at a time when the French preparations were still in such a backward condition that not only was it impossible to assume the offensive, but even a satisfactory defensive was out of the question. The attitude of South Germany seriously thwarted Napoleon's plans. Considering the obstinate wrongheadedness of the ultramontanes and democrats as irresistible, he felt sure of the neutrality of Bavaria and Württemberg, until he learned that the orders to mobilize had actually been issued. To prevent the union of the southern troops with the northern he now proposed to carry out a part

of Niel's plan, and supply by rapidity what he lacked in numbers. The strength of the German field army he reckoned at 559,000 men and that of his own at 300,000. He proposed to make up for this almost twofold superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy by a quick and energetic initiative.

One hundred and fifty thousand men were to assemble at Metz, 100,000 at Strasburg and 50,000 in the camp at Châlons. He proposed to unite the two eastern armies and cross the Rhine at Maxau at the head of 250,000 men, thus forming an iron barrier, as it were, between North and South Germany, and compelling the southern states into neutrality, or perhaps even forcing upon them a new confederation of the Rhine. If successful in this, he hoped to secure the alliance of Italy and Austria, with both of which states promising negotiations had already been opened, and then it would be time to search out the Prussian army, which he estimated at 350,000 at the utmost, and scatter it by the proverbial *élan* of his brave soldiers. In the meantime the 50,000 men who had assembled in Châlons were to advance to Metz, in order to cover the rear of the army of operation and guard the northeastern frontier, while the appearance of a French fleet in the North and Baltic Seas, and the landing of French and Dan-

ish troops on the coast, was to draw off part of the Prussian forces.

The execution of this plan was possible only in case, simultaneously with the declaration of war, Napoleon could cross the Rhine with 250,000 men. But there were at that time not more than 100,000 in Metz and only 40,000 at Strasburg, while two divisions were still lacking at Châlons. Artillery and cavalry were not ready for action, not a single corps had a complete outfit for field service; and when Napoleon gave orders to hasten the arrival of the missing regiments, his orders did not meet with rapid obedience; under the pretext that Algeria, Paris and Lyons could not be stripped of their garrisons. Other things necessary for a campaign were also lacking. Great stores of provisions, ammunition and accoutrements had been accumulated, but, unfortunately, not where they were needed. The railroads were not properly equipped for such colossal transports of men and goods, nor had the officials any training in such matters; consequently everything was soon in hopeless confusion, and while the railroad stations were crowded with the necessities of war the fortresses were in dire need.

Under such circumstances there could be no thought of carrying out Napoleon's plan and assuming the offensive. Other hopes also

proved delusive. South Germany identified itself completely with the North so far as the war was concerned. The proposed alliances with Denmark, Austria and Italy depended for their signatures upon preliminary French successes. On Denmark's part there was no lack of inclination to invade Schleswig-Holstein and other Prussian territory as well, but there still existed so vivid a recollection of the experiences of 1864 that the government could not venture to act until 40,000 French troops appeared and genuine Napoleonic deeds of arms were reported from the theater of war. But troops for the North and Baltic Seas could not well be spared where soldiers were so scarce, and Napoleonic deeds of arms were wholly lacking.

In Austria, where an alliance with France had been in negotiation ever since the meeting of the two emperors in Salzburg in 1867, the opinion prevailed that the occasion for war had been badly chosen; nevertheless the war party, which had been strengthened by Beust's intrigues inspired by his hatred of Bismarck, thought the opportunity of humiliating Prussia and rehabilitating the Hapsburgs in their old position too precious to be lost. Hence the promise was given that preparations should be at once begun, and on their completion, in the month of September, war declared and an invasion of

Germany undertaken. A formal treaty of alliance between France and Austria had already been drawn up in St. Cloud and simply awaited ratification. But this plan was never carried out, for Austria could not mobilize so rapidly as Prussia, and before everything was ready the tempter of St. Cloud was safe behind bolts and bars.

Italy was in the peculiar position of being the ally of both France and Prussia. To the former she owed the possession of Lombardy, while to the latter she was indebted for Venetia; consequently one would have supposed that she was almost obliged to remain neutral. And yet it seems that the king, with a considerable party of generals and statesmen, could have been won for Napoleon if the latter had been willing to abandon to them Rome as the price of their assistance. Nothing less than this would have overcome the parliamentary opposition to a French alliance. But Napoleon, in whose programme the pope played so important a part, would not consent. Accordingly, Italy remained neutral and waited for a favorable opportunity to help herself. So far as results are concerned, the events of 1866 were repeated, Italy reaping the benefit of Prussian victories.

Accordingly, France remained isolated. Alone she had begun the war and alone she must end

it. The fine speeches of the French diplomats, and the journey of Thiers later to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Florence, wrought no change in this respect. Every state warmly advocated neutrality, however lax some of them were in the fulfillment of their neutral obligations—like England and the United States, which furnished the French ships with coal, and in the second stage of the war sold the French army the arms without which the governing powers could not have prosecuted the war. The Spanish government, forbidden by Gramont to insist upon its Hohenzollern candidate, dishonorably submitted to French dictation. Prince Leopold's resignation was accepted as final; and Prim, now minister-president, began to look about him for a new candidate.

Germany also entered upon the war without an ally, and she had cause to consider herself fortunate in having none. In 1814 and 1815, although she had borne the brunt of the conflict, she had received the jackal's share of the booty, while her wisest and most important recommendations and requests had been treated as so much waste paper. In 1870 Germany was strong enough alone to undertake the fight with France; and if victorious she would also be strong enough to disregard the officious recommendations of the tender-hearted brothers of

charity-in-other-men's-affairs, in London and elsewhere, and dictate a peace at her own pleasure, without consulting other interests than her own. But it was also fortunate for Germany that she had some one to cover her rear and make it possible for her almost completely to strip her eastern provinces of troops and concentrate her whole force at the seat of war.

That which kept Austria's sword in its sheath, and perhaps the swords of some other countries, too, was Emperor Alexander's announcement, at the beginning of the war, that he would remain neutral as long as the other powers did the same, but that, in case a third power interfered on the side of France, he would abandon his neutrality and act as Prussia's ally. By means of this resolute attitude on the part of the Russian emperor the war was localized and prevented from becoming European. In case Austria should be induced by any untoward turn of events to march her troops into Germany, the Russians would invade Austria and employ the opportunity to take revenge for 1854. At the end of the war (February 27, 1871), in a telegram to Emperor Alexander, King William expressed himself as follows: "Prussia will never forget that it is owing to you that the war did not assume the most extreme dimensions."

CHAPTER II

THE GREAT GERMAN VICTORIES

LIKE the Prussian king, the French emperor undertook in person the chief command of all his troops. General Lebœuf, the minister of war, was appointed chief of staff. July 23 Napoleon intrusted the regency to the empress for the period of his absence from Paris; and on the 24th she set out for Cherbourg to inspect the fleet before its departure for the North and Baltic Seas and dismiss it with a proclamation. On the 28th Napoleon, accompanied by his son, left for Metz to assume command of the army. The proclamation to the "Army of the Rhine," far from breathing the old confidence of victory, held in view "a long and toilsome war." The army consisted of eight corps. Of these, the 1st, under Marshal MacMahon, was stationed at Strasburg; the 2nd, under General Frossard, at St. Avold; the 3rd, under Marshal Bazaine, at Metz; the 4th, under General Ladmirault, at Diedenhofen (Thionville); the 5th, under General Faily, at Bitsch;

the 6th, under Marshal Canrobert, in the camp at Châlons; the 7th, under General Felix Douay, at Belfort; the 8th—the Imperial Guard—under General Bourbaki, at Nancy. Accordingly, the French forces were divided into two groups, the larger stationed on the Moselle and the smaller in Alsace. To the latter belonged the 1st and 7th corps, both of which were placed under the command of Marshal MacMahon, with orders to prevent the crown prince's army from entering Alsace. The larger group comprised the 2nd, 3rd and 4th corps, the 2nd being pushed forward as advance guard. The 6th and 8th were to have formed the reserve; but the greatly superior numbers of Prince Frederick Charles and Steinmetz, who were advancing against this larger group, necessitated the immediate bringing of those corps to the front. The connection between the two groups was to be maintained by the 5th corps, stationed at Bitsch.

Skirmishing of the advanced posts and collisions between reconnoitering parties began on the 19th of July. The most important of these minor engagements was that at Saarbrücken, on the 2nd of August. One thousand Germans (one battalion of fusiliers and three squadrons of uhlans), under Lieutenant Colonel von Pestel, were stationed at that place. In order to inform himself of the enemy's strength and send

the impatient Parisians news of victory, Napoleon ordered General Frossard's corps to advance, thus bringing about the so-called battle of Saarbrücken, where 1,000 Prussians were attacked by 30,000 Frenchmen. Napoleon, with his son, was present at the action, wishing to convince himself of the superiority of the *chassepots* and the effectiveness of the *mitrailleuses*. The French, occupying the heights of Spichern, on the left side of the Saar valley, opened fire upon Saarbrücken and its occupants from twenty-three guns, simultaneously advancing against the unfortified town. After a resistance of three hours the Prussians withdrew to the right bank of the river, and, leaving a force to occupy the opposite town of St. Johann and the railroad station at that place, bivouacked four or five miles away toward the northwest. Toward evening General Frossard entered Saarbrücken, but withdrew again to the heights without attempting a pursuit.

In this engagement, which was principally an artillery action, the Prussians lost four officers and seventy-nine men, and the French six officers and eighty men. News of the victory was at once dispatched to Paris, the emperor's telegram to Eugénie speaking of the young prince's "baptism of fire" and extolling his coolness and presence of mind. The press teemed with fan-

tastic compositions, imagining the army of the Rhine already before the gates of Mainz, and greeting this glorious feat of arms as "the sign of a new epoch."

This triumph was brief. August 4 the crown prince crossed the French frontier and attacked the town of Weissenburg, on the little river Lauter. MacMahon's advance guard, General Abel Douay's division, consisting of eleven battalions and four batteries, held the town and the strongly fortified Geisberg. Weissenburg was successfully carried by Prussian and Bavarian battalions combined, and the Geisberg by sixteen battalions of Prussians alone. General Douay fell in the fight. The French loss was 1,200 dead and wounded and 1,000 unwounded prisoners, of whom 30 were officers. The remainder of the defeated forces escaped to Wörth. The German loss was 91 officers and 1,460 men.

August 5 MacMahon with his corps took up his position at Wörth, fortifying the heights westward from Sauerbach, together with the villages of Froschweiler and Elsasshausen, in the intention of meeting at that place the advancing columns of the crown prince, whose attack he expected on the 7th. To strengthen his army sufficiently for the task required of it he endeavored to bring up General Felix Douay's corps from Belfort and Mühlhausen, and that of

General Failly from Bitsch; but only one division of the former arrived in time and a division of the latter which was sent to his support did not reach the neighborhood of the battlefield until the evening of the 6th, in time to afford a partial protection on the retreat. Consequently, MacMahon was left with not more than 45,000 men to face the crown prince's whole army.

It was the prince's intention to deliver a decisive battle on the 7th, as he could not undertake a concentric attack with all five corps before that time; but on the morning of the 6th the advance guard of the 5th corps became involved in a sharp action with the enemy at Wörth, while the 11th corps on the left and a Bavarian corps on the right also came into collision with the French on the two wings. There was, accordingly, no choice left but to continue the battle and concentrate as many troops as possible at the threatened points. In this way, from a mere skirmish of the advance guard resulted the decisive battle of Wörth. With the exception of the Badish division every corps ultimately took part in the battle. After Wörth itself had been carried, the fighting was most severe around the fortified village of Froschweiler. This was finally taken and a desperate charge of the French cuirassiers repulsed.

Thereupon MacMahon's army broke and fled in wild confusion, some toward the passes of the Vosges, others to Strasburg or Bitsch.

The fugitives were energetically followed, the pursuit continuing through the following day. The trophies of victory were numerous and valuable: 200 officers and 9,000 men prisoners, one eagle, four Turco banners, 28 cannon, 5 *mitrailleuses*, 23 wagons full of arms, 125 other wagons, 1,193 horses, and the army chest with 222,000 francs in gold. The French lost 6,000 dead and wounded; the German loss was 489 officers and 10,153 men—a loss greater than that of Sadowa. On the battlefield, where the victorious army bivouacked, went up that night from thousands of voices and hundreds of instruments the hymn "*Nun danket alle Gott*." MacMahon, with about 15,000 of his defeated troops, reached Zabern on the morning of the 7th, and set out thence for Châlons, whither Generals Douay and Failly were also directed to lead their forces. A new army was to be formed at that point, and northern Alsace was abandoned to the crown prince's victorious troops.


The Badish division received orders to march against Strasburg, and by the 9th the whole corps was assembled before that city, Hagenau having been taken by the cavalry on the way. General Urich, of Pfalzburg, the commandant,

was summoned to surrender, and on his refusal preparations for a siege were made, a regular siege corps being formed from the Badish division, a Prussian reserve division and the *garde-landwehr* division, and placed under the command of General Werder. With the remainder of the third army the crown prince left Wörth on the 8th of August, marched through the unguarded passes of the Vosges, and entered Nancy on the 16th. On the way the Württemberg troops took the small fortress of Lichtenburg and Lützelstein, and the Bavarians Marsal, while detachments were left behind to blockade Bitsch and Pfalzburg. At Nancy the prince rested for a few days and waited for decisive news from the Saar and Moselle.

A second victory had also been won on the 6th of August by the northern armies at Spichern. Like the battle of Wörth, this action was not the result of a strategical combination, but rather of a misunderstanding. According to Moltke's plan Frossard's corps, which was stationed on the heights of Spichern, was to be forced to beat a retreat by a simultaneous movement of the first and second armies threatening the French position in the rear of Forbach and Saargemünd. In case the French made a stand, they were to be overwhelmed by weight of numbers. On the morning of August 6, when

Generals Kameke and Rheinbaben with troops from the first and second armies arrived in the neighborhood of Saarbrücken, they were led by the reports of their reconnoitering parties to suppose that Frossard was already in full retreat. Wishing to inflict upon the retiring foe as much damage as possible, they at once attacked, driving the French outposts back to the steep and woody heights of Spichern, where they for the first time ascertained that Frossard's whole corps was before them. Holding it irreconcilable with their honor to yield ground which had once been won, and retreat across the Saar, they continued the uneven combat, a single division maintaining the battle for four hours against three divisions of the foe, with numerous artillery and an extraordinarily favorable situation.

After three o'clock other divisions of both the German armies began little by little to reach the field of battle, attracted by the thunder of the cannonading, so that finally 27,000 Germans were matched against 40,000 French. Some battalions at length succeeded in gaining a footing on the heights and planting twelve guns there. The resolution and endurance of the German soldiers were almost unexampled. The Brandenburg grenadier regiment alone lost 35 officers and 771 men. After the heights had been won



King William rejoices with his soldiers after the decisive victory at Vionville.

Glümer's division advanced against the French left wing, defeated it and threatened the enemy's line of retreat. Thereupon the French retired, the movement here and there degenerating into actual flight. As the Forbach road was already occupied by the enemy, Frossard fell back on Metz by way of Saargemünd. Bazaine, who, although not more than seven or eight miles from the field of battle, had made no attempt to come to Frossard's assistance, led his corps to the same place. In this battle, owing to the unfavorable nature of the ground, the losses of the conquerors were heavier than those of the conquered. The Germans had 223 officers and 4,648 men dead, wounded and missing; while the French, according to their own reports, lost 249 officers and 3,829 men, 2,000 of whom were taken prisoners.

August 7 the victors continued their forward march, capturing great stores of provisions in Forbach. On the 9th St. Avold was taken and foraging parties advanced almost to Metz. Marching through the Rhenish Palatinate, part of Prince Frederick Charles's army directed its course toward Metz by way of Saarbrücken, and part through Saargemünd. On receipt of the news of the victory the king left Mainz, arriving at Saarbrücken on the 9th and St. Avold on the 11th. Here he issued a proclamation to the

French people to the effect that he was waging war against soldiers and not citizens, and that the latter should not be molested in person or property so long as they were guilty of no hostilities toward the German troops.

In the imperial headquarters at Metz the greatest consternation prevailed. In the first moment of alarm it was decided that the whole army should fall back on Châlons, leaving a garrison of only 20,000 men in Metz, and that the emperor should return to Paris. Other counsels, however, soon prevailed, and it was decided to concentrate five army corps on the right bank of the Moselle, at Metz, and to form a second army, consisting of four corps, under MacMahon's command, in the camp at Châlons. The first line of defense on the Rhine and Saar had been abandoned and France was to be defended on the Moselle. By this decision Alsace and Lorraine were surrendered to the foe at the very outset. Everything now centered on the banks of the Moselle. Paris, in the very midst of its wild intoxication and imagined victory, was terribly undeceived by the news of August 6. The opposition in the lower house spoke openly of the incapacity of the emperor, the necessity of his surrender of the chief command, and even of his abdication. In the excitement of the moment some one administered to Gramont a box

on the ear, and Ollivier narrowly escaped a like indignity. A vote of censure against the ministry for their deficient preparations was moved and carried, whereupon the Gramont-Ollivier ministry resigned, and on the 10th a purely Bonapartist cabinet was formed, with Count Palikao (General Montauban) as president.

Under such conditions the retention of the chief command, with its consequent responsibility before all the world for the defeats of his marshals and generals, had no farther attractions for the emperor. August 9 he resigned his position as commander-in-chief and appointed Marshal Bazaine as his successor, while Lebœuf at the same time withdrew from the direction of the staff. The whole energy of the government was now directed toward the strengthening of France's insufficient military organization. New levies were called into the field, comprising all unmarried men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty not already enrolled in the *garde mobile*; the project of sending troops to the Baltic was definitely abandoned, and even the soldiers stationed in the states of the Church for the protection of the pope were recalled, leaving Pius to his fate and the discretion of the Italian government. The provisioning of Paris was pushed forward with all speed, and the Germans resident in France, whose departure had been pre-

vented at the outbreak of the war, were now expelled with circumstances of indefensible brutality.

The maritime operations, not being supported by landing troops, were attended with small success. The entrances to the German harbors were well guarded by batteries and torpedoes, so that the French fleet could accomplish nothing farther than a couple of months' blockade and the capture of a few merchantmen. One division of the fleet had sailed for the Baltic in July; a second was dispatched to the North Sea in August; and a third followed the second in October. With the exception of a couple of insignificant actions at Hiddensee and Danzig, on the 17th and 21st of August, nothing worth mention in the way of naval operations occurred, and the fleets returned home.

In the German headquarters, which had been at St. Avoird since the 11th of August, it was resolved in some way to make Bazaine's army harmless, either by shutting him up in Metz or by pushing him northward to the Belgian frontier. With this end in view, the first army, under General Steinmetz, was to take up a position on the right bank of the Moselle and hold the French troops there as long as possible, preventing them from attacking the Germans in their passage of the river above Metz. In the mean-

time, by forced marches the second army, under Prince Frederick Charles, was to cross the river at Novéant and Pont-à-Mousson, where the bridges had not been destroyed, anticipate any attempt on the part of the French to retreat by occupying the road to Verdun, and hold them in check before Metz until all the corps of the first and second armies were on the left bank of the Moselle, in position to undertake a decisive battle. The task was a difficult one, and it was questionable whether all the parts of the various corps could accomplish the long march from St. Avold to the Verdun road in time to effect the desired result. All depended upon what course Bazaine might conclude to pursue and the energy with which he executed his plans. It was his purpose to leave Metz with the field army and join MacMahon at Châlons. There would then be 300,000 French at that place to block the German march to Paris. In that event the Germans would have to leave 60,000 men before Metz—which was adequately provisioned for a small garrison—and Diedenhofen, and would not have enough left to venture an attack on the united and well-intrenched armies at Châlons. Accordingly, the union of those two armies must be prevented at any price and Bazaine be attacked before Metz. The execution of this plan led to the severe fighting near

that city—the battle of Colombey-Nouilly (Borny), on the 14th, Vionville on the 16th, and Gravelotte on the 18th. On the 14th, before the fighting began, Napoleon, with his son, left Metz for Châlons by way of Verdun.

Bazaine made the great mistake of not carrying out with sufficient energy the retreat to Verdun and Châlons, which had already been determined upon on the 12th. On the morning of the 14th the order to march was given. As soon as the advance guard of the 7th Prussian corps perceived this retrograde motion on the part of the enemy, it assumed the offensive with the object of delaying the purposed retreat, and was supported by the 1st army corps, which had arrived in the very nick of time. The attack was directed against part of the 4th French corps and the 3rd corps, commanded by Decaen—who had taken Bazaine's place—which were still on the left bank, the rest of the army having already crossed the river. The battle lasted from half past three in the afternoon until nine o'clock in the evening, ending in the retreat of the enemy to the fortifications of Metz. The positions which he still held at the end of the day he evacuated during the night, withdrawing altogether behind the protecting outer forts. The result of this improvised battle was such a delay on the part of the French that two days

later the Germans were able effectually to bar all further attempts at retreat. The loss on the German side in the battle of Colombey-Nouilly (Borny) was about 5,000, including 222 officers, while the French lost 3,408 men and 200 officers.

Bazaine did not yet perceive the necessity of hastening his retreat, and was trapped in the great battle of Vionville. On the morning of the 16th all his troops were on the left bank of the Moselle, on the road to Verdun, but the lack of supplies prevented any considerable advance. The roads were completely blocked up by the baggage train, and that part of the army which was following the southern road from Grave-lotte to Verdun lay encamped on the plateau of Rezonville and Vionville. In this position it was attacked at ten o'clock in the morning of the 16th by the 3rd Prussian army corps—the Brandenburgers—under General von Alvensleben II, at Vionville. For six whole hours this corps, assisted by two cavalry divisions and an infantry brigade from the 10th, sustained the struggle against three French corps, taking the villages of Vionville and Flavigny, and driving Frossard back.

Somewhat after two o'clock Canrobert advanced against the German center, while Lebœuf—commanding the 3rd corps in the place of Decaen, who had been badly wounded on the

14th—attempted to turn the left wing of the Brandenburgers and take them in the rear. Alvensleben, merely to gain time until reinforcements should arrive, dispatched Bredow's cavalry brigade against Canrobert's batteries and infantry. The cuirassiers and uhlans broke through the hostile ranks, shattering them so completely that Canrobert's advance was abandoned, the French being convinced, furthermore, that such a charge would not have been undertaken unless the assaulting party had a large force behind it. The cavalry who had participated in this daring ride into death, 900 in number, were so terribly cut up that of six squadrons only two returned.

Soon after this charge, at half past three o'clock, Prince Frederick Charles arrived upon the field and assumed the command. At four o'clock the Hanoverians began to come up on the left wing. The two corps of Lebœuf and Ladmirault made a new effort to outflank the Germans, and a warm action on the heights of Bruville ensued. Again a cavalry charge was resorted to. This time it was the Guard dragoons, under Count Brandenburg, who were intrusted with the task. They broke their way through the ranks of the opposing infantry, but themselves lost almost all their officers and a large part of their men. Then followed a bril-

liant cavalry engagement between twelve French and six German regiments, in which the former were defeated, relieving the left wing from all further attack. Bazaine next attempted to turn the right wing; but reënforcements arrived from the 8th and 9th corps, and the enemy was repulsed. Late on the same evening the Germans in their turn made an attack with infantry and artillery on the French center; but Bazaine had planted fifty-four guns there, and no impression could be made. Between nine and ten o'clock, after twelve hours of hard fighting, darkness put an end to the battle. When the French at length realized the German plan they fought with desperate valor in the attempt to break through, but the Brandenburgers and Hanoverians on their part maintained their position with unwavering fortitude and daring courage. The loss on the side of the Germans was 711 officers and 15,079 men, while the French reckoned their losses at 879 officers and 16,128 men. The number of Germans who took part in this battle—on the whole the most brilliant of the war—was 60,000, to whom was opposed double that number of French.

Even now, when the danger of being shut up in Metz was so imminent, Bazaine made no attempt to break through at all hazards, but instead, fearing that his communications with the

fortress might be broken, drew back his troops toward Metz, and awaited the attack of the enemy in a position rendered strong both by nature and by art. On the right wing, at St. Privat, stood Canrobert; on the left, at St. Hubert and Rozerieulles, Frossard; in the center, to the right, at Amanvillers, Ladmirault; to the left, at Leipzig and Moscou, Lebœuf; while the Guard corps was stationed behind the center as a reserve. Before these positions on the morning of the 18th stood seven German army corps, and by evening they were joined by an eighth, the Pomeranian. Only the 1st corps was left behind on the right bank of the Moselle. According to orders from headquarters the Guards and the Saxons were to operate against St. Privat, the 8th and 7th corps against Rozerieulles, and the 9th, in the center, against Amanvillers, while the 3rd and 10th, which had been roughly handled at Vionville, formed the reserve. The enemy was to be driven out of all his positions, forced from the open field back to the guns of Metz and into the fortress itself, and shut up there. This was Moltke's plan for the battle of Gravelotte, the first battle in the war in which a prearranged plan was actually carried out.

King William assumed the chief command in person in this tremendous struggle of Grave-

lotte. At twelve o'clock the battle began. The 9th corps, advancing against Ladmirault's position at Amanvillers, was attacked on the right and left by Lebœuf and Canrobert, but succeeded toward evening in taking the foremost heights, and, after the capture of St. Privat had laid bare his right wing, forced Ladmirault to abandon his position and retire to the fortress.

On the left wing the Saxons took the village of St. Marie-aux-chênes, and attempted to turn Canrobert's position, for the purpose of falling upon his left flank simultaneously with the attack of the Guards in front. As this maneuver consumed more time than had been expected, the commander of the Guards, Prince Augustus of Württemberg, undertook an attack in front without waiting for the completion of the flank movement; but his men were exposed to such a deadly fire in crossing the open ground before the French position that it became evident the assault was premature, and after suffering terrible losses it was abandoned. Between six and seven the Saxons reached the desired position, and the Guards again advanced to the charge. Attacked on two sides, the village was taken at seven o'clock, and Canrobert's forces driven back into the city.

On the right wing everything did not work

so smoothly as could have been desired. After three unsuccessful attempts the little hamlet of St. Hubert was finally taken, but Rozerieulles still remained in the hands of the French; and at seven o'clock the latter, assuming the offensive, even descended into the ravine and attempted to scale the heights of Gravelotte. They were at length beaten back by the artillery; and the Pomeranian corps, which had just arrived on the field, followed up the advantage, carrying all the enemy's outlying intrenchments. As darkness fell, Frossard was in possession of his main positions only, and during the night these also were evacuated.

It was a brilliant victory, and followed by important results. Bazaine's army was shut up in the fortress and among the outlying forts, and rendered unavailable for further service in the field. The losses of the French amounted to about 13,000 men, including 600 officers; the German loss was 899 officers and 19,260 men, of whom 328 officers and 4,909 men were killed outright. The number of combatants on the side of the French was about 140,000, on the side of the Germans 178,818, the former having 550 and the latter 822 cannon. It must be remembered, however, that the French occupied a position very much of the nature of a fortress, which had to be carried by storm, and for the

most part without any protection for the storming parties.

This victory was scarcely won when new plans were developed by the strategists at German headquarters. For the blockade of Metz a siege army was formed, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of seven corps, two cavalry divisions, Kummer's reserve division and one reserve cavalry brigade. General Steinmetz was relieved of his command, for reasons which are not yet clearly ascertained (various as accounts may be in other respects, they yet all agree in assigning essential insubordination toward Prince Frederick Charles as one cause of his removal), and appointed governor of Posen. The Guard corps, the Saxon troops, the 4th corps and the 1st and 2nd Bavarian corps were formed into a new army, the fourth or Maas army, the command of which was intrusted to Albert, Crown Prince of Saxony. This army and that of the crown prince of Prussia were to carry out the further field operations, under the chief command of King William. In the meantime the Prussian crown prince had been joined by the 6th army corps, which had been left behind in Silesia at the beginning of the war, so that the two armies together consisted of eight and a half army corps and four cavalry divisions. The immediate ob-

jective of their operations was MacMahon's army at Châlons. This had been raised to about 150,000 men, and consisted of the 1st, 5th, 7th and 12th corps—it is characteristic of the French organization at that time that the 9th, 10th and 11th did not exist—commanded by Generals Ducrot, Faily, Douay and Lebrun.

Before any certain information had been received by Napoleon and MacMahon regarding the events before Metz it had been resolved in a council of war that the emperor should at once return to Paris and resume the government, and that MacMahon should follow with the army. The empress and Count Palikao were strongly opposed to the execution of this plan, and sent word to Châlons that the emperor's return would be the signal for a revolution in Paris. According to them the army was more necessary for the support of Bazaine than for the protection of the capital, which was rendered impregnable by its forts.

Although MacMahon did not share this view, yet, constantly urged by Palikao to go to the relief of Metz, he set out on the 21st of August from Châlons for Rheims, accompanied by the emperor, who in this whole crisis displayed lamentable irresolution, weakness and general inefficiency. From Rheims he marched on the 24th to Rethel, with the intention of crossing

the Maas at Stenay and there forming a junction with Bazaine, in case the latter should succeed in breaking out. If the attempt to break out failed, then MacMahon was to march up the right bank of the Maas toward Metz, and endeavor to release him from the iron chain in which he was bound. This plan, for which Palikao was responsible, was exceedingly hazardous, as it gave the two German field armies an opportunity to cut off his communications and drive him across the Belgian frontier, or force him to engage in battle against superior numbers. For its execution, in which respect it resembled Bazaine's plan of retreat from Metz, the important question was whether he could reach the Maas in time or not. He did not reach it, ascertaining on the 27th that Stenay was already occupied by the Germans.

August 24, as soon as MacMahon's departure from Châlons and the direction of his march became known in German headquarters, the third and fourth armies set out with all speed for the North, the latter from Verdun and the former from Vitry, farther to the South, in order to prevent his junction with Bazaine. The plan was to force MacMahon's army up toward the Belgian frontier, surround it on three sides, and leave him no other choice than either to lead his whole army into Belgium and be disarmed or,

in case he deemed that incompatible with his military honor, to venture a battle against superior numbers, and after an honorable struggle surrender with all his forces. The Germans hastened forward by forced marches, the fourth army on the right, the third on the left. The former gained Stenay before the French, rendering the passage of the Maas at that point impracticable.

On the 27th and 29th there was fighting at Buganzy, Nouart and Voncq, and on the 30th Faily's corps was surprised at Beaumont. In the meantime the Bavarians in the third army had driven in Douay's corps, so that MacMahon saw no better chance of escape than to throw himself with his army into the neighboring fortress of Sedan. Here he occupied the hills which shut in the fortress on three sides, stationing Lebrun's corps on the right wing, at Bazeilles; Douay on the left, at Illy and Floing; Ducrot in the center, at Moncelle and Daigny; and Wimpffen in the Garenne forest, as reserve. The last-named general had been appointed in place of General Faily, who had just been removed on account of his conduct on the 6th of August.

August 31 the Germans advanced against Sedan in order to encircle it with the iron ring of their unyielding troops. The attack on the

east side, at Bazeilles and Balan, was committed to the 1st Bavarian corps, supported in the rear by the 4th Prussian and on the left by the 2nd Bavarian. The 5th and 11th corps were to carry the positions on the west and northwest, while the Saxons and the Guards were to advance in the center. The Württemberg division was detailed to watch the fortress of Mezières and render any assistance from that side impossible. The 6th corps was stationed farther west, at Attigny, in order to block MacMahon's way in case he escaped westward.

The great and decisive battle of Sedan thus began between four and five o'clock in the morning of September 1st, at the village of Bazeilles. After the severest fighting—the marines, probably the best soldiers in the French army, were stationed at this point—for several hours, in which the villagers themselves took part, the Bavarians, supported by the 4th corps, finally took the place by storm. At three o'clock in the afternoon Balan was also taken, and toward evening the Bavarians stood before the gates of Sedan. On their right the Saxons and the Guards had taken the villages in the valley and stormed the heights on the other side, while to the northwest the victors of Weissenburg and Wörth had captured heights and villages, and repulsed numerous charges of the

French cavalry. From all sides the defeated troops flocked into the narrow space between Sedan and the forest of Garenne. The German artillery, commanding the whole circle, was in a favorable position to hurl death and destruction into this despairing mob and compel an unconditional surrender. Some time after four o'clock in the afternoon bombshells fell into the town and set some houses on fire, and each moment the situation of the French troops became more untenable.

At length the emperor, seeing that further resistance was hopeless, planted a flag of truce on the walls of the fortress and sent General Reille to King William to offer him his sword. The king accepted it, on condition that the French army should lay down its arms. That evening, in Donchery, Bismarck and Moltke met General Wimpffen—who, since seven o'clock in the morning, when MacMahon was wounded by the explosion of a shell, had held the chief command—to negotiate regarding the capitulation. On the following morning Napoleon had a meeting with Bismarck at the same place, in the hope of securing better conditions. The capitulation was finally concluded in the course of the morning of the 2nd. At one o'clock in the afternoon of the same day took place the meeting between Napoleon and King William, and

on the following day Napoleon set out as prisoner of war for the palace of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel.

The trophies of the victory consisted of one eagle, two colors, 419 field guns and *mitrailleuses*, 139 pieces of fortification ordnance, 1,072 wheeled vehicles of all sorts, 66,000 stand of arms, 6,000 serviceable horses, 83,000 prisoners from the capitulation (including Marshal MacMahon, 40 generals, 230 staff officers and 2,595 officers of the line), 21,000 unwounded prisoners taken in the battle, and—as the telegraph reported—one emperor. Fourteen thousand French had been wounded in the battle, 3,000 killed, and 3,000 had escaped to Belgium and been disarmed. Accordingly, the whole strength of MacMahon's army, which had thus been utterly annihilated, was 124,000 men. The prisoners were transported to Germany, and placed under military guard at various places. The officers were allowed to return to France on giving a written promise not to serve against Germany during the remainder of the war. Five hundred officers signed such a pledge; but all did not keep their word, some, like Generals Ducrot and Cambriels, escaping on the way. The German loss in dead and wounded was 460 officers and 8,500 men.

The rejoicing of the German army was un-

bounded. Nothing seemed any longer impossible. In every corner of Germany there was a mighty outburst of enthusiasm when the telegraph brought the news, "Emperor and army taken," and the confidence in the ability of the German leaders was unlimited. Foreign countries were filled with astonishment, and those which had had some thought of taking part in the war now became as peaceful as though they themselves had met with a Sedan.

CHAPTER III

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF PARIS

SEPTEMBER 2 King William made the round of his victorious troops, and the unanimous cry of the soldiers was, "To Paris!" An hour after the conclusion of the capitulation of Sedan, on the selfsame day, the order to march was given. On the 3rd the troops set forward; and on the 19th six and a half army corps and three divisions of cavalry, numbering in all 122,661 infantry and 24,325 cavalry, with 622 guns, stood before the French capital. This army was not large enough to blockade such an enormous city, and at the same time repulse any relief armies which might be formed, and accordingly in the next few weeks the two corps which had been left behind at Sedan—the 17th infantry division, under the grand duke of Mecklenburg, and a *gardelandwehr* division—were also brought up; so that on the 21st of October the total strength of the blockading army was nine and a half corps and four divisions of cavalry, numbering in all

202,030 infantry and 33,794 cavalry, with 898 guns. The third army, under the crown prince of Prussia, guarded the southern half circle; and the fourth army, under the crown prince of Saxony, the northern, the lines of each extending from the Marne to the Seine. Only one mishap occurred on the road to Paris. On the 9th of September, after the capitulation had been signed, the citadel of Laon was blown into the air by a French non-commissioned officer, with the result that 100 Germans and 400 French were killed or wounded.

On their arrival before Paris the German armies found the imperial government already overthrown, to the inevitable protraction of the war. Palikao's ministry had kept the chambers and the people in complete ignorance in regard to the fighting before Metz and its results, for weeks maintaining themselves on lies; and it was not until the 3rd of September, when all the foreign papers were full of Sedan, that they found themselves compelled, both in the chambers and in a proclamation to the people, to acknowledge that Bazaine had been defeated and shut up in Metz, MacMahon's army had capitulated at Sedan, and the emperor was a prisoner. Jules Favre, in the lower house, at once moved the deposition of Napoleon and his dynasty and the establishment of a provisional government.

The ministry, on the other hand, asked for the formation of a committee of government and defense, consisting of five members, and the appointment of Palikao as governor general. These measures were to come to a discussion in the sitting of September 4, at five P.M.; but, as on the 24th of February, 1848, at the time appointed the hall was full of workingmen and soldiers demanding the deposition of the emperor and the proclamation of a republic. Ill at ease in such a company as this, the ministers and the members of the Right hurried off.

Gambetta proclaimed the Napoleon family dethroned in perpetuity. Then arose a general cry, "To the City Hall!" and, escorted by thousands, the members of the Left made their way thither. The empress had fled from the Tuileries at one o'clock on the same day. She reached in safety the little coast town of Deauville, and on the 9th of September was landed on the English coast. There she met her son, who had parted from his father on the way from Châlons to Sedan and journeyed to England by way of Belgium. Both of them took up their residence at Chislehurst, in the neighborhood of London, where they were joined by Napoleon on the 20th of March, 1871, after the close of the war; and there the ex-emperor died, on the 9th of January, 1873.

The provisional government in the City Hall assumed the official title of "The Government of National Defense." It had been set up by the radical delegates representing the city of Paris, and its members were chosen wholly from their number. The names of the eleven members of this government were: Favre, Gambetta, Simon, Picard, Pelletan, Cremieux, Ferry, Glais-Bizoin, Emanuel Arago, Garnier-Pagès and Rochefort. To his honor Thiers, who had been offered a seat in this body, declined. General Trochu was named president, and at the same time governor general of the capital. Favre was vice president and minister of foreign affairs, and Gambetta was minister of the interior. It could not be regarded as a legal government, with which negotiations might be opened and treaties concluded, inasmuch as it had been chosen by the Parisians only, and hence represented the capital, and not the French people at large. Elections for a constitutional assembly, which could have given this government its sanction or a successor, were ordered for October; but the government was not in earnest in its endeavors to bring together such a body, nor were the times propitious. "The Government of National Defense" was merely *de facto*, exercising a sort of dictatorship. Proclamations and decrees were issued *ad libitum*. The re-

public was formally proclaimed, the lower house dissolved, and the senate abolished. The Germans still remaining in Paris were compelled to leave under penalty of martial law.

Measures were taken for fortifying and provisioning the city and calling new forces into the field. In consequence of the enormous influx of fugitives, the population rose to about 2,400,000. Outside of the city walls were fifteen forts, as well as defenses of other descriptions, which were in part provided with heavy marine ordnance. The line of defense had a circuit of about thirty miles, and the army defending that line numbered more than 400,000 men. The two corps of Generals Vinoy and Renault, numbering about 60,000, together with 18,000 marines, formed the core of the Parisian army. The remainder consisted of 100,000 soldiers of the *garde mobile* from the neighboring departments and 30,000 from Paris, with 200,000 or more national guards from the capital, all of whom were of very doubtful value. In comparison with King William's thoroughly disciplined troops, they were nothing more than a street mob. But everything connected with the defense was on such a colossal scale that a siege of the most arduous and tedious description was to be expected. Notwithstanding the enormous number of inhabitants, there was a

sufficient supply of provisions for more than four months, and not for six or eight weeks only, as had been at first supposed at German headquarters.

To take so well fortified a city by storm would have been a most arduous enterprise even for a far more numerous army than that of the Germans. The opening of an energetic bombardment required a park of about 300 siege guns, with the necessary ammunition; and as the railroads, which had considerable difficulties of one sort and another to contend with, were fully occupied with the transport of additional forces and provisions, this could not be set in place before the end of the year. Consequently there was no other course than to surround the city, completely cutting off all communication with the outside world, and reducing it to a state of isolation. Paris must be cast on its own resources for defense and provisions.

It soon became evident that there would be two modes of opposition to be encountered in the execution of this plan: first, sallies of the Parisians for the purpose of driving back the besiegers, breaking through their lines, and operating in their rear; and, secondly, the formation of provincial armies, which were to advance to the relief of the city, and, in concert with the Parisian garrison, compel the Germans to raise

the siege. The latter mode of opposition was essentially the work of Gambetta, who on the 6th of October left Paris in a balloon for Tours, where he set up an outside government, assumed the direction of the war department in addition to that of the interior, and at last exercised a provisional dictatorship. He made every effort to arouse the national hatred against the Germans and array under the French banner for the defense of their country all who were capable of bearing arms. Under his direction large forces were collected on the Loire and to the north and west of Paris, and finally the communications of the besiegers with Germany were threatened. To him, therefore, was due the prolongation of the war; and on him also rests the responsibility for the more bloody character which it now assumed, and the severer nature of the wounds inflicted on his country. Nothing more than this could be achieved, for his generals were no match for Moltke's strategy, and their soldiers were scarcely better disciplined than the *garde mobile* in Paris.

By the 5th of October King William's headquarters were in Versailles, but before that time some important diplomatic documents had been already written and some oral negotiations had taken place. In a circular note of September 6 Favre claimed that since the overthrow of

the empire the king of Prussia had no reason for the continuation of hostilities, inasmuch as the present government had not been in favor of the war. At the same time he announced that if war were forced upon them he and his colleagues would not prove remiss in its prosecution; they would throw the whole responsibility for its continuance upon the king of Prussia; but, whatever might be the result, not a single foot of land nor so much as a solitary stone of a French fortress should be surrendered to the Germans.

To this document Bismarck replied, in his circular note of September 13, that since senate, popular representatives and press had almost unanimously pronounced in favor of the war, it could not be claimed that the country had not wished it and that only the imperial government was responsible. Furthermore, Germany must expect a war of revenge on the part of France, even if she exacted no cession of territory and levied no money indemnity, contenting herself merely with the glory she had won; this being the case, she must consider her own security, and, by strengthening her boundaries on the side toward France seek to render more difficult the next French attack on Germany, and especially on the hitherto unprotected South German frontier.

As the neutral powers, with the exception of Russia, took part with France, and seemed inclined to interfere in any negotiations for peace which might be opened between the two belligerents in order to shield France from all oppressive conditions, and as Thiers was at that very time making his European tour for the accomplishment of that result, Bismarck issued a second circular note on the 16th of September. In this he recommended the powers not to prolong the war by cherishing among the French people any hope of intervention, since Germany had conducted the war alone and would alone settle the terms of peace regardless of any attempted intervention, from whatsoever source. It was the fixed determination of the German governments and German people, he said, to protect Germany against French attacks by better boundaries, and the fortresses of Metz and Strasburg, which in French hands had been gates of invasion constantly open toward Germany, must come into the possession of the latter, a transfer through which they would acquire a purely defensive character.

The Parisian government, which since the annihilation of the French armies had been so ardent an advocate and admirer of peace, was desirous first of all to ascertain under what conditions King William would consent to a sus-

pension of hostilities. With this object Favre requested an interview with Bismarck, and held several conversations with him at Ferrières on the 19th and 21st of September. In these conversations Favre asserted that the most to which France could consent was the payment of a war indemnity, and that it could never agree to a cession of territory. For the decision of this matter it was necessary to elect a national assembly, by which a regular government might be set up, and for the election of this assembly a truce of fourteen to twenty-one days was requisite, and such a truce France accordingly requested. Bismarck replied that a truce was not to the interest of Germany from a military point of view, and could, therefore, be granted only on consideration of the surrender of the fortresses of Strasburg, Toul and Bitsch. As the Parisian government would not consent to these conditions, the negotiations were broken off, and Favre and the other French diplomats complained in new circular notes of the intention of Prussia to reduce France to the condition of a second-rate power. The absurdity and falsity of the assumption that a country with 38,000,000 inhabitants, or, including Algeria, 42,000,000, could be reduced to the condition of a second-rate power by the cession of territory containing about one and a half million was

clearly brought out by Bismarck in his dispatch of October 1.

A few weeks later negotiations were resumed, and this time Thiers, now returned from his tour of the European courts, appeared in Versailles (November 1) as negotiator. Again the question at issue was a suspension of hostilities, to afford an opportunity for the holding of the much-talked-of elections. Not only would Gambetta have used this respite of about four weeks for the collection of new forces, Thiers even demanded permission to provision Paris unmolested; and when Bismarck in astonishment asked what France offered in return for all these concessions, he did not hesitate to answer—nothing. Of course this brought the negotiations to an end. The republican government was childishly defiant, the victim of a sort of crazy sense of its own importance.

In every war where France had been the victor she had imposed hard conditions on her vanquished foes, never omitting to exact a cession of territory. Quite recently, in the Italian War of 1859, after the victories of Magenta and Solferino, she had exacted from Austria the cession of Lombardy, and no reasonable human being in all Europe doubted that, in case France had come out victor in the present war, the left bank of the Rhine would have been lost to Ger-

many. Yet France had the impertinence to demand from the foe, so much of whose territory she had in former centuries appropriated, and whom she had intended in the present war to rob of her finest provinces, that she should respect the French boundaries in their full extent, regard French territory as sacred and inviolable, and not attempt to win back even those provinces which had originally been German. Such arrogant pretensions could be answered only by new defeats. The humiliation must be still more severe, and Paris must have a still more bitter taste of need before France could learn that every people, even the French, must pay the penalty of its sins.

It was again necessary to resort to arguments from the cannon's mouth, and both at Paris and at other points the iron controversy at once commenced. On the first day of the investment, September 19, the Parisians, numbering about 40,000 men, made a sortie on the side toward Chatillon, but were repulsed by Prussian and Bavarian troops and returned to Paris in disgraceful flight. The sallies on the 30th of September and the 13th and 21st of October met with no better success. October 28 the French succeeded in taking the feebly garrisoned village of Le Bourget, to the north of Paris; but on the 30th they were dislodged from this posi-

tion by a division of the Guards. In Paris great dissatisfaction prevailed in consequence of these constant defeats. Taking advantage of this for the purpose of overthrowing the government and establishing the Commune, the social-democrats effected an uprising on the 31st of October and 1st of November, and for a few hours held possession of the City Hall. The Parisians now rested all their hopes on the armies of relief which had been formed outside, and passed a few weeks in quiet, awaiting their action.

The first attempt to relieve the capital was made from the side of the Loire, where an army corps assembled under the command of General de la Motterouge, and began an advance from Orléans toward Paris. The 1st Bavarian corps, under General von der Tann, Wittich's infantry division, and two cavalry divisions were sent out to meet them. On the 10th and 11th of October the French were beaten at Artenay and other places, and driven back across the Loire; and on the evening of the 11th von der Tann entered Orléans. Leaving the Bavarians to hold that city, the remaining troops were employed to capture Chateaudun, Chartres and Dreux, to the northwest of Orléans, and put to flight the parties of *garde mobile* and *franc-tireurs* which they there encountered.

Gambetta, who had joined to himself M. de Freycinet, formerly a mining engineer, as a sort of adviser in military matters, called out all the men between the ages of twenty-five and forty, organized five new army corps, and established special drill camps for the instruction of the new recruits. After the defeat at Orléans General de la Motterouge was removed, and General Aurelle de Paladines appointed in his place. The new general crossed the Loire with two corps, and directed his march toward the road leading from Paris to Orléans, with the intention of severing the communications of the Bavarian general. On the first news of this maneuver von der Tann abandoned Orléans, leaving his sick behind him, and set out for Paris. After an obstinate engagement with the enemy at Coulmiers on his retreat, November 9, he finally took up a position at Toury, thus blocking the road to Paris. Another infantry division was sent from Versailles to von der Tann's assistance, and the united forces placed under the command of the grand duke of Mecklenburg. Notwithstanding all Gambetta's urgency, General Aurelle with his poorly equipped troops, now numbering four corps, would not venture an attack upon this force, to whose assistance, furthermore, Prince Frederick Charles, with three additional corps, was hastening by

forced marches. He accordingly intrenched himself before Orléans and awaited the attack of the Germans there. This sealed the fate of his troops and freed the army of investment before Paris from all further danger on that side.

In the meantime great successes had been achieved in the East—successes important partly for themselves, and partly because of the possibility they afforded of new and more extensive operations. The fortress of Toul capitulated on the 23rd of September, opening the railroad between Strasburg and Paris. The capitulation of Strasburg, the ancient German imperial city, took place on the 28th of September. As a bombardment lasting from the 24th to the 27th of August had not induced General Uhrich to surrender, it became necessary to besiege the city in regular form. Everything was ready for a general assault, the result of which seemed certain, when the commandant finally yielded, surrendering himself, 451 officers and 17,111 men as prisoners of war. The news that the city, which had been acquired by shameful treachery on the 20th of September, 1681, was once more German, was received with enthusiastic rejoicings.

From a military point of view the capture of Metz was far more important than that of Strasburg. There lay the "Army of the Rhine,"

under Marshal Bazaine, closely shut in by Prince Frederick Charles. Like General Trochu in Paris, Bazaine made several attempts to break out, but with no better success. The most important attempt was that of the 31st of August and 1st of September, which led to the battle of Noisseville. Informed of MacMahon's advance toward the Maas, Bazaine endeavored to break out and form a junction with him, but after an obstinate fight his troops were driven back into their position between the forts. The later attempts, on the 22nd and 27th of September and the 2nd and 7th of October, were little more than sallies for the purpose of employing the troops and procuring food and forage. On learning of the catastrophe of Sedan and the fall of the empire, Bazaine resolved to hold out until the conclusion of peace, which he supposed to be close at hand, in the belief that, at the head of the only regular army left in France, he would be able to play an important part in the reorganization which must of necessity ensue. But the republican leaders showed themselves in no hurry to conclude a peace, and the provisions, which had been intended for a garrison of twenty or thirty thousand, and not for an army of almost 200,000, were soon exhausted.

Through his adjutant, General Boyer, Bazaine at length opened negotiations with Bismarck in

Versailles, and offered (October 14) to capitulate for himself and his army, but not for the fortress and the garrison. This proposal was naturally rejected and the surrender of the whole force insisted on. On the 24th of October the last rations of bread were distributed, and on the 25th Bazaine opened negotiations with Prince Frederick Charles. An agreement was reached on the 27th, and a French council of war accepted the terms on the following day. On the 29th the city and forts were surrendered to the German troops. Three marshals—Bazaine, Canrobert and Lebœuf—6,000 officers and about 173,000 men, including the National Guards and the sick, were made prisoners of war; 53 eagles and colors, 541 field pieces, 66 *mitrailleuses*, 800 stationary guns, about 300,000 stand of arms and other stores fell into the hands of the enemy. The history of war contains no similar capitulation. The king of Prussia at once named the crown prince and Prince Frederick Charles field marshals general, a dignity never enjoyed before by any prince of the Prussian royal House. In recognition of his services Moltke was at the same time raised to the rank of count, while a general order of congratulation was issued to the allied German armies.

The most important result of this capitulation was that it set the army of investment free

for use where its presence was most urgently required. The 2nd corps, under General Fransecky, marched to Paris to reënforce the army of the crown prince of Prussia. Of the remaining six corps two armies were formed, the first under General Manteuffel and the second under Prince Frederick Charles, each consisting of three corps, with one cavalry division. On the 2nd of November Prince Frederick Charles set out from Metz with 49,607 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and 276 guns; and on the 14th his advance guard was able to participate in the actions on the Loire. The grand duke of Mecklenburg's troops, some detachments of which had in the meantime driven back the western army, under Count Keratry, and occupied Dreux and Châteauneuf, united with those of the prince and formed his right wing.

The army to which was assigned the task of dislodging General Aurelle de Paladines and his 200,000 men from their well-fortified position and driving them across the Loire numbered altogether 105,275 men, with 556 guns. Gambetta, looking at the relative numbers rather than the quality of the respective armies, was hopeful of victory and incessantly urged Aurelle to assume the offensive. In concert with the aggressive movement of the army of the Loire, on the 30th of November a sortie on a grand

scale was to be undertaken by the Parisian garrison. Accordingly, unsuccessful attacks were made on the German left wing on the 24th and 28th, and on the 2nd of December a similarly unsuccessful attack was made on the right wing. December 3 Prince Frederick Charles assumed the offensive and drove back the enemy in a general assault. On the 4th he continued the attack, taking the railroad station and the suburbs of Orléans by storm; and at midnight the grand duke of Mecklenburg marched into the city, part of the French army retreating up the Loire and part down the same stream. More than 12,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans, as well as 60 cannon and 4 gunboats.

Gambetta, dissatisfied with Aurelle's generalship, removed him from the command, and divided the army of the Loire into two parts, which were to act separately or in concert, according as circumstances might dictate. Of these the first army of the Loire, consisting of three corps, was stationed at Nevers, under the command of General Bourbaki; while the second, consisting of three and a half corps, and commanded by General Chanzy, was at Blois. A detachment sent down the Loire in pursuit of Chanzy occupied Meung, Beaugency, Blois and the chateau Chambord, taking more than

7,000 prisoners and capturing several cannon. The government at Tours, deeming itself no longer safe in that city, removed to Bordeaux on the 10th of December. General Chanzy retreated to Vendôme, and from there still farther westward, to Le Mans. Leaving one corps in Vendôme to watch Chanzy, the prince, toward the end of December, allowed the rest of his troops to go into quarters at Orléans, in order to afford them an opportunity to refresh themselves and repair their outfit.

January 6, 1871, in accordance with orders from Versailles, with a force of 57,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 318 guns, Prince Frederick Charles again took the field against Chanzy. The latter had spent the intervening time in camp at Le Mans. Where Bourbaki's army stood and what its purpose was—whether it would march toward Le Mans to support Chanzy, or advance on Paris by way of Fontainebleau, or be ordered off to the east for the defense of Belfort—no one knew. To be prepared for all contingencies, the Hessian division remained behind at Orléans; Gien and Blois were occupied; the 2nd corps, under Fransecky, took up a position at Montargis and to the east of that place; and the 7th corps, under Zaskrow, was stationed at Auxerre. The prince's march through the Perche was rendered exceedingly

difficult by frost, snow and thaws. Fighting their way step by step, the Germans advanced against Le Mans along three different roads. As they were on the very point of cutting off Chanzy's line of retreat, he hastily withdrew to Laval and Mainz on the morning of January 12, and the same evening the Hanoverians entered Le Mans. Taking up his headquarters in that city, the prince sent out detachments to pursue the foe toward Laval and Mainz. The empty camp of Conlie was also occupied and large stores taken. On the 19th detachments of the German army entered Tours. The grand duke of Mecklenburg, with the 13th corps, marched to Rouen by way of Alençon, in order to give the German northern army an opportunity to force a decisive action on the part of the French. For the present there was nothing more to be feared from Chanzy, who had retreated into Brittany, incapacitated from any further operations. Between the 6th and 12th of January he had lost 18,000 prisoners and 20 guns, while his loss in dead and wounded is unknown. In the same time Prince Frederick Charles had lost 180 officers and 3,470 men killed or wounded.

The French army of the North met with the same fate as those of the South and West. The command of this army was held in succession by Farre, Bourbaki and Faidherbe, the latter

succeeding to the position on the 3rd of December. The northern fortresses, Arras, Cambrai, Douai and Valenciennes, offered a favorable base of operations, as well as a convenient refuge in case of defeat. At first one corps only was put in the field, with which General Farre took up his position south of Amiens. General Manteuffel was to operate against this foe. Of his army one corps had to be left behind in Metz and before Diedenhofen (Thionville) and Montinedy, and of the remaining two corps, numbering altogether only 38,244 foot and 4,483 horse, with 180 guns, several detachments were drawn off for the siege of the northern fortresses. Leaving Metz on the 7th of November, Manteuffel arrived in the neighborhood of Compiègne on the 20th, and on the 27th encountered the enemy at Moreuil. The French were defeated, Amiens taken, and the little fortress of La Fère forced to capitulate. Manteuffel now turned toward Normandy. On the 5th his soldiers entered Rouen, and on the 9th Dieppe, after scattering on the way some detachments of French which attempted to make a stand at various points along the Seine. In the meantime Faidherbe, who had succeeded to the command, had put a second corps in the field and begun a southward movement, taking the little fortress of Ham on the way. Man-



Bismarck in Conquered France.
The French Peace Commissioners, Thiers and Favre, yield perforce to
Bismarck's terms.

teuffel, turning about, attacked the enemy on the 23rd at Querrieux, and obliged him to retreat to Douai. On the 9th of January he compelled the fortress of Peronne to capitulate.

In the meantime General Bentheim, who had been left behind in Normandy, had driven back hostile detachments numbering 15,000 or 20,000 men toward Havre, taken the chateau Robert le Diable by assault, and barred the passage of the Seine against some ships of war which attempted to ascend the river from Havre by sinking eleven large boats at Duclair. Among the sunken craft were six English coal ships, whose owners had to be compensated for their loss. January 3 Faiderbe, again assuming the offensive, attacked a division of the 8th corps at Bapaume, but suffered a repulse. On the 6th of January General Göben, hitherto commander of the 8th corps, succeeded General Manteuffel in the command of the first army, the latter being transferred to the army of the South.

Ordered by Gambetta to coöperate with the grand attempt to break out of Paris which had been planned for the 19th, Faiderbe advanced for the third time, and took up his position at St. Quentin with 50,000 or 60,000 men. With about 30,000 General Göben advanced to the attack on the 19th, and after a seven hours' fight drove the French out of all their positions, tak-

ing six guns and 10,000 prisoners. The enemy fled to Cambrai in a state of utter disorganization, and for several weeks Faidherbe was as little capable of any further action as Chanzy.

A third French army appeared in the East. There, after the capitulation of Strasburg, General Schmeling, with a reserve division, had reduced the fortresses of Schlettstadt and Neubreisach on the 24th of October and the 10th of November respectively; and on the 3rd of November General Tresckow, with another reserve division, had invested the strong fortress of Belfort, the key to the southern Vosges. These two divisions, with a third which was formed later, belonged to the 14th corps, commanded by Werder. That general left Strasburg in October with the Badish division and the troops under General von der Goltz's command marched across the Vosges to Epinal and Vesoul, the monotony of the road being varied by daily fights, and on the 22nd, at Etuz, defeated Cambriels and drove him back to Besançon. Beyer, the commander of the Badish division, was dispatched against Dijon. After a sharp fight and a short bombardment the city capitulated on the 31st, and in November the whole of Werder's corps assembled at that place.

Garibaldi, possessed of a republican devil, had

arrived in Tours on the 9th of October, and had been appointed by Gambetta commander of the volunteers of the Vosges. With a motley army of 20,000 men he advanced from Autun against Werder's position at Dijon, only to be defeated at Pasques on the 26th and 27th of November. On the 18th of December General Cremer's division, which was advancing against Dijon, was put to flight at Nuits by a part of the Badois troops under General Glümer, while General von der Goltz drove some other hostile detachments into the fortress of Langres. On the 30th of December, learning that large bodies of troops were assembling between Lyons and Besançon for the purpose of making a powerful demonstration in the direction of Belfort, Werder evacuated Dijon and took up a position at Vesoul.

Against this little army, consisting of 33,278 infantry and 4,020 cavalry, with 120 field guns, Bourbaki was advancing with about 150,000 men. Commissioned by Gambetta to make a diversion on a grand scale in the rear of the German main army, in the middle of December he had brought his three army corps from Nevers to Besançon, and added to these a fourth corps from Lyons and the division under Cremer's command. His plan was to overwhelm Werder's corps by force of numbers, relieve Belfort,

march into Alsace, sever the communications of the German armies with their base of supplies, and undertake a campaign of revenge in South Germany. The danger for the besiegers at Belfort and for the communications of the army of investment before Paris was no small one. Apprised by Werder of the situation, Moltke at once ordered the formation of a southern army, consisting of the 2nd, 7th and 14th corps, and conferred the command on Manteuffel, who received his instructions in Versailles by word of mouth on the 10th of January. The 2nd and 7th corps, which had been stationed at Montargis and Auxerre, at once left those positions, and met at Chatillon, on the Seine, on the 12th.

As soon as Werder knew that Bourbaki's immediate aim was Belfort and not Vesoul, he evacuated the latter place, and, delaying Bourbaki's march by an attack at Villersexel on the 9th, succeeded in gaining the famous defensive position southwest of Belfort before the arrival of the French. Here he strengthened his forces by bringing up 10,000 men and 37 siege guns from the army of investment before the fortress of Belfort. His lines of defense, strengthened in front by the Lisaine and the swampy valley of the Allaine, extended from Frahier through Hericourt and Montbeliard to Delle, on the

Swiss frontier. To carry this position and force a passage to Belfort it would be necessary to cut down Werder's corps to a man, for the German soldiers, appreciating the threatening danger, were resolved to frustrate the accomplishment of Bourbaki's purpose at any cost. Leaving out of consideration the fourfold numerical superiority of the enemy, the external difficulties to be contended with were great, for the supply of provisions was scanty, and the cold was so severe that the Lisainè froze over, thus affording the enemy a natural bridge; but the strong sense of duty of the German soldiers surmounted every obstacle.

Bourbaki did not understand how to make a proper use of his superior numbers, and either break through the German center or turn the weak right wing. In the three days' battle of Hericourt or Belfort, January 15, 16 and 17, all his assaults were repulsed. He only succeeded in taking the weakly garrisoned village of Chenebier, which he was obliged to evacuate again after a few hours. On the 18th, learning of Manteuffel's approach, he beat a retreat. The losses of the French in the battle and on the retreat reached six or eight thousand, in addition to which 2,000 were taken prisoners. On the 19th Werder set out in pursuit of the foe. It was Bourbaki's object to retreat

to Besançon, and thence to Lyons; and there was need of considerable haste, in order to prevent the consummation of his plans.

General Manteuffel, who had assumed the command of the southern army in Chatillon on the 12th of January, set out by forced marches toward Belfort on the 20th. He passed through the mountainous region of the Côte d'Or, and from there between the fortresses of Langres and Dijon, without any interference on the part of Garibaldi, who, after Werder's departure, had taken possession of Dijon with 25,000 men. On the news of Bourbaki's retreat he turned south-east, in order with his two corps (44,950 infantry and 2,866 cavalry, with 168 guns) to block the road to Lyons, and leave the French general no other choice than to venture a battle with his demoralized troops, to surrender without a battle or to take refuge in Swiss territory.

January 23 the road to Lyons was occupied, and the first engagements with Bourbaki's troops took place, the 2nd and 7th corps moving up from the south and west and the 14th pressing down from the north. The only exit was toward the east. In Besançon, on the 26th, Bourbaki in despair made an attempt at suicide. At the same time a telegram arrived from Gambetta removing him from the command of the eastern army and appointing General Clinchant

in his stead. But he also was unable to carry out Gambetta's wish that the army should retreat southward, and was obliged to retire to Pontarlier. Here he endeavored to save himself by means of the armistice which had been concluded in Versailles, but it turned out that the eastern armies were not included.

The final catastrophe could be no longer postponed. On the 1st of February the last pass toward the south on the Swiss frontier was occupied, Pontarlier was carried by assault, and the French retreated to Neuchâtel, pursued by the enemy as far as the two border forts of La Cluse. Ninety thousand three hundred and fourteen men and 11,787 horses entered Swiss territory at the border town of Verrières, where the men were disarmed and distributed among the various cantons. In the last few days the Germans had taken 15,000 prisoners and captured 28 cannon and *mitrailleuses*, together with a large quantity of wagons and arms.

In the meantime Garibaldi had been held in check by General Kettler with 6,000 men. On the news that larger bodies of Germans were approaching, he evacuated Dijon and retired southward. Shortly after he laid down his command and returned to his island home in Caprera. The fortress of Belfort, which was defended by Colonel Denfert, had been enabled to

hold out so long by the favorable nature of the country. A former attack on the forts of upper and lower Perche had failed; but on the 8th of February they fell into the enemy's hands, rendering it impossible for the fortress to hold out much longer; and, King William consenting to an extension of the armistice only on condition of the surrender of Belfort, the garrison, still 12,000 strong, marched out on the 18th of February with military honors, and Tresckow's division took possession. Other fortresses, like Soissons, Verdun, Diedenhofen (Thionville), Pfalzburg and Montmedy, had surrendered in 1870. Only the fortress of Bitsch remained in the hands of the French until the 26th of March, 1871.

In the meantime the Parisian garrison had not been inactive. A grand attempt to break through the lines was arranged with Gambetta for the 30th of November. General Ducrot, with about 50,000 men, was to break through the line of investment on the east, march to Fontainebleau, form a junction there with the army of the Loire, and, in concert with that army, raise the siege of Paris. While demonstrations were made in other directions, Ducrot directed his attack against Champigny and Brie, on the Marne, driving the Württembergers and an incomplete Saxon division out of those vil-

lages, but was unable to advance farther, owing to the obstinate resistance of the German troops. December 2nd the Württemberg and Saxon divisions, supported by the 2nd corps and one brigade of the 6th, under the command of Fransecky, again advanced to the attack, and, after severe fighting, retook one-half of Champigny. In the night of the 3rd the French evacuated Brie and the other half of Champigny, and fell back to the right bank of the Marne. The German loss in the two battles was 232 officers and 4,868 men, while the French lost 10,000 men, including 1,600 prisoners.

The sorties of December 21-22 against Stains and Le Bourget were also repulsed. On the 29th, after a two days' bombardment, Mont Avron, with its heavy guns, was abandoned by the French and occupied by the Saxons; and at the same time the bombardment of the eastern forts began. January 5, after the arrival of the siege park, fire was opened against the southern forts, the guns of which were soon silenced; and on the 8th the bombardment of the city began. In this bombardment the left bank of the Seine suffered most, though even there the damage done was not very serious. The restlessness and discontent in Paris increased. New sorties were demanded; and accordingly unsuccessful attacks

on the German lines were made on the 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th of January. It was thought that a monster sally of at least 100,000 men directed against a single army corps must succeed in forcing a passage. Such a sally was undertaken on the 19th of January on the side toward Versailles. After an obstinate battle with the 5th corps, under General Kirchbach, between Mont Valerien and St. Cloud—the latter of which had been set on fire by shells from the defenders' guns—the French were utterly defeated, with a loss of 6,000 men.

The destruction of the various armies of relief left Paris nothing to hope from without, and the ill success of the various sallies had conclusively demonstrated the inability of the capital to raise the siege unassisted. After the last failure Trochu, who had long been convinced of the futility of such attempts, laid down his office, and was succeeded by General Vinoy. A new uprising of the social-democrats on the 22nd of January was put down with difficulty. The provisions, consisting of bad bread and horseflesh, were sufficient for not more than fourteen days; after that no one would be able to restrain the hungry masses from acts of desperation. It was necessary to act at once, and so on the evening of the 23rd Favre appeared at Versailles to offer Count Bismarck the capitulation of Paris, on

condition that the regular troops, retaining their arms, should be allowed to march out of the city and retire behind the Loire. These terms were not accepted, and after some further negotiations the Convention of Paris was finally concluded on the 28th of January.

This granted an armistice of three weeks, in which the eastern departments, where Bourbaki's army was at that very moment being driven to its destruction, were not included. During the armistice a national assembly was to be elected to decide upon the question of peace or war. All the Parisian forts and material of war were surrendered to the Germans; the garrison of Paris and the forts became prisoners of war, and were obliged to give up their arms, but remained in Paris and were maintained at the expense of the authorities there. One division of 12,000 men, however, was to retain its weapons for the preservation of order, and, against Moltke's will, at Favre's urgent wish—which he later bitterly repented—a similar exception was made in the case of the National Guards. The city of Paris was to pay a contribution of 200,000,000 francs within fourteen days and the French were allowed to provision the city. On the 29th the surrender of the twenty-five larger and smaller forts to the Germans took place, and the black, white and

red colors of their new masters were raised in triumph.

This convention was very unwelcome to Gambetta; nevertheless he had hopes that the respite of three weeks might be turned to account for the purpose of putting new armies in the field, and he further hoped by influencing the elections to be able to return a radical national assembly resolved on a war *à outrance*. With this end in view he published on the 31st of January a proscription list, declaring ineligible for election all who had accepted any high office at the hands of the empire or had been official candidates under that régime. Both Bismarck and the government at Paris protested energetically against such despotism, and insisted upon free elections. Finding himself unsupported by the other members of the Bordeaux government, Gambetta resigned on the 6th of February. The elections took place everywhere on the 8th, and on the 12th the national assembly was opened in Bordeaux. On the 17th Thiers was elected chief of the executive department, on the 19th he formed his ministry, and on the 21st, accompanied by ministers Favre and Picard, he repaired to Versailles, commissioned by the national assembly to open negotiations for peace.

The French representatives felt that they must make up their minds to the loss of Alsace with

Strasburg; but the cession of Metz and Belfort seemed to them, with their weak memory for the terms Napoleon had been wont to impose, too severe for acceptance. It was not until the war indemnity had been reduced to five milliards, and the restoration of Belfort to France agreed upon, that the negotiations again advanced. On the 26th of February the preliminaries of peace were signed. Thiers at once returned to Bordeaux and laid the treaty before the assembly, which adopted it, by a vote of 546 to 107, on the 1st of March. Favre then brought the document to Versailles, where it was signed by King William on the 2nd.

By this preliminary treaty France ceded to the German empire Alsace and part of Lorraine, with Strasburg, Metz and Diedenhofen (Thionville), and pledged herself to pay a war indemnity of five milliard francs, of which at least one milliard was to be paid in 1871 and the rest within three years. The evacuation of French territory was to keep even pace with the payment of the indemnity, in such a way that after the payment of two milliards only six departments, together with Belfort, were to be occupied by 50,000 Germans, as security for the remaining three milliards. The western part of Paris was to be occupied by 30,000 Germans until the treaty was accepted by the national

assembly. The Parisians were to be compelled to see the German soldiers as victors within their walls, that their fantastic notions of the inviolability and invincibility of their "holy" city might be dispelled.

March 1 the 30,000 men were first reviewed by King William and then marched into Paris. Seventy thousand men were held in reserve, and the cannons of the forts were all trained on the city. Any resistance would have been punished in the most summary manner. On the 2nd of March thousands of soldiers, armed only with their side arms, were led into the city by their officers and shown a few points of interest. The population remained quiet; but after the withdrawal of the troops on the following day the pent-up noise and abuse broke out. According to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the southern forts and some of the western and southern departments were at once vacated, but the northern and eastern forts remained in the possession of the Germans until the payment of the first half-milliard, and the line from Rouen to Dijon was maintained unbroken. The headquarters at Versailles were abandoned on the 7th of March, and on the 17th the king of Prussia was in his own capital again.

From the actual commencement of hostilities to the conclusion of the armistice the war had

lasted 180 days. During that time the German armies had been engaged in 159 actions of all sorts, had won 15 considerable battles, taken 26 fortified places, shut three armies up in fortresses and compelled them to surrender, forced a fourth to take refuge in Switzerland, captured and carried to Germany 11,650 officers and 363,000 men, and held 100,000 more prisoners in Paris. Besides this, there had fallen into their hands 6,700 cannon, 120 eagles and colors, and a vast amount of military stores. The total loss of all the German armies had been 4,990 officers (1,165 dead, 3,795 wounded and 30 missing) and 112,041 non-commissioned officers and private soldiers (18,132 dead, 87,742 wounded and 6,145 missing). At the end of the campaign a German force of 569,875 foot and 63,465 horse, with 1,742 guns, stood on French soil. If officers, officials, pioneers, camp followers and the like be reckoned in, it may be estimated that on the 1st of March, 1871, there were in France about 1,000,000 Germans, either soldiers or in some way connected with the army. In addition to this there were still 250,000 troops in Germany as reserve forces or in garrison service.

The negotiations with reference to a definite peace were opened in Brussels on the 28th of March. The French representatives, however, put such difficulties in the way of the execution

of the Treaty of Versailles, especially the financial articles, that the negotiations finally came to a standstill. In Berlin there was some talk of reopening hostilities; and the return of the French prisoners, who were so necessary for the suppression of the Commune, was stopped. At last the French government was brought to an appreciation of the serious nature of the situation. The Brussels conference was dissolved, and on the 6th of May the French ministers Favre and Pouyer-Quertier had a meeting with Bismarck in Frankfort. This time the negotiations progressed favorably, and on the 10th of May the treaty of peace was signed. This provided for a border line more in accordance with the nationality of the inhabitants, shortened the limits of payment for the first two milliards, and prolonged the time of occupation in certain districts. An additional article transferred the ownership of the French eastern railroad, in Alsace and Lorraine, to Germany on payment of 350,000,000 francs. With this last act, which was played in Bismarck's temporary headquarters, at the Sign of the Swan, in Frankfort, the curtain at length fell on the Franco-Prussian War.

PART II

THE EMPIRE UNDER WILLIAM I

CHAPTER IV

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE

THE modern German empire was born, as we all know, in 1871, springing like a splendid phoenix from the fires of the war with France. The "unity of Germany," the dream and prayer of every loyal German for centuries past, was at length accomplished. Let us look back to see how the sudden change had been brought about.

The various German powers which had entered on the war were, first, Prussia; second, the confederacy of the North German states, of which Prussia was the head; and last, the four larger and wholly independent South German states. The North German Union had been formed in 1866, and so well had Prussia treated her lesser neighbors in this bond that the South German states had already shown some inclina-

tion to join the Union voluntarily. But Prussia's peace treaty with Austria had prevented Prussia from taking any step to extend the Union.

After the first significant military successes against France there existed two aims of the struggle in the hearts of the Germans: the regaining of Alsace-Lorraine and the foundation of a uniform confederate state of all the belligerent German territories. The former was obtained through the conclusion of peace, the new German unity was brought to a conclusion even during the military advance.

The sympathies of the nation and the cordial collaboration of public opinion in behalf of the ideal of unity did not need to be aroused. Newspapers and magazines, societies and meetings, spoke everywhere and eagerly of the aim that had been set. Yet in order to obtain concrete results, a great deal depended upon the princes. The direct power was theirs; and the ideal of moderate patriotism has always been the uniting of the public will and the individual free will of the princes. It was well known that King William of Prussia, now the sole master of German fate, never would assume formally the leadership of the nation unless his princely cousins on German thrones should ask it from him.

If one looked at the world of German princes in 1870, it was obvious that the minor sov-

ereigns of the North German Alliance would gladly approve of the expansion of that alliance over the South German states also. King John of Saxony, the ruler of the only large state of the North German Alliance except Prussia, fully agreed with the minor German princes. Since 1866 he had been the most faithful champion of the formation of a new confederacy. The will of the nation in South Germany, to bring about perfect unity, was also unquestionable. Thus it was only a question as to how the four South German princes would look at the idea of expanding the Alliance.

Nothing was to be feared with regard to the Rhenish princes, the grand dukes of Hesse and Baden. The grand duchy of Hesse had belonged since 1866, with some part of her territory, to the North German Alliance; nothing was more desirable than to end that double position of hers. Even Herr von Dalwigk, the leading Hessian minister and opponent of Bismarck, comprehended that fully, albeit with some sort of indignation. Baden had asked to be admitted to the Alliance. She had aided the North German diet, which at the beginning of 1870 had requested all German princes to join the Alliance. Why should she not now do everything in behalf of the realization of a German confederacy?

Affairs in Württemberg and Bavaria, which were at a greater distance from the French danger, were by far more complicated. In Württemberg the population was largely in favor of unity; but the weak King Charles wavered between the advices of his ministers, who rightly represented the sentiment of the country, and the influences of a reactionary-feudal court party which was aided by Queen Olga, a native Russian grand duchess. Still more difficult were the conditions in Bavaria. The *regnum Bavariæ*, as the kingdom was still called in the nineteenth century, had always, because of the size and peculiar situation of the Bavarian territory, played a peculiar rôle in German history. In its political complexion it resembled Austria in her position toward the universal German empire. And gloriously had the ancient race of the Wittelsbachs ruled ever since the days of the Hohenstaufens, much beloved by the Bavarian people. Thus public sentiment here was not so favorable to the idea of unity as in the other German territories. The widely spread clergy, rapidly rising in political influence, were firmly opposed to it. Only during the public enthusiasm because of victory, while war was still going on, could it be expected with any degree of certainty that the influence of the clergy would be mastered. On the Bavarian

throne, moreover, sat a prince endowed with most peculiar habits of life, and by no means normal attitude, Louis II. Whether his haughty spirit, his peculiar conception of princely rank, and above all of his own dignity, would allow him to consent to the subordination of his state in a confederacy of any form whatever was questionable.

Moreover, the fact that the classes, princes and persons that strove consciously or under less definite conceptions after the unity of Germany, were by no means on good terms with each other rendered difficult the evolution of any one concrete unity. Democrats and pronounced liberals demanded unity by the grace of the people. In this they partly corresponded to the personal inclinations of the Prussian crown prince, as he would fain have done away with the power of the minor princes. The conservatives in general were opposed to the formation of a German confederacy. Whenever approaching the idea of unity at all, they desired that Prussia should stand alone, exercising her own will as a universal protector, and thus increasing her dignity in Germany. King William was to a certain extent in favor of this conception, far more than in 1866 or even in 1860. He regarded himself, above all, as King of Prussia, and was by no means inclined to "diminish that dignity by as-

suming general German duties." Such was the general state of affairs. The entire diplomatical skill of Bismarck and of Minister Delbrück, his never-tiring collaborator in that behalf, was needed to bring about a happy result, notwithstanding all the approving sentiment of the people.

The first thoughts regarding immediate unity arose naturally from the first important victories. They ripened at an early time, especially because even leading military circles thought that war would end soon after the battle of Sedan. On August 14 the Prussian crown prince, Frederick William, handed over to Prince Bismarck a pamphlet favoring the future unity; and as early as August 22 Bismarck discussed with Crown Prince Albert of Saxony as to whether the question regarding the expansion of the Alliance might not be solved at a congress of the princes during the military expedition, on French soil where many a German scruple would be silenced automatically. The nation, meanwhile, went straightway onward along with these princes. At Munich, Stuttgart and Karlsruhe circles which were in favor of joining the northern Alliance were organized and expanded through the activity of Lasker and Forckenbeck, the foremost liberal members of the North German parliament.

On September 2 the grand duke of Baden seized the first real initiative. He requested that his country should be admitted to the North German Alliance, that the latter should be expanded all over South Germany, and that the king of Prussia should assume the imperial title. September 12 Bismarck responded satisfactorily; but he said that the initiative must come from the South German governments. Thus it was incumbent upon Bavaria and Württemberg to act; for Hesse could be regarded as having the same attitude with Baden.

Bavaria started her initiative doubtfully. Count Bray, the leading Bavarian minister, who looked at the question of unity soberly from a fundamental Bavarian viewpoint, obtained King Louis's consent to propositions which strongly emphasized Bavarian independence despite her general inclination to join the Alliance. Bismarck had expected nothing else; and he sent Delbrück to Munich to negotiate under the ever-increasing impressions of German military successes. September 21 Delbrück arrived at Munich; he soon was joined by von Mittnacht, Minister of Württemberg, and all the three ministers negotiated on the basis of the already existing North German constitution. These negotiations lasted till September 29; they grew more and more favorable: Delbrück thought he

might regard the outcome as satisfactory and the unity of Germany as assured. Bismarck now sought to win over the crown prince and king of Prussia for the final solution and the solemn conclusion of the negotiations. He planned that the climax should be reached by means of a congress of German princes, and by calling a German imperial diet on French soil.

The carrying out of that conclusion met with unexpected difficulties. They emanated from King Louis of Bavaria; yet they were also done away with by the position of King Louis of Bavaria. This peculiar ruler was at that time already a hermit and could not bring himself to travel to France, although residence at Trianon or Fontainebleau seemed very enticing. The interruption of the negotiations caused by his hesitation led King Charles of Württemberg to change his attitude. Unlike his good German ministers he succumbed to the previously described influences of his court, which were opposed to German unity.

Bismarck stood up against these unfavorable movements by formally accepting the offer of Baden to join a new alliance and by inviting its grand duke to send mediators to Versailles regarding a conclusion. This step met with the hoped-for success. Led by jealousy and fear lest they should be injured, mediators from

Württemberg and Bavaria also appeared at Versailles. Hesse had previously been invited to be present at the negotiations, and so, toward the end of October, new conferences commenced at Versailles, under the direct leadership of Bismarck. The discussion included all the most important questions of the southern states.

These conferences, as was to be expected, led to a speedy settlement of the affairs relating to Baden. By November 3 these were brought to a satisfactory result. Negotiations with Hesse went off very smoothly also. Even Württemberg seemed favorable to union. Again it was Bavaria which would not obey: she demanded full independence for her foreign relations and for her army. This led Württemberg to hesitate once more, and rumors were spread to the effect that King Charles would recall some of the concessions he had previously granted.

Suddenly there came aid from Munich, from King Louis. The king had begun to worry over the slow progress of the negotiations at Versailles. First of all he could not understand how it was possible to negotiate with Baden, Hesse and Württemberg more easily than with him. That question affected him to such degree that it seemed he would abdicate. Yet this was only a transitory whim; the desire to par-

ticipate in the negotiations in a manner befitting Bavaria remained his dominant idea. That was the psychic disposition which persuaded King Louis that he, as leader of the German princes and free cities, should have the glory of offering the imperial crown to the king of Prussia. Negotiations on this point had already been carried on, and the grand duke of Baden had played a quite important rôle in them. But a letter of the grand duke of Baden to King Louis remained without decisive results. Bismarck then sought to induce the king to decide quickly, by hinting at Munich that he would persuade the king of Saxony to offer the imperial crown to Prussia. That was the looked-for means. King Louis, jealous of his position among the princes, sent one of his advisers, Count von Holnstein, directly to Versailles, to Bismarck. Nominally, of course, he came only in order to obtain information with regard to the general state of affairs. Holnstein was an ardent German patriot; and he knew his king. He advised Bismarck to send him back to the king with a wholly complete document regarding the offering of the imperial crown, something which the king would only have to sign. This was done, and the king signed, after having made slight changes. On December 3 King William had the document in his hands. It was

promptly followed by the unanimous consent of the other princes and free cities.

Meanwhile, on the 15th of November, Bismarck had come to a final settlement with Hesse and Baden. The new alliance which arose out of the union of these two countries with the North German Alliance was to become valid January 1, 1871. That meant that Württemberg and Bavaria could no longer hesitate regarding the treaties wherewith they were concerned, unless they were willing to be ignored and run the risk of losing many an opportunity for profitable arrangements which the conferences could still offer. Bismarck negotiated first with Bavaria. He was willing to make far-reaching concessions because of the important historical position of the country. A conclusion was soon reached; on the evening of November 23 German unity and the German imperial rank were thus made almost certain, as we learn from the parallel records at Munich and Hohenschwangau. Of course the peculiar position of Württemberg could no longer be maintained; November 25 she signed the treaty which regulates her stand in the manner shown in the imperial constitution of today.

Thus unity was established as far as treaties by the German princes and free cities were concerned. Yet these treaties had still to be sanc-

tioned by the council of the North German Alliance, the North German diet and the four South German parliaments. In the North German council they were accepted without difficulties, although the special favors accorded Bavaria met with many a complaint. It was also voted that the new alliance should be called "Empire," and that the president of the council, the king of Prussia, should obtain the imperial title. The North German diet of the people convened November 24. Here, too, the extraordinary concession to Bavaria caused much hot discussion, but was finally consented to, with 195 votes against 32. Negotiations in the lesser South German parliaments no longer caused any difficulties. Only in Bavaria, in the chamber of deputies, the clerical "patriotic party" under Jörg was opposed to the whole scheme. The majority only finally gave their consent on January 22, 1871, after the imperial proclamation at Versailles.

Meanwhile things in Versailles went on both speedily and surely. After the ratification of the November treaties, King Louis of Bavaria offered King William, as president of the council, the title of German Emperor. King William could not reject the offer which had thus been approved by all the German princes and free cities; although his old Prussian spirit much

doubted the happy outcome of the new dignity bestowed upon him. After it became known that he was willing to accept it, the North German diet took active steps. A deputation of thirty of its members, headed by Simson, the aged president of the national convention of 1848, betook itself to Versailles to greet and congratulate the king. King William received them on the 18th of December and declared that, from the 1st of January, 1871, he would assume the new title which both people and princes had offered him.

On January 18, 1871, the solemn proclamation of the empire took place in the Mirror Room of the Castle of Versailles. On the walls around this room were hung those battle paintings which from the time of Louis XIV. had been glorifying French triumphs, chiefly over the German armies. A hundred and seventy years had elapsed since the acquisition of the royal rank in Prussia by the first Hohenzollern king. After a brief religious ceremony, the aged King William approached the stage of the room, declared in a moved voice that he was willing to accept the new title, and called upon the imperial chancellor to read his statement of his attitude, which had been written down. The document, composed by Bismarck, had the form of an appeal to the German people: "We assume

the imperial rank conscious of the duty to protect the rights of the empire and its members with German fidelity, to maintain peace and the independence of Germany, and to strengthen the power of the people. . . . Would that God would grant us and our successors of the imperial crown to be always increasers of the German empire, not in warlike conquests, but in works of peace, in the field of natural welfare, freedom and discipline!"

The imperial proclamation was followed by the conclusion of the war with France, the return to Berlin amid the indescribable joy of the people, and by the convening of the first German imperial diet, as a perfect symbol of the reëstablished unity of the greatest part of the nation.

The elections held on the 3rd of March, 1871, still bore the character of the great era. Those who were opposed to what had been achieved were defeated, although future difficulties from clerical party politics were already foreseen. The national-liberal party comprised one hundred and thirty men; it stood at the highest point of power in its history. The central states, Saxony, Bavaria and Württemberg, contributed chiefly to this extraordinary increase of the liberal members.

March 21, 1871, King William opened the imperial diet. "We have achieved," said he,

"what Germany has been striving for since the time of our forefathers: unity and its organic formation, safety of our frontiers, independence of the evolution of our national rights. . . . Would that the German imperial war which we have waged gloriously may be followed by an equally glorious imperial peace; and would that the tasks of the German people might henceforth consist in winning victories only in a contest in behalf of the blessings of peace. Amen!"

CHAPTER V

THE ORGANIZING OF THE EMPIRE

THE *Reichstag* or imperial diet was quickly organized. Its first president was Simson, the able leader of the diets of Frankfurt, Erfurt and the North German Alliance, and president of the revenue parliament at Berlin. During the organization there soon arose differences between the liberals and the clericals. Yet the first and foremost task of the representatives of the people was solved both gloriously and speedily. On April 14 the imperial constitution was adopted, with only seven opposing votes, as proposed by the allied governments, after the fashion of the North German constitution. The new constitution was announced on the 20th of April. All men were pleased with the situation. The extreme elements of both the liberals and the conservatives were as yet feeble; even the clericals had not grown strong. Thus the new and yet old constitution, now transferred to the great majority of all Germans, could develop and maintain itself in a most favorable atmosphere.

It soon grew obvious that this constitution did not regulate all those fields with which affairs common to the whole nation were closely connected. Bismarck had developed the constitution of the North German Alliance, now called the empire, out of the direct political needs and presuppositions of 1865, in the sense of a mere hegemony of Prussia. Thus the constitution touched no themes except such as were absolutely indispensable; and thus the possibility was saved to further German life of developing in a spontaneous manner and in various forms, without being compelled to change the constitution, or without even slightly twisting its intent.

For example, it was a quasi political necessity, because of the existing state of affairs, that the entire inner policy of the individual states must pursue the course of the general imperial policy. Nothing, however, is found in the constitution with regard to this. The year 1871 showed at once the necessary consequences. In Hesse, Minister von Dalwigk, one of the opponents of the movement toward unity, resigned on the 9th of April, after unity had been brought about. He had been sarcastically told by the *Grenzboten*: "A minister in the new German empire must possess other qualities than those of a cat, to fall sound to the ground from any height." In a similar manner, or at least for similar rea-

sons, there took place a systematic change in the cabinets of Bavaria and Saxony. Henceforth a rule was formed, according to which the policy of the various countries was to pursue the course of that of the empire. The applicableness of that policy was guaranteed to a certain extent by the council of the Alliance as a regulating organ between, on the one part, the universal German sentiment which was to find expression in the imperial diet; on the second part, the universal German benefit as considered by the diet and the imperial government, and, on the third part, the particular interests of the individual states.

Much more concrete examples of the necessity for immediate and uniform legislation were the systems of communication. In regard to these the constitution had laid down general rules in a few general paragraphs. With the exception of the postal and telegraph system, which was regulated most excellently by Secretary of State Stephan, the constitution failed to give the government any direct authority. Yet the questions of mintage, banking concerns and railroads all demanded regulation.

Seven different standards of coinage were still in vogue in North Germany alone. The last German revenue parliament had already striven to organize a uniform mintage, as seen in its

edict of May 5, 1870. Now, however, after the war, the large payments from France could be used to help in a general and uniform regulation of legal currency. The imperial diet therefore demanded, on November 23, 1871, that the imperial chancellor should draw up laws concerning mintage, banking concerns, and the issue of state paper currency. After a thorough and hot discussion, it was decided to adopt a gold currency standard. Accordingly, on July 9, 1873, a law concerning mintage was established, which created the basis of the monetary system of Germany of today.

Twenty- and ten-mark pieces of gold were coined, and silver specie was coined amounting to 410 million marks, that is, ten marks per head for the entire population. In addition to the old style specie there still remained much paper currency in vogue in the provinces of the minor states. This old state paper money amounted to 100 million thalers, and old bank notes to 480 millions; and the larger part of this was not covered by specie. A reduction of this paper currency, and a general imperial law concerning the banking system, was obviously needed. The first step was taken with the aid of the imperial constitution. From January 1, 1876, on government greenbacks were to be issued for 120 million marks, making about three

marks for every inhabitant. These greenbacks were distributed in accordance with the population of the individual confederate states, being substituted for their old paper currency. Thus such confederate states as had issued little or no paper currency at all benefited a good deal. Others, however, which had issued much more, as, for instance, Bavaria and Saxony, were badly circumstanced. To soften their distress, the suffering states were allowed 55 million marks of the new greenbacks, in addition to the 120 millions. The excess, however, had to be returned to the government within fifteen years.

The private banks were treated less gently than these old state treasuries. The private banks had increased their notes during the years 1868-1873 from 208 to 230 per cent. Their issues were now limited to a total of 135 million marks, freed from taxation. Any large amount of notes issued by them were to be taxed five per cent. At the same time, through a law established January 30, 1875, the Prussian Bank was turned into an imperial bank. It became an institution of mixed character, part private, part governmental. Its ground capital of 120 million marks was contributed by private shareholders, but the officers of the bank were to be chosen by the emperor at the request of the council.

The result of all these legislative measures

was the uniformity of the money system of Germany under the supervision of the empire. The individual confederate states lost all significance in that respect. Even more, however, was accomplished in the field of modern forms of economic life. Laws established in 1874 and 1876 protected trade-marks of commerce and industry, models and labels, original rights regarding fine arts and photography. Still more was accomplished through the imperial law regulating patents, issued May 25, 1877.

Only the railroads now remained for the government to supervise. No general system of railroads could be established while each individual state regulated its own. Hence the transportation rights of the individual states must be absorbed. The efforts of Prince Bismarck in that respect were at first futile, despite the creation of an office of imperial railroads in 1873. Yet even without the realization of a vainly dreamed ideal of imperial railroads, the superiority of the empire's position for regulating the system of transportation was already undisputed. In later years all economic interests of a general character were placed under the care of the empire to a far wider extent than had been foreseen or ascertained by the constitution.

Still more fundamental and still more thorough was a similar process in the field of legal

interests. According to the constitution of the North German Alliance, jurisdiction was originally a privilege of the individual states; they therefore possessed executive judicial power, the Alliance had the power of establishing general rules regarding those executive rights, and of securing their just application through a severe control. Thus it is today, in accordance with the constitution of the empire. In behalf, however, of the interpretation and application of the common commercial law some general law court was clearly necessary. A supreme commercial court had been founded at Leipzig on June 12, 1869; it exercised judicial power in the name of the Alliance, and thus interfered with the jurisdiction of the individual states. A great deal of this interference followed in the course of the next few years, so that the commercial court became a general imperial court. Alongside with that movement went another emanating from the imperial diet. November 15, 1871, it was moved in the diet that all particularistic laws should be abolished and uniform laws be established in the empire regarding criminal processes, court procedure and organization, and finally that a uniform civil code be created. The motion was carried almost unanimously on December 12, 1873. Only the two Mecklenburgs and Reuss of the older lineage voted against

it. A committee was elected to work out a civil code and prepare laws regarding court procedure.

These laws were laid before the diet in 1874. They sought to spare the jurisdiction of the individual states, and were thoroughly investigated in the diet, in autumn, 1874, from that point of view, chiefly by the liberal parties. It was then decided to refer the laws to an extraordinary permanent judicial committee comprising twenty-eight members, who were chosen January 28, 1875. The committee worked very diligently under Miquel and was through with its work in autumn, 1876. In September, 1881, the imperial diet adopted by an overwhelming majority the civil and criminal codes and a law concerning the constitution of the courts.

Only the consent of the federal council or *Bundesrat* was needed. The *Bundesrat*, however, declared that not less than eighty-six of the adopted decisions of the committee could not be accepted. Bismarck thereon returned from Varzin, assumed for the first time after a great lapse of years the leadership in the council, negotiated with the leaders of the various parties, and induced the liberals and conservatives to grant each other mutual concessions so that a formulation was found which was certain of the consent of both *Bundesrat* and *Reichstag*. There-

upon the laws were accepted December 21, 1876.

The new laws became valid on October 1, 1879. On the same day the imperial court was opened at Leipzig by a solemn address of its venerable first president, Simson, a man whom we have frequently met as president of parliaments. On October 31, 1888, Emperor William II laid the cornerstone of the palace of the imperial court of today, which was solemnly opened in the year 1895. Since this introduction of judicial laws the territory of the German empire is under one jurisdiction, inasmuch as every individual state exercises judicial power over the whole empire through its country courts. The laws and prohibitions of every court are obeyed everywhere, but it does not exercise that hegemony by reason of its own power. The source of its power is the empire.

In addition to the judicial laws of 1879 there was also the much desired uniform civil code. Like the procedure in court, material civil law has been the same for the whole empire since January 1, 1900. The particularism of the confederate states had abdicated in this respect, in favor of the universalism of the empire. Thus, looking backward, one can see that the three great vital themes of general interest, state policy, transportation and jurisdiction, had been rendered uniform for the whole empire. This

went far beyond the original presuppositions and demands of the constitution.

In the functions of foreign politics, too, the alliance of states under Prussia's leadership developed in a very peculiar manner into a confederate state ruling all the particularistic states, and even ruling Prussia. The leadership of foreign affairs was thought to be uniform from the outset. In the North German Alliance it was Prussia which had taken control, and Prussia, too, had to pay the expenses. Yet the individual states also had the privilege of electing ambassadors. This continued to be the state of affairs when the empire began. Meanwhile, a committee on foreign politics was chosen by the *Bundesrat*, to control general politics and settle its most important questions. Thus there existed two competing authorities for leadership: the embassies of the individual states and the committee of the *Bundesrat*. Yet neither of these institutions assumed real life. The committee remained only on paper during the incomparable leadership of the foreign policy by Prince Bismarck, and was seldom heard of, unless it was asked by the foreign ministry to undertake some special task. With regard to the embassies, Bavaria recalled her representatives from London, Paris, Brussels, Carlsruhe and Darmstadt in 1871. Saxony recalled hers in 1872. As early

as July, 1871, Baden abolished her "ministry of foreign affairs." Although some of the individual embassies were afterward reëstablished in behalf of the especially particularistic Bavarian domestic spirit, or in behalf of transportation among the various confederate states, the uniform leadership of foreign affairs was soon allowed to pass into the hands of the emperor's ministers.

Similarly uniform and wholly conformable was the organization of the army in case of war. The emperor is the sole and supreme war lord: that principle had already been established by the imperial constitution. The organization of a uniform army in time of peace was, however, a different matter. Here the elementary law of the imperial constitution was expanded by two sorts of procedure: the conclusion of military conventions between Prussia and the minor states, and the decisions of the *Reichstag* regarding the whole of the army. Through the military conventions, the contingents of a number of states became part and parcel of the Prussian army. These included Oldenburg, the free cities, Waldeck, Lippe, the two Gonderhausens, and finally Baden, on condition, however, that the troops of Baden should form a separate division (the 14th army corps). The conventions also included such states as possessed only

warlike rights of a very limited nature: the two Mecklenburgs, Hesse, Weimar and the Thuringo-Wettinian states, Anhalt, Rudolstadt and the two principalities of Reuss. The king of Prussia had the power of naming officers in all the above-named provinces. Only the aged Duke William of Brunswick led a life in lonely independence among these minor princes. He did not go beyond the concessions made before 1870, and remained in time of peace supreme commander of the Brunswick army, which still wore a black uniform in memory of the military expedition of Duke Frederick William in 1809. After the old duke's death, Brunswick, too, accepted the system of the other minor states.

In these states a more or less uniform army was thus created. Common government and common leadership were established. The four army corps of Saxony, Württemberg and Bavaria still existed separately. Their relation to the rest of the army was regulated through special conventions, which granted great liberty to Bavaria. All troops, however, were to receive similar training. In Bavaria it was introduced by the emperor himself through a special inspection by the crown prince, the most popular military leader in Bavaria because of Wörth and Weissenburg.

These conventions guaranteed the inner uni-

formity of the German army. Everything else depended upon the monetary question, that is, on the willingness of the *Reichstag* to grant the necessary sums for building up the army. There still existed a certain regulation for army finances from the days of the North German Federation. At that time a law had been passed according to which Prussia undertook the maintenance of a standing army for the price of 225 thalers per soldier. This agreement was extended by the *Reichstag* in 1871 for three years, becoming void in 1874. In those three years the *Reichstag* expected to be able to come to some better arrangement, and to be able to work out a more comprehensive organization of the entire army, as required in articles 60 and 61 of the constitution. These articles provided for a fixing of the future peace strength of the standing army in Germany, and the development of a thorough organization of this army for war purposes.

The time was fixed for not later than 1874. One of the most important decisions concerning the external development of the empire was to be made, and the elections of 1874 stood under its influence. They were favorable to the further unification of the empire. The composition of the *Reichstag* showed a majority for the government, and its expected military plans, of

240 against 135 votes. With the result of the elections at hand, the government introduced a bill in the *Reichstag* which embodied the military preparation bill, provided in the constitution. It was practically a continuation of the conditions as they were at the time, but contained the important provision that henceforth the standing army of the German empire should at all times be composed of one per cent. of the population—at the time of the introduction of the bill amounting to 401,659 soldiers.

If the government had expected to see this bill accepted without trouble it was grievously in error. The left wing of the national-liberal party saw in the fixing of a definite army strength for the future (instead of from year to year) a *de facto* abolishment of their right to settle financial appropriations, and with that the collapse of the whole *Reichstag* structure. The army was one of the main reasons for an imperial tax system and imperial budget; if the strength of the standing army was fixed for a long time in advance by law, it took from all succeeding *Reichstags* the right of fixing the amount of money to be devoted to the army. The party would not hear of any other arrangement than the fixing of the size of the standing army each year at the time of the discussion of the budget.

The government promptly answered that it was impossible for Germany to leave the actual strength of its army to the annual discussion; for the exact figure being known in advance permitted the army organization to take measures for supplies and contracts still further in advance; if the number of soldiers remained unknown or elastic, the uniform administration of the army sustained a serious check and its entire structure would become precarious, because of uncertainties. Furthermore, the government believed that the continuity and reliability of the standing army, on the most precise advance knowledge, were absolutely necessary for the maintenance of a firm and influential foreign policy. The differences of opinion which arose over this matter in the *Reichstag* seemed impossible of settlement; Field Marshal von Moltke appeared personally in the *Reichstag* and delivered the longest and most passionate speech that ever came from his mouth—it was in vain; the opposition refused to budge an inch from its standpoint. Bismarck was ill; the situation became dangerous. It was then that the leader of the national-liberal party, von Bennigsen, offered a counter proposition: The proposed number of the standing army—one per cent. of the population—was to remain in force for the next seven years only. The amendment found favor

with all parties and the bill became law in April, 1874. The principle of a uniform German army as an imperial institution was assured.

The development of the army organization now continued along the lines laid out in the bill. There were a number of additions, such as the law covering the *Landsturm*, of February, 1875, under the terms of which any and all men between the years of seventeen and forty-two could be called to arms in case of utmost emergency; a number of minor improvements were also made, based on the experiences of the first year of the new law. The law was renewed in 1880 for another seven years, without material changes. It was not until 1887 that radical changes were found necessary. About this time Russia and France began a series of extraordinary armaments on land and sea, and there was considerable anxiety in Germany regarding the possible enemy against whom they might be directed. Under the influence of these armaments a new military law passed the parliament in February, 1888, a short time before the death of William I. Thus all foreign affairs passed, with the military control, entirely under the dominion of the empire. No prince of any individual state could take any independent step in a matter of foreign policy. And what has been said of the army applies still more sharply to

the fleet. The fleet was from its beginning solely a national institution.

Despite the undeniable influence of the army and navy on the national life, they are not such decisive forces as to remodel the whole life of the nation. They could not alone have developed the authority and influence of the empire, as against the traditional individual rights and powers of the individual federated states of the empire. This influence was exerted in a far greater degree by the imperial finance system and by the uniform financial administration of the imperial projects, through which the inhabitants of the various states came into much closer personal contact with the representatives of imperial authority.

These representatives, or imperial "ministers," also arose as a natural development from the constitution. The North German Federation, at the beginning, had been without any definite plan of uniform administration. It had been the idea of Bismarck that the few affairs of the Federation could easily be attended to by the Prussian authorities, in addition to their usual duties. Bismarck himself had no idea of becoming an official of the Federation, but desired to remain simply prime minister of the kingdom of Prussia. At that time there was still the idea prevalent that the presidency of the

Frankfort *Reichstag* belonged to Austria, and later that the North German *Reichstag* should be organized along the lines of the old Frankfort *Bundesrat* under the presidency of von Savigny. The president would have no other duties except to present and announce the federal laws and to see to it that they were carried out by the authorities.

But when the *Reichstag* was formed on the basis of a general election system, a discrepancy was discovered at once. Although the *Reichstag* had the same right as the *Bundesrat* to pass laws, and to discuss proposed laws with the representatives of the federated states, it had no means of controlling the administration of the laws which it passed. In other words, the *Reichstag*, as at first proposed, could say what the people should or could do, but had no means of making them do what they ought to do and preventing them from doing what they ought not to do. The *Reichstag* saw at once that the easiest way out of the dilemma was the appointment of *Reichs-ministers* (imperial officials) who were responsible to the *Reichstag*. The federated governments could not agree with the *Reichstag* on this point, and Bismarck also vetoed the plan. But the *Reichstag* was convinced that some one should be responsible for the actions of the federated government to the fed-

erated parliament and proposed the appointment of a special minister for this position. The person chosen for the work was the Prussian delegate to the *Bundesrat*; but when the bill establishing this post was passed into law, it contained the following sentence: "The orders and rules issued by the *Bundesrat* will be issued under the authority of the Federation, and require for their validity the signature of the *Bundeskanzler* (federal chancellor), who thereby assumes responsibility for them!" What had happened through the addition of this sentence? It had made out of a mere "Prussian delegate" a "responsible federal chancellor"!

Bismarck himself took this office, which he held until 1890, first as *Bundeskanzler* and later as *Reichskanzler* (chancellor of the German empire). The few words of this sentence had implanted in the federal field the seed of an "imperial" office, and within a short time imperial offices, administrators, officials, and, finally, a complete imperial administration were evolved. And what is most important, this new administration was not alongside and equal to the state administrations, but was clearly and frankly above them.

Bismarck established first of all the Bureau of the Chancellor, which in the beginning was a modest office with three departments: the cer-

tral department, which was really nothing but a secretarial office for the needs of the chancellor; the general post office, and the general manager's department of the imperial telegraph system. Soon there were added other departments: department for Alsace-Lorraine; department of justice; department of railroads; department of the imperial treasury, and so forth. Within a few years the duties of the Department of the Chancellor had increased to such an extent as to make it a physical impossibility for any one human being to keep posted on all its activities. Yet the constitution held the chancellor personally responsible for any and all actions taken by any official in any of the subdepartments.

This unbearable condition led again to the *Reichstag's* demand for a complete cabinet, responsible to the empire; but again the definite establishment of such a cabinet was avoided by a subterfuge. A law passed in 1878 established so-called imperial departments, under the responsible leadership of "secretaries." Although these secretaries were really responsible for their departments, they were not permitted to sign their orders and regulations as "responsible heads," but merely as temporary representatives, acting for the chancellor, who in theory remained responsible for the acts of these

secretaries. Cleared from its puzzling formalities and its confusing phraseology, the new situation actually presented an imperial cabinet under the leadership of the chancellor, as responsible prime minister; an arrangement which Bismarck considered as particularly suited to the uniform administration of the affairs of the empire, as well as to the constitutional monarchies of the independent states. And Bismarck managed to centralize his cabinet still further by establishing in the department a new bureau, called Central Bureau, which acted as intermediary between himself and the secretaries of the various departments.

With the establishment of this cabinet and the departments there had been created an imperial administration which since its inception has proven itself exceedingly adaptable and flexible. It soon made its influence felt in the legislation of the empire. For it was clear that the duty of preparing bills in connection with the budget, the consulate forces, naval matters, postal department and all similar national matters, must lie with the special departments and their secretaries. Any other state bureau must have failed in this respect, even the respective Prussian officials. It became an axiom that all such bills would be prepared in the chancellor's

office and then submitted to the *Reichstag* as imperial suggestions.

Did the kaiser, as such, have a right to offer suggestions? Not at all! The *Bundesrat* recognized the right of its members to introduce bills, and the king of Bavaria, king of Saxony, or king of Prussia, or their representatives, could introduce their suggestions as members; but there was no statute recognizing the kaiser as an authority as kaiser! As king of Prussia he might have introduced any bill he desired; but not in his capacity as German emperor. By means of the new chancellor's office and the bills prepared therein, the kaiser obtained a new privilege in the *Bundesrat*; a privilege which, so to say, placed him alongside and above the king of Prussia. It represented the establishment of the empire as a force which partook in the legislation itself; a living, breathing being: a fully developed personality. This was a development due in no small degree to the inexorable force of circumstances, but also to the admirable wording of the constitution. Despite the apparent individualism and federation principle which it seemed to represent, it contained the unifying element of the *Reichstag* and the universal, equal system of elections; and these must inevitably aid the centralization factor in its further evolution.

Did this unifying tendency of the new empire, whose rapid concentration and evolution we have followed in the preceding chapters, stop with the first years? Not by any means! It still continues at the present time, and some of its later developments are still to be related. There remained for its work a field which had hardly been touched at the beginning and which we have barely mentioned before—the field of imperial finance.

CHAPTER VI

BISMARCK'S FINANCIAL EFFORTS

THE North German Federation, as planned in the first draft of its constitution, would not have required a financial system at all. Of course there were some provisions in the constitution covering receipts from taxes, post office surplus moneys and customs duties. But these receipts were to be used solely for special purposes: army, navy and consulate service. Nothing was said regarding the expenses of a foreign department, of a chancellor of the empire, of a central administrative office. Anything that came into these categories was supposed to be paid by Prussia, as the leading power of the empire. If the receipts of the Federation showed a surplus over expenditures for the purposes named, this surplus was to be divided among the independent states according to population, while a deficit had to be made good by the states in proportion to their inhabitants. This was the system which had been originally proposed, quite expressive of the basic idea of a federation of states under the

hegemony of Prussia. The plan had no thought of federal debts, federal obligations, federal budget questions and a federal financial bureau. The original draft of the constitution did not even mention the word finance at all!

As soon as this project came before the elected representatives of the people, the question of money came up with decided emphasis. How about the budget? Every member wanted to know "where are you going to get the money, and after you've got it, what are you going to do with it?" They immediately demanded the preparation of an annual budget, and reserved to themselves the right to pass or reject it. As for the distribution of surplus receipts among the states—that was farthest from their intentions. Any surplus obtained should be utilized in a fund providing for possible later deficits; the matter of payments on the part of the states, in the event of a deficit, was called a make-shift arrangement. Instead of such an insecure arrangement they demanded the establishment of a proper federal tax system, and a federal right to take up a loan in emergencies. In a word, the *Reichstag* introduced a complete federal finance department without so much as asking the *Bundesrat's* opinion. The *Bundesrat* was dumfounded at the idea of facing a federal budget, and federal loans instead of individual

payments from the states. And, worse than that! if the federal finances were administered shrewdly and carefully, the imperial treasury would soon be in a position to lord it over the treasuries of the several states; the latter came, so to say, into the category of "free boarders," while the empire supplied them with the means to live.

Looking at the matter in the light of past history, was it not a fact that only with the introduction of an independent financial system of its own was the empire secured in its independence? The splendor of the early German emperors was dimmed, especially under the last of the Hohenstaufens, when the imperial finances went to pieces. The reforms in the empire which were attempted in the first half of the fifteenth century miscarried because the empire was not financially independent. And even later these money matters had come up to disturb promising developments. In the nineteenth century the Frankfort parliament avoided assiduously the placing of the federal finances in jeopardy by restricting them to contributions from the individual states; for such a course meant to deliver the empire, for good or evil, into the hands of the individual states. As Bismarck expressed it in homely form one day while discussing the question of the states contributing to the im-

perial treasury, "Such an arrangement makes it easy to move out. If you don't like the accommodations any longer you seek better quarters; and you are likely to take all the possessions along with you." It became therefore one of the chief aims of the great chancellor to secure an independent income to the empire; and never, until the end of his days, could he forget for a moment the extreme importance of the independent budget for the new empire.

But how difficult were the problems which had to be solved once the decision was made to establish an imperial treasury and an imperial budget! It was of advantage at this time that even in the formation of the old territorial administrations in the old empire the direct taxes had been collected by the states and the indirect taxes by the empire. This view had been defended as early as 1430 by Nicholas von Kues, in his *Concordantia Catholica*, when he proposed the collection of imperial customs duties. The experience gained in the early times was never lost, for in 1848 the new empire was pictured chiefly as a united customs territory, in which the central authority should have the right of levying customs duties and passing laws regarding the levying of taxes and duties in the states. The actual collection of these taxes and duties was left to the states themselves.

After the establishment of the German empire, at a time when the finances of Prussia were in a precarious condition, and the large contributions to the imperial treasury difficult of liquidation, these views became more and more pronounced in the *Landtag*, and public opinion swung sharply to the side of the prime minister. Bismarck, at that time, was a free trader, as was nearly the whole conservative party; the times of the tremendous rivalry on the field of agricultural activity between Prussia and other countries of Europe had not yet begun. He was therefore still able to imagine a sort of assistance to the finances by duties levied for the purpose of obtaining funds, as distinct from the later plan of levying tariff duties for the protection of the home industries, in the first place, and incidentally providing additional funds for expansion purposes. Bismarck's idea was to distribute the duties over a great many commonly used articles, excepting bread, meat, milk and the cheaper vegetables. He would tax heavily spirits, beer, wine, tobacco and similar products. The duties levied at the frontiers would then be augmented by internal taxes, based on consumption of these products. Direct taxation was an abomination to Bismarck; he referred to it as a clumsy makeshift; the only use he could see in it was the inflicting of a tax

on incomes, beginning with 2,000 thalers annual income. Considering these views of Bismarck, one can understand how hard it was for him to admit that it would be best for the empire to levy the indirect taxes, while the individual states would collect the direct taxes. This difficulty Prince Bismarck solved at first by himself taking sole charge of the federal finances, in which field he devoted himself to the indirect tax system.

True he had little success with his first suggestions. The financial programme of 1869, which proposed an increase in the duty on kerosene, as well as an increased tax on cordials and beer, remained without success. Successive attempts in 1872 and 1875 also failed; nothing but a very moderate increase in the tax on breweries and a stamp tax for bank drafts and promissory notes was installed. These first attempts showed how difficult it was to obtain from the *Reichstag* any consent to taxing mass articles—ordinary products used by the people in large quantities. The conservative party would have followed the suggestions of Bismarck, but it was not then the political party representative of the government. The liberals, who at this time were in control, knew and realized the importance of the tax laws, but remained opposed to Bismarck's ideas, mainly out

of fear for their constituents. The financial policy of the new empire seemed on the sure road to disaster, when help arrived from a quarter which had been closely connected with the former activities of the chancellor, the commercial policies. The free trade idea of the early seventies had frowned on anything but nominal import duties; suddenly the idea changed and the desire for protective tariffs gained ground. Was it not plain that such a change must inevitably bring the desired solution of the imperial finance problem? The second half of the seventies brought this change. In the years from 1867 to 1876 the liberal commercial laws controlled everything. It was the time of the complete emancipation of free enterprise, and its basic principle of free competition naturally demanded free trade; tariff after tariff was thrown out of the programme of the *Zollverein*.

In the meantime, however, the situation in the German industries and commerce changed. The period of high finance (1871-1872) was followed by a terrible panic (1873), and it became plain that the young enterprises of the New Germany were not yet strong enough to stand free competition with the older, more experienced industries of other countries without some assistance from the empire. The farmers, on the other hand, to whom free trade in grain was almost

a gospel, experienced vigorous competition from abroad, and grain began to flood into Germany, nearly carrying the agricultural interests off their feet. Nothing but a high protective tariff seemed likely to counteract this competition, and the field was prepared for another attempt on the part of Bismarck to force a new tariff law through the *Reichstag*.

Even before this movement had become quite clear to the people, President Delbrück, leader of the Prussian-German commercial policy, asked for his resignation. Calm and conservative, he represented in his person the system of free trade; his resignation therefore struck all as a sign of portentous changes in the policies governing trade and industry. Were these changes intended by Bismarck as early as 1876? The government documents of that time do not answer the question, and nothing is known privately of Bismarck's plans at that time.

What Bismarck desired to improve first of all were the finances of the empire. For a time he met his former poor success. In March, 1877, he had become so disgusted with the useless fight that he became openly sarcastic and embittered: "Go and collect your contributions from the states, and if that isn't enough, take the state railroads and sell them at auction, or the private domains of the states and change

them into money—in short, use up the whole national wealth, like a profligate who eats up his capital!" But he did not drop all attempts; it seemed impossible for him to give up. Before the end of 1877 he was busily negotiating with von Bennigsen, leader of the national-liberals, trying to convince him of the necessity of becoming minister of finance or of the interior. Bismarck hoped by a closer association with the national-liberals to attain his objects. But when von Bennigsen took the offer in the light of a complete liberal ministry and demanded the simultaneous appointment of von Stauffenberg and von Forckenbeck, who were among the most rabid "left liberals," Bismarck thought the price too high—even granted that Emperor William would have approved of such a change. He therefore tried once more the old bouquet of taxes—a pleasing arrangement of production and consumers' taxes.

Minister Camphausen presented this bouquet anew to the *Reichstag* in the beginning of 1878. The *Reichstag* did not like the aroma of the faded nosegay and threw it out. The only flower saved from it was the tax on playing cards. Camphausen, who made a poor impression before the *Reichstag* on the occasion of the presentation of the "bouquet," was treated so insultingly by the disgusted chancellor that he re-

signed at once. And his successor, Hobrecht, barely succeeded in convincing the federated states of the general desirability of Bismarck's plans by excluding the tobacco monopoly, which occupied the central position in the Bismarckian tax bouquet. In this desperate situation a number of events occurred which forced the issue. The parties which heretofore had preached free trade found themselves in difficulty with their constituents because of the foreign competition. They had to embrace the high protective tariff.

The two attempts to kill the old emperor did their share in the revulsion of feeling; for the second attempt was the direct result of the dissolution of the *Reichstag*, after the *Reichstag* in session had refused to pass a strict law directed against the socialists, which had been introduced shortly after the first attack. Never did the clear and rapid thinking of Prince Bismarck show itself to better advantage than in this emergency. Less than an hour after the second attack (May 2, 1878), Prince Bismarck, who was then in Friedrichsruhe (not far from Hamburg), was informed of it. After a moment's hesitation he combined rapidly the consequences of this second attack with his financial policies, and exclaimed, while the messenger stood waiting: "*Jetzt lösen wir den Reichstag auf!*" (Now we'll dissolve that *Reichstag*!) It was not until he had

given vent to his calculating plan that he remembered the serious condition of the emperor and found time to ask after his wounds and all the details. Twenty-four hours later the *Reichstag* was dissolved.

The election platforms which now made their appearance showed a complete revolution in imperial politics. The center and the conservative parties demanded vehemently the immediate dropping of the free-trade ideas; a new tariff was demanded which "would be regulated according to the requirements of the growing German industries and the reciprocal intentions of the neighboring countries." This was the beginning of the protective tariff system for Germany.

After the elections had spoken in July, 204 members of the new *Reichstag* joined in a loose "politico-economic union." The programme of this union was worked out along general lines; declarations such as "it is not so much a matter of free trade and protective tariff, which are merely slogans, but to equalize the differences of opinion, both real and imaginary, with care and patriotism." In spite of these vague expressions it was clear that the union was ready to accept a protective tariff plan as soon as such a plan would be submitted to the *Reichstag*. And as this union comprised an absolute majority of the *Reichstag*—Bismarck smiled! The union had

87 members of the center or Catholic party, 36 conservatives and 37 free-conservatives, and only 27 national-liberals and members of the small parties. Thus the elections of 1878 brought a strong return of the conservatives, while the anti-Catholic movement had quieted down under the new pope Leo XIII, and the liberals had lost their predominance in the *Reichstag*, falling from 176 to 135 votes. Hence it became clear that the empire and its policies need no longer remain under the influence of the liberals, but could appeal to the conservatives and the center party.

Prince Bismarck had grown disgusted with political life and the unthinking opposition which he encountered, and planned a coup which involved his seeming resignation as prime minister and chancellor. As he had expected, the emperor refused to accept his resignation (April, 1877), but granted him a leave of absence of ten months, until February, 1878. He utilized this time not so much for recuperation, but for the purpose of a thorough, clear analysis of the conditions as they existed, and a close examination of the events of the past thirty years, in which he had taken such a prominent part. Free from the continuous interruption and strain of his responsible positions, he gained a remarkably clear insight into the causes of things and the

correct line of evolution which the empire was destined to follow. He saw things clearly then, which some of his able contemporaries did not perceive until years later.

Be this as it may, the moment certainly had arrived in which the chancellor discovered that the decisive free-trade policies of 1861-1865 had condemned German industries and agriculture to a species of consumption, which had only been covered and hidden by the rain of money from France in 1872-1874. Compared with the precarious condition of the German industries, he saw the neighboring states of Austria and Russia on a wave of prosperity which was to no small degree due to their high protective tariffs. If he directed his glance westward he saw a country which in 1877 had increased its protective tariff, and which had gained enormous sums from indirect taxation as well as the tobacco monopoly. And if he looked further, across the Channel to England, he had to admit at once that the young, undeveloped German industry could not hope to compete successfully with the extensive industries of England, without at least temporary assistance in the form of protective tariffs. He therefore came to the conclusion that the only possible way to assist the nation to organize a satisfactory financial system would be to provide for indirect taxation, such as the

tobacco monopoly, and for a strong protective tariff in connection with the existing customs duties already being collected for the purposes of finance.

Bismarck came to a final conclusion in this field at the time of the formation of the "politico-economic union," as explained in his memorandum of December 25, 1878. He placed the financial requirements in the foreground, in which respect he not only carried out his own original ideas, but also furnished a medium of understanding with the individual states, some of which had suffered greatly under the system of contributions toward the imperial treasury. These were the fundamental reasons; there were others of much greater importance. His main object now was to reserve the "national market for national products"—in other words, to prevent any product of a foreign country from being sold cheaper in Germany than the same product made in Germany.

In order to accomplish this Bismarck planned a railroad law which would forbid all the big railroad lines quoting preferential rates to any foreign shipper. And the policy of customs duties included the payment of a tax on any and all products crossing the frontier, excepting only those raw materials which were necessary to the industries of Germany, but which could not be

grown or produced within its borders. All products were to be taxed in such a manner as to bring their selling price in Germany to at least the same height as the native product of similar type. Although this policy may seem to be chiefly developed in order to protect the native industries, it supplied to Bismarck the important factor of *finances*, which, it must be admitted, was at this time his *alpha* and *omega*.

In this connection it is necessary to call attention to the incredible size of the state's contributions which had been made in the years after the panic. They had risen from 59,000,000 marks in 1873 to 70,000,000 marks in 1878. And the very fact that they could differ so much in individual years indicated financial anarchy in the budgets of the individual states, as they could not tell beforehand how great their contribution to the imperial treasury would have to be at the time when their own budgets were made up. Added to this must be the evident injustice of the division of the contributions. They were arranged according to the size of the population, without the least regard to average income or average prosperity within the state. A comparatively poor agricultural population of 2,000,000 people would have to pay a larger share than a population of 1,800,000 centered around great industrial plants and possessed of

much greater individual and collective incomes.

This was to be changed entirely. Not only would the empire no longer ask contributions from the state for the purpose of paying for its own administration expenses, but it would even pay moneys to the states. To be able to do this the empire required 70,000,000 marks of new taxes in 1879, and this sum could be easily obtained by a protective tariff, by indirect taxation of liquors, tobacco and documents, in connection with which it seemed advisable to establish a tobacco monopoly. If such a project became law, the empire would take charge of the indirect taxes, and the individual states of the direct taxes.

This was the theory of taxation and commerce demanded by a new era, as Prince Bismarck announced it to the nation toward the end of 1878; a system which was undoubtedly opposed to the former views of the chancellor, particularly in the points of protective tariff suggestions, which were directly opposed to his former free-trade ideas. But protective tariff and free trade are unstable contradictions, whose amalgamation depends entirely upon the temporary economic conditions of the people. And besides, the protective tariff assured Prince Bismarck at last of a stable financial policy for the empire.

The nation responded to the announcement

of the new financial programme with an excitement such as had not convulsed it since the Franco-Prussian War. The passions rose the higher the more the regulations required a deep analytical thinking along political lines, and considerable financial experience, both of which were requirements not possessed by the majority of the people. The consequence was that every beer garden, every restaurant, was filled with shoutings and discussions about commercial politics, financial programmes, etc. Everybody, down to the most ignorant laborer and farmer's hired hand, tried to express his opinions as to what was necessary in international commerce, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of free trade and protective tariff. The weeks that followed the announcement of this programme were weeks of political schooling for Germany's electors, which advanced their political education by leaps and bounds. Above all the discussions in homes and public meeting places, there raged a bitter fight through the press of the country, in which thousands of ancient, modern and ultramodern theories and ideas were played against one another, and which in its comprehensiveness and intensity only served to confuse the readers more than ever. The whole excitement finally culminating in a veritable cloudburst of popular petitions which rained

upon the members of the *Reichstag*, the *Bundesrat* and, not the least, upon the head of the old Iron Chancellor.

In the midst of this vortex of debates the *Reichstag* assembled, February, 1879, and immediately endeavored to crystallize some of the paragraphs of the new tariff bill into acceptable laws. The portion of the tariff bill dealing with the railroad administration failed at the first attempt. But Bismarck managed later to recoup this loss by inducing the *Landtag* of Prussia to pass a law for the nationalization of the railroads and their sale to the empire. He had better fortune with the succeeding portions of the tariff programme, especially in so far as the individual interests of the various federated states were concerned.

The way to a new tariff law was opened through the continued postponement of new tariff arrangements with Austria, after the war of 1866. The *Bundesrat*, it will be recalled, had also appointed a special commission which was to decide upon the question of protective duties and purely financial duties. In February, 1879, at the same time that the *Reichstag* began the deliberations on the tariff, Bismarck placed before the *Bundesrat* commission a programme of discussion relating to duties on such articles as kerosene, coffee, tea and tropical fruits, which in

their very nature were purely "financial duties," as the problem of "protecting a home industry" is evidently absent in considering tropical products. By placing these duties before the *Bundesrat* commission the chancellor succeeded in mixing financial tariff and protective tariff in such a manner as to make them appear a single measure—which was far from being the case in reality.

The commission, working diligently and at high speed, succeeded in finishing its deliberations by March, and in the last week of the month its results were announced. A high protective tariff was provided for industrial raw products, such as iron, coal and copper; agricultural products received very high protective duties on grain, cattle and lumber. Rye, corn and barley were taxed at twenty-five pfennig per hundredweight; wheat, oats and pulse were taxed fifty pfennig per hundredweight. The *Bundesrat* accepted this programme readily, even adding at the suggestion of Bismarck the provision that these duties were to be doubled in case of such countries as maintained a high tariff on German products. This programme was one of the clearest examples of reciprocity commerce at that time; it was a powerful factor in the commercial development of Germany and other European states.

This tariff and finance reform next came before the *Reichstag*. It was found that the favorable agricultural protective duties had pleased the agrarian population immensely, and that the conservative party as a whole was distinctly in favor of the bill. Bismarck now needed but the support of any one of the other scattered parties in order to force the bill through the *Reichstag*. This came to be the deciding moment in the life of the liberal party, especially that portion of it styled "modern liberals." If the entire liberal party, with its various factions, could stick together in this question, it could still control legislation and could use its deciding vote as a club over the head of the administration. And if it should decide to vote for the passage of this bill it would greatly strengthen its position in the political life of the nation. Such action seemed clearly presaged because of the large number of national-liberals who had declared themselves for protective duties. The radical section of the liberal party, however, won out; and its leader, Lasker, opposed Bismarck in the *Reichstag* in the most strenuous manner. His adherents caused such a dissension in the ranks of the liberals that their party no longer could claim a degree of unity entitling it to consideration as a whole. Bismarck's negotiations with Bennigsen remained without result, because the

leader of the national-liberals pointed out to the chancellor that if the empire controlled such a large income from tariff receipts it became independent of the *Reichstag* in the matter of income; the annual budget debate, therefore, became nothing but a farce, a joke. What was the use of a budget discussion if the administration collected enough money to keep its expenses going on uninterruptedly, whether the *Reichstag* agreed with its budget or not? There was good logic in this, and the negotiations fell through.

The debate on the tariff was the end of the solidarity of the liberal party. It soon afterward split into several independent factions. Twenty members of the national-liberal party separated from the rest and joined for a short time the radical faction of Eugen Richter. Later, in 1893, they disagreed with Richter's policies and formed the "freethinking union" (*Freisinnige Vereinigung*). The liberal split into factions naturally caused a considerable loss in numerical strength in the *Reichstag*. Besides, the action of the liberals showed that they were inclined to place their own individual "doctrinary" ideas above the national needs; and this sounded the death knell of the liberal party as a compelling force in Germany. Disgusted with the turn of affairs, von Bennigsen, the able leader of the national-liberals, resigned his posts

in the *Reichstag* and the Prussian house of representatives (1883).

Returning to the debates regarding the tariff bill in 1879, there was a third party which might be considered as a decisive factor—the center party. It is true there were in the midst of the clericals some elements which hated all ideas of protective tariffs; but they were in the minority, and were under the strict control of the more modern, moderate majority, so that they could not afford to oppose it in matters of politics. This majority, politically conservative and reasonably moderate, defending frequently the interests of the agrarians, was found on the same side with the latter as far as protective tariffs were concerned. In the matter of the purely “financial tariffs,” however, the center party had grave doubts. Should it really assist the German empire in establishing its finances on this firm basis? The doubts which arose in the midst of the debates finally suggested a means of escape. It was proposed by the center party that, in return for the assistance in passing this bill on financial duties, the empire should agree to some plan under which the “flood of money” would not be used for purposes which might injure the federated Union; that is, which would still leave the individual states some sort of authority over financial matters.

An amendment was offered which seemed to provide this guarantee. It was only necessary to turn over to the empire not the entire receipts from the duties collected, but only a part; for instance, 130,000,000 marks. The remainder should be collected and turned over to the states of the empire, whereupon the latter, assisted in their budgets by the imperial contributions, would in turn be able to continue the old contributions toward the support of the imperial administration, which had been included in the constitution of the empire when it was formed. The amendment, introduced by Freiherr von Franckenstein, found favor with the conservatives in June, 1879. It was now distinctly up to the government to declare itself; its assent would mean the passage of the tariff bill. Bismarck did not hesitate long as to his actions. He viewed the Franckenstein clause not as an obstacle, but as a smooth road, perhaps a little roundabout but still fairly easy, to the financial independence of the empire. And it was worth a little concession to find that the center, the obstinate clerical party, actually could lay aside its particularism and doctrines long enough to pass a truly "national" law, a law which required that patriotism be placed above particularism.

The new German tariff law was passed by the

Reichstag on July 12, 1879, with a majority of 217 votes (conservatives and clerical-center) against 107 votes (liberals, socialists and scattered votes). Several amendments, among which were a further increase on iron duties and an increase of all grain duties to fifty pfennigs per hundredweight, were also passed. Bismarck, it is true, did not succeed in forcing through his favorite scheme of a tobacco monopoly; but he gained the consent of the *Reichstag* to put a duty of eighty-five marks on foreign tobacco and forty-five marks on the domestic product.

Aside from all the effects of this protective tariff law on the industries and commerce of the empire, the latter thereby obtained at least an income of respectable dimensions, without the aid of the individual states; yes, it actually became a sort of "rich uncle" to those of the smaller states which were always in financial difficulties. Bismarck's hope for a financially independent German empire seemed fulfilled after ten years of hard work.*

But these great problems of imperial finance

*A comparison of the contributions paid by the states to the empire in the period of high tariffs is of interest here: In 1878-1879 the states paid to the empire 70 million marks; in 1880-1881, under the new law, 25.9 millions; 1881-1882, 17.1 millions; 1882-1883, 1.4 millions. In 1883-1884 the empire be-

had hardly been solved when new perplexing problems arose. The several states, with their budgets completely changed and prosperous because of the great sums paid to them by the imperial treasury, had to instigate immediately some sort of tax rearrangement, something to lighten the increased burden of taxes on the poor. This was chiefly the case in Prussia. Here again it was Prince Bismarck who was the driving power. His aim was, first of all, to ease the taxation on the poorer classes which had been especially hard hit by some of the indirect imperial taxes and duties. The remedy was to be a system of class taxation and a graduated income tax. The lowest class that had formerly to pay an income tax was to be freed from it entirely; and the stamp tax, which rested particularly heavily on the agricultural population, was to be abolished. The communities, too, were to be assisted by the state's taking over the communal school and police taxes, and dedicating the receipts of all building and real estate taxes to the communities themselves. The state itself was to arrange for a system of taxation of

gan to assist the states with 11.5 millions; 1884-1885 with 50 millions; 1885-1886, 13 millions. The total receipts of the empire from duties amounted to 100 million marks in the '70s; 200 million in the '80s; and 350 million in the last year of Bismarck's administration, 1889-1890.

money, both mobile and immobile capital, which would bear equally heavily upon both.

In order to carry out such a gigantic financial reform in a state of the size and strength of Prussia, it was necessary to have an absolutely safe majority in the *Landtag*, and also a stiffening of the imperial duties. In the other states it would only be possible to carry out the proposed tax reforms by a generous assistance from the imperial treasury. And the chancellor was always careful to include these states in this discussion, although Prussia was undoubtedly chiefly in his mind. The other states, of course, would benefit from such legislation in exactly the same manner as Prussia; and Bismarck counted on this fact to force his increase in imperial duties through the *Reichstag*. The members of the *Reichstag* could never forget that they were residents of certain states within the empire, which states would benefit if the empire levied higher duties.

Bismarck soon discovered that the Prussian *Landtag* was not yet ready to follow his far-reaching plans. Not even those good friends of Bismarck, the agrarian conservatives, could see the necessity of such schemes. The reform was accomplished in only a few minor points. The great majority of the proposed innovations did not become law until after Bismarck's with-

drawal from the post of chancellor; they were then carried out under the energetic, shrewd management of Miquel, minister of finance in Prussia.

Bismarck had still less success in inducing the *Reichstag* to open further sources of imperial income. For in the meantime a reconstruction had begun in the ranks of the liberal party, which made it exceedingly difficult for the administration to count on a solid majority for its projects. Instead of being able to do this, the administration had to enter upon a difficult political game, in which it was compelled to play the interests of one party against those of the others, and to attempt to obtain a majority for each particular case. But none of the possible combinations was constituted so as to assure compliance with the financial ventures of Bismarck. True, wherever protective tariff and financial tariff touched, or overlapped, the old majority of the "politico-economic union" could be marshaled for the fight; but the amalgamation of these two types of tariff had been utilized to the utmost. Hereafter it could only be a question of extending the income and inheritance taxes, and the internal revenue duties on beer, spirits, sugar and tobacco. As in the decade 1869-1879, the *Reichstag* failed the chancellor again, and chiefly for the same reasons.

Under these conditions it was but natural that Bismarck should try to connect his future attempts with those previous to 1879, when Camphausen had presented that famous "bouquet of taxes" which the *Reichstag* threw out with little ceremony, retaining only the proposed tax on playing cards, which produced an annual income of only 1.2 million marks. The attempt to squeeze through a tobacco monopoly, on the occasion of the tariff bill, failed completely. The *Bundesrat* voted against it, and the *Reichstag* granted a small increase of duty on foreign tobacco and one on domestic kinds. A tobacco sale license was refused by the *Reichstag* after the *Bundesrat* had accepted it; for the members of the house thought it represented a first step toward the hated monopoly.

The whole situation presented a serious warning to the people to look out for further attempts to pass indirect taxation laws. The monopoly idea was also discarded by the *Bundesrat*, because its members saw too great a danger in an imperial monopoly which would menace the states themselves. Bismarck again and again tried to pass some sort of monopoly on tobacco and on spirits, but his experiences were not exactly pleasant. The *Bundesrat*, it is true, finally agreed to establish a monopoly on tobacco, which would have yielded an income of

at least 165,000,000 marks; but the *Reichstag*, in the spring of 1882, soon made an end to Bismarck's expectations. Neither the center party, nor the liberals, nor the democrats would hear of such an unpopular measure; it was declined with the crushing vote of 277 against 43. But even while the debate was going on, and as soon as Bismarck saw how things were going against him, he exclaimed in the *Reichstag*: "Go ahead and refuse it! We want your refusal to pass this measure, so that we can justify ourselves in the future, if we are compelled to introduce 'less favorable' taxation plans." These less favorable plans he now proceeded to prepare by going further back into the experiences of the times before 1879.

He had attempted, at that time, to force through a brewing and a stamp tax, but was compelled to drop the former after the *Bundesrat* had given its assent to it; the *Reichstag* declared in advance of a vote that a brewery tax would be discussed only in connection with a general tax on spirits. There remained only the stamp tax, and with this the chancellor managed to squeeze through both *Reichstag* and *Bundesrat*, although only after a hard fight in the latter. In July, 1881, Emperor William signed the new stock exchange tax law. This required a tax of one-half of one per cent. on foreign and domestic

shares in incorporated companies; one-fifth of one per cent. on foreign and domestic bonds and government securities; one-tenth of one per cent. on domestic bonds issued by municipalities and communities; a lottery tax of five per cent.; and a straight stamp tax for all bills of exchange, mortgages and similar property transfer papers. This, as was shown soon, was a very small financial success; but to the historian the passage of this law is of more importance and value than huge tariff laws bringing hundreds of millions into a state treasury. For this law was the first attempt to place the burden of the support of the state on the rich, on the users of capital, instead of loading the poor and working class with unequal burdens. This care for the poor has become in Germany the principle on which all future taxation and legislation were based and still are based.

When Bismarck saw that he could not possibly obtain the acceptance of a tobacco monopoly, not even under the high pressure of the financial demands for the new social enterprises of the state, he turned to the whisky monopoly. His defeat in this was even worse. The bill providing for the establishment of a monopoly on spirits was defeated *unanimously*, a humiliation which stands without a parallel in German history. Bismarck was furious, but unlike other

men he did not flinch or resign. He came back instantly at the *Reichstag* with a bill raising the tax on spirits to 114 million marks annually, excepting in South Germany, which at first had a separate whisky tax. The *Reichstag*, after having shown Bismarck its power, was in a more lenient mood, and passed the new taxation laws without much dispute. The tax on sugar went through without opposition and yielded an additional 50,000,000 marks.*

These were the last successes of the chancellor in the field of finance. True, he had not attained all that he had tried for, namely, a thorough construction of an imperial indirect taxation, aside from the tariff duties. But he had at least succeeded in showing the way, and even in proceeding a short distance along it himself. The advance would take care of itself in the future; for, taken all in all, the accomplishments had been enormous. Never in the history of the world was a great empire created out of a conglomeration of states and duchies and territories and free cities, with more than a dozen distinct nationalities among its population, and

* A comparison of the income of the empire from these taxes may be of interest: In 1874 the yield was 246,000,000 marks—in 1889-1890, the last year of Bismarck's rule, it was 587,000,000 marks! The stamp tax in 1874 yielded 6,000,000 marks—in 1889-1890 it brought 42,500,000 marks!

then furnished with sufficient financial means in so smooth a manner. The empire had not only attained complete financial independence from the individual states, but it had acquired an undeniable supremacy over them. It had obtained full means to take care of all the needs of defense against enemies and expansion of its administrative policies. More than that! It had collected so much funds that it could undertake to carry out a socialistic programme, could take care of the poor, the needy, the sick, the invalids, a method of procedure which opened an undreamed-of circle of influence to the imperial government. Its kindly care entered into the hearts and souls of the people, into their homes in time of trouble and industrial panic. It made the people see in the government the true and ever-ready protector against attacks from without, and sickness and death from within. Germans began to feel themselves "children of the state," looking to the state for precisely those things for which a child looks to its father. And if the state carried out this policy, if the expectations of the people did not fail, not the least of Bismarck's merits was that he, and he alone, had had the brain and power to force this legislation upon the people—often against their will, always against spirited opposition. What Germany owes to Bismarck in the field of legislation

for the poor is becoming more and more evident from year to year. He, the *junker*, the aristocrat, the prince, the "Iron Chancellor," was nevertheless the most effective of all friends to the poor man.

CHAPTER VII

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OLD AGE, INVALID AND SICK INSURANCE

THE years 1860 to 1877 had been an era of liberality and generosity toward the demands of industrial and commercial enterprise. The laws of the North German Federation especially had had this effect. A summary of the most important of the laws passed during this period would include the abolishing of the passport between the states, freedom of domicile wherever the individual pleased, the right of coalition between employers as well as employees, civil marriage, the abolishing of imprisonment for debts, the abolishment of the right of a creditor to garnishee the wages or salary of an employee for any cause, and other steps involving the freedom of action of manufacturers with their employees and of employees among themselves.

The years before the development of this new spirit had been guided by the idea that the em-

ployee was in some manner personally dependent upon the employer. It was for that reason that the laws referred to *knecht* (servant) and *Brot-herr* (master). Men were far from the modern conception of labor as a commodity, a product for sale. Where personal services came into connection with objective values in political economy, labor appeared as a sort of attachment that belonged to the soil, which was the only actual property value of those times. Labor was sold or rented together with the soil, or the farm, or the estate. By thus looking on all service from the viewpoint of the employer, there naturally was a tendency to utilize it in the manner most productive for the employer, instead of considering it an economical asset. There was also a natural desire to exert a dominating influence over the private life of the employee in the field of dispensing justice, in military leadership and in similar affairs. This changed the private relation between employer and employee into one of public submissiveness. These had been the aims of all landed proprietors from the seventh century until the middle of the nineteenth. And in correspondence with this series of "masters' rights" there were also "masters' duties," *noblesse oblige!* Chief of these duties was protection against external influences. It was most certainly unthinkable

that any landed proprietor should permit his servants to go hungry. Even Charlemagne had impressed the feudal lords with the necessity of protecting their servants and slaves against the ravages of famine which at that time struck Germany; he called this duty the *officium nobile*. This duty has been recognized ever since as one of the most important of all public duties; gradually this feeling of responsibility for the well-being of the poorer classes permeated the community, and later the state. By the middle of the nineteenth century it had, in Germany, thoroughly become a part of the self-assumed duties of both Church and State.

Later the great extension of commerce and industry brought up in the minds of the members of these enterprises the idea that, after all, labor must be a marketable quantity—a product just as purchasable as any product of agriculture and industry. Even before the great commercial enterprises completed this transformation, the relationship between employer and employee had undergone a great change. The journeyman was no longer considered as a “servant” of the baker, the butcher, or shoemaker, or cooper, but as a worker for wages. These wages were no longer paid in part cash and part “family privileges”; they were based on a solid cash foundation, regulated not infre-



William I. proclaimed Emperor of Germany at Versailles, January 18, 1871.

quently by the growing power of the workmen's associations, later the trades unions.

But the complete transformation of "labor" into a "capital," if one may use this expression, did not take place until the great period of industrial expansion in 1872-1873. The transformation was then natural; the familiar relationship which existed between the employer and a corps of from five to perhaps twenty-five employees was evidently impossible in the case of a manufacturer employing several hundreds and even thousands of persons, among whom there naturally must be weekly if not daily changes. It is still doubtful whether the future will bring a return to some sort of patriarchal relation between employer and employee; there are certain indications in modern industrial enterprises which seem to presage some such arrangement, but the tendencies in that direction are still too vague to permit of a clear understanding. For the present we can say that modern enterprises have destroyed the personal intercourse and personal feeling between the man at the head of an enterprise and those whom he pays for carrying out his orders.

This idea, which consciously or unconsciously penetrated into the liberal legislation of this period, found an important obstacle in another consideration. Just as the human body could no

longer be considered as a part of some piece of property to be sold with it; so, on the other hand, it could not be classed entirely as a "purchasable quantity," an absolute part of capital. It can never be forgotten in any legislation covering the laboring classes that behind each body there is an immortal soul and a distinct personality. Only barbarian legislation can ignore the one in seeking to control the other. Can labor, as a product of a human body, be sold, while the body itself is classed as a sort of emballage, a packing in which the purchasable product, "labor" is sold or shipped? Most assuredly not! And it follows that the laborer, as a human being, must think and feel just as other human beings do. This idea which to the modern American seems so evident and so self-understood is not by any means an old established principle. Barely fifty years ago the majority of human beings on the earth were inclined to argue the point, as to whether or not the slave, servant, bondman, or whatever he may be called, actually had a soul just the same as the employer! He who ventured to suggest that the lower man was just as good met ridicule and obstinate hatred.

This human side of labor, as might have been expected, was at first left out of the question in the modern relation between employer and em-

ployee. The very privileges which were to help both to better circumstances became full of dangers. The "free privilege" of moving, of quitting, of transferring one's home from one end of Germany to the other, was gradually used by the employers in deliberately squeezing the laborer. Of course the laborer had a legal right to resist this treatment: he could refuse to sell his labor under conditions which did not suit him. But could he actually do this? Was it true that the two parties to the agreement, as supposed in the legislation relating to labor and capital, occupied equally strong positions?

In order to make the laborer equally independent he had to have two things: first, a satisfactory wage and a recognition of his personality, and, second, a provision which would protect him against those times of need and trouble which were always considered in the old patriarchal arrangement. The protection of the laborer and a "labor insurance system" were therefore two things which required immediate attention on the part of the empire. This principle has been recognized in all modern civilized countries as a necessary correlated adjunct to labor emancipation and free development. In Germany attempts to regulate this matter date back to 1844, when an association was formed at Berlin, under the name "Society for the Wel-

fare of Working People," supported chiefly by a number of the leading "captains of industry." This later changed its name to the "Central Association for the Welfare of the Working Classes." Aside from this enterprise on the part of a few individuals there was little done along the lines of state legislation, although everybody seemed to realize that a proper solution of the question could only come as the result of "social" legislation. In the meantime the number of factory workers rose to several millions; and beside them there appeared the mass of agricultural workers who were shifted from year to year into the modern relation between employer and employee. And finally there were the great masses of the trade workers. It was absolutely necessary that the liberal party should undertake some legislation which would modify the dangerous conditions.

The first law to make a decisive impression on the laboring class was that regulating the wage question of such laborers as had become indebted to some one. The creditor could not garnishee the salary or wage of any employee for debt; this prevented the indebted laborer from becoming a public charge. A still more important law was passed in 1871, which provided that an employer in whose plant there occurred an accident was to be held responsible

for the damages inflicted on the workingmen; but the law was faulty in that it made the proof of negligence on the part of the employer a necessary item. Expensive lawsuits had to be fought over the question of responsibility, and it was not until much later that a law came into effect which brought all accident questions before a court, without cost to the workingman, the orders of which court were binding.

In 1874 the *Reichstag* took up the question of Sunday labor, child labor and women's labor in manufacturing establishments, as well as that of preventing the growing habit of breaking employer's contracts for frivolous causes. But no definite laws were passed covering these matters. Two years later a law was passed regulating the sick insurance problem by the establishment of semi-official insurance funds, applicable to all the members of a certain trade. All these steps were merely a trying out of the real problems. They were mere beginnings in the field of social legislation, which later was carried to such extraordinary lengths in Germany.

In the meantime, investigations carried on outside the trades and the liberal political parties had brought to light numerous inconsistencies and faults which required attention. In the first place, it was discovered that not only the laborer, but also the skilled artisan, suffered

under the so-called "free expansion" of industry and commerce. In fact, it seemed as if the skilled artisan was far worse off than the unskilled laborer. The trades stood apparently before a yawning precipice, and loud complaints were voiced in the big meetings in 1872 and succeeding years. The churches, too, particularly the Catholic Church, had made a number of suggestions as to how to ameliorate conditions in the trades, but with little success.

Strange to say, the activity of the empire, as a champion of the working class, began in a very inauspicious manner. In fact, on first glance, it appeared as if the states had suddenly become reactionary and were disposed to crush the rising head of the fourth class, the laborer. The socialists became exceedingly turbulent in 1873 and the succeeding years, until their pernicious activity led two weak-minded fanatics to make successive attempts to kill the old Emperor William in 1878. The two attempts have been of the most tremendous influence on the legislation of Germany. Bismarck realized the situation better and more quickly than any other statesman living at the time, and his course of procedure was both drastic and peculiar. He forced his "socialist laws" through the *Reichstag*, which were to prevent further trouble-making on the part of the socialists; and while

the turbulent elements were thus held in check for a while, he proceeded to erect a structure of social legislation which would take all the wind out of the sails of the agitators. At the time, however, no one knew his intentions, and he was hooted and insulted by the socialists as their vilest foe.

Bismarck has been often misunderstood in his relationship with the socialists. He has been branded as a reactionary, as the enemy of the poor people and as everything else except what he was, a half socialist himself, whom fate and his own tremendous energy and ability had placed at the head of the young German empire, a man in whose hands the emperor was like wax. He was always deeply concerned with the betterment of the fourth class, even in those days when he forced through the laws making free competition in trade and industry easier, laws which at the time seemed to hurt the employee. It is not a matter of general knowledge that Bismarck was a close friend of the brilliant young socialist, Lassalle, and was for a long time very friendly with Lassalle's followers. It was not until these extremists leaned toward the "gospel of murder and arson" that the Iron Chancellor turned away in disgust. But with the moderate socialists he maintained friendly relations for a long time, taking Bucher,

Lassalle's closest friend, into the foreign office. He even asked one of the extreme socialists, Rodbertus, to write a book for him on the financial needs of the farming population, while Dühring, another radical socialist, prepared for Bismarck a pamphlet suggesting legislation in favor of workingmen. Bismarck even sent personal and government representatives to the Eisenach congress of the association for social politics, which was formed to agitate for better laws for the laboring class.

The very fact that Bismarck went so far afield to obtain information and knowledge concerning conditions, and to seek suggestions for the best method of ameliorating them, shows that he had not yet formed a definite programme of his own, and that he was very willing to learn all he could about the situation and about the things discussed by other men in the same fields. There is but one thought that seems to run through all his preparation and work at that time, and that is his belief that the German workingman of the time was not able to help himself.

After the attempted assassinations the chancellor was called upon to "do something" and to do it at once! Public opinion was in a turmoil. He could not go for guidance to the press; for the press did not seem to know what

it wanted. What was he to do first: proceed along the lines of "protection" or "insurance"? He did not quite reject the idea of self-help on the part of the laboring class; on the contrary, he was quite ready to give it a trial. But could he do this, now when he was suppressing all political activity on the part of the laborers, in order to be able to catch his breath, while they were being held down by a few reactionary laws? Such a course would have been extremely illogical on his part, and also highly dangerous. There remained, therefore, only the question of insurance, insurance against the most dangerous enemies of the workingman: accident, sickness, permanent disability and old age. The idea of such an insurance would undoubtedly appeal to the majority of the working people, and perhaps break the stranglehold which socialism appeared to have upon the fourth class.

Bismarck declared it a duty of the state to step in, for the purpose of giving to the millions of the working classes "the protection and support which would prevent them from being run down and crushed upon the great path of life by forces that were stronger than they themselves." And this duty seemed to him preëminent. "We will do our best to create a satisfied state of mind," he said; "we can thereby ease our minds in case it should become necessary

some day to suppress the agitation of the socialists with an iron fist!"

The plans of the prince for a liberal legislation for working people were greatly strengthened by the new conservative-clerical majority in the *Reichstag* which had just helped him pass his financial reforms. The conservatives were at that time completely on the side of the chancellor; and among them were a number of great industrial leaders, like Stumm, who desired above all to bring back a more pleasant relationship between employer and workingman, and who introduced in 1879 the first bill for an old age and invalid insurance system. Besides the conservatives there were also the clericals. The policy of the Church to which they belonged demanded of them legislation which would improve the social position of the laboring man, and would probably induce him to form closer associations for spiritual work, thereby again favoring the Church.

The way to a comprehensive system of social legislation seemed free, especially as the *Reichstag* had passed in 1879 a law against usury and one controlling the sale of food products, which possessed the character of social measures.

In January, 1881, Bismarck submitted to the *Bundesrat* a bill regulating insurance in case of accidents. This bill, although only worked out

in the rough, was accepted and sent to the *Reichstag*. Here something happened which came near upsetting the chancellor's whole calculations. The *Reichstag* would not hear of the payment in each case of a sum of money which was to be added to the amount provided in the insurance contract itself. To the chancellor the idea of the rich empire coming to the assistance of the unhappy one, in the time of his greatest trouble, with a sum of money that was ridiculously small for the state, was splendid. It was worthy to be fought over! Not only that, but he thought it would be a great and generous thing for the state to do this, aside from all legal compulsion. The desire to supply the money for this work was one of the main reasons of his many new demands for indirect taxes.

Here the chancellor met the most obstinate resistance. In the first place, it was a case of stupidity, pure and simple. The people could not appreciate the grandeur of the idea of the chancellor; and those who might have been able to understand it refused to believe in the chancellor's good faith. They were trying to look behind it to find out what crafty, dangerous game he was playing back of this sudden "love of the poor people." And, strange to say, the most obstinate of his opponents was the center

party, men who should have known him better by that time.

The chancellor was downcast by the defeat in the *Reichstag*, and especially by the action of the center party, on whose support he had counted. But he had courage enough to reject the amended bill, as the *Reichstag* did pass it (without the addition of state money to the accident payment) in the *Bundesrat*. He calculated on the fact that the new *Reichstag*, which would be elected that same summer, would perhaps be more favorably inclined. This, however, was far from being the case. The constitution of the new *Reichstag* proved entirely opposite to what he had expected. Yet the chancellor did not lose courage. What he could not obtain by the proper alignments of the various parties, he attempted to secure by a particularly solemn speech, at the opening of the *Reichstag*. Emperor William was to open the *Reichstag* on November 17, 1881, but by the exercise of ingenuity and cajolery Bismarck succeeded in delivering the speech himself. Court gossip even had it that he bluntly told the emperor that the occasion was so important that it would be better to have this speech delivered by a powerful orator! The fact remains that, after the delegates had assembled in the great White Salon of the palace, the emperor excused himself on

the plea of not feeling well, and Bismarck took his place before the throne.

The speech which he then read is probably the most famous message presented to the delegates of the *Reichstag* from a German emperor. Delivered by a striking personality like Bismarck it had double the effect. It read in part as follows: "As early as February of the present year we have endeavored to express our opinion that the healing of social wounds cannot be attained solely on the basis of suppression of social-democratic excesses. This must be accompanied by the simultaneous improvement of social conditions in the life of the laboring class. We consider it our imperial duty to urge again upon the *Reichstag* the necessity of again considering this problem, and we would be able to look back upon all the great results with which God has blessed our government with a satisfaction which would be the greater if we succeeded in taking with us the knowledge of having left to the Fatherland new and lasting securities of internal peace, and of a greater measure of help and assistance to those who are in need of it. In our endeavors toward the realization of our aims we are assured of the support of the united state governments, and we sincerely hope for the support of the *Reichstag*, without party distinctions."

The programme was then outlined in the fol-

lowing words: "The bill introduced in the last session will be amended and redrawn, and will then be submitted once more for consideration. It will be accompanied by another bill providing for a proper regulation of the sick insurance question. Aside from these, those who have suffered by reason of permanent disabilities or of old age have a right to demand greater attention from the state than they have received before. To find the proper means for meeting this problem is a difficult matter, but it is the most important duty of a community which has been erected upon the basis of a Christian people." In conclusion the chancellor (or the emperor) declared that the solution of such a tremendous problem would be impossible in a single session. But, before God and man, regardless of the immediate results obtained, he considered it his duty to work for its solution. The message made a tremendous impression; but it was received by the assembled *Reichstag* in the deepest silence. There was no enthusiastic demonstration when the chancellor had finished.

In May, 1882, Bismarck submitted to the *Reichstag* the amended bill for a general accident insurance system. The result was worse than in the preceding year. The bill was not even reported out of the committee! There remained nothing but to omit the paragraphs providing

for an imperial insurance bureau and for a state contribution to the payments made in case of accident. It was also decided to make the new insurance law applicable only to such trades as had been included before in a compulsory insurance law: mines, refining plants, quarries, coal mines, wharves, builders' and contractors' business, factories and mills.

These conditions were contained in a new bill, introduced in March, 1884. This bill was accepted by the *Reichstag* after numerous amendments had been made during the debate. The new insurance law regulated matters to the satisfaction of the whole people, and its effects were so instantaneous and so beneficent that it was soon extended to cover all fields of work, with the exception of the army and the high government officials. Even persons within the army and the lower government positions came within the limits of the law. One of the main advantages was that henceforth the victim of an accident had no longer a direct claim against the employer in whose plant the accident took place, but against the insurance district in which he lived. The claim therefore lost that peculiar quality of personal insult; the employer no longer had any interest in defending himself, while the employee looked at the accident from an objective point of view, in which he found

compensation a legal right for which he did not have to fight before a court.*

This law went into effect on October 1, 1885. By the end of that year fifty-seven associations for accident insurance had been formed, comprising 2,800,000 workingmen. The first noticeable result of the law was a feverish intensity on the part of the employers to prevent accidents in their enterprises. Within a few months a veritable industry had been established, supplying protective appliances for all sorts of ma-

*A short résumé of this famous law is given herewith:

1. All persons employed, whose income is less than 2,000 marks per annum, must be insured against accidents. This includes all accidents, even those caused with intent by the injured.

2. Accident payments. They consist, (a) in paying hospital and medical expenses after the 14th week; up to the 14th week these payments are made by the trade insurance societies; (b) in a weekly income of two-thirds of the wages earned, in case of complete invalidity; partial invalidity is compensated by partial income. Where the earnings of a laborer have been less in the year preceding the accident than the usual wages paid to such people in that community, the latter rate is taken as a basis to figure the compensation; (c) in case of death of the insured the state will pay for burial expenses a sum twenty times as large as the day's wages, with a minimum of thirty marks; the widow receives 20% of his last wages; for each child under fifteen years of age 15% of the wages; the limit for the family being 60% of the wages the injured earned at the time of the accident. Persons, related and de-

chinery and instructing the workingmen in the safest way of working their machines. The consequence was that accidents due to poor protection of dangerous machines became exceedingly rare. They dropped seventy per cent. in the first year! Another result of the law was the extraordinary decrease in the number of accidents which had a fatal result. This undoubtedly was due to the rapidity with which a physician or surgeon was rushed to the injured, often managing to save a life which would have

pendent upon the deceased for support, would obtain 20% of the wages.

3. The cost of this insurance is paid by the employers. They must form mutual insurance corporations; these corporations must accept the report of the police authorities regarding the accident as true and must make their regular payments to the insured, or his family, by means of the post office. The association should take care that accidents in the plants of their members are as rare as possible.

4. The control of the whole system is in the hands of an imperial insurance bureau; the individual states have the right to establish their own control bureaus, if they desire.

5. Should the injured person be dissatisfied with the payments made by the association, he is permitted to bring the matter before an arbitration court, consisting of one-half employers and one-half employees, under the presidency of a public official. In case of dissatisfaction with the decision of this court, a final appeal may be made to the Imperial Insurance Bureau, in which a mixed court of employers and employees dispense justice.

been lost under the old system. The effects of the law showed plainly that accident and sick insurance are closely related and are dependent upon one another.

The law covering sick insurance passed the *Reichstag* while the above accident insurance law was still being debated, in June, 1883. To understand this exceedingly complicated law one has to consider the first attempts at sick insurance in April, 1876. In this law, workingmen were entitled to form benefit associations among themselves, with voluntary membership; if they desired to have these benefit associations recognized in a legal sense they had to fulfill certain conditions; in this case they became "registered" sick funds. All communities had the right of establishing benefit associations for working people living within their confines; such a sick fund was called a "community fund," and it was compulsory for the workman not insured in a "registered" sick fund to become a member of the "community fund." The formation of these sick and benefit associations was exceedingly slow, left, as it had been, to the voluntary activities of the working people and the communities. The introduction of a compulsory insurance was therefore necessary. But in considering this compulsory insurance system, the point could not be forgotten that the

private sick fund associations should not be disturbed or damaged. This condition required a good deal of tact and of clever construction in the new insurance law. After the law had once been passed, its results were wonderful; before the year 1885 had come to an end, one-tenth of the whole nation carried insurance against sickness; and in 1890 the figure had reached 13.4 per cent. of the whole population.*

* The Sick Insurance Law.

1. (a) Every person employed for one week or more must be insured by his employer.

(b) This insurance must be carried out by compulsory membership in some sick insurance fund, or benefit association.

2. As Workingmen's Sick Funds may be considered:

(a) The community sick funds, which are maintained by the community for the insurance of persons employed in similar trades. The membership of such sick funds must be not less than 100; such funds are called "normal" funds.

(b) The industrial funds, which comprise special benefit associations in large industrial enterprises; they also include such associations as are formed by the trade guilds, or associations of master artisans.

(c) In addition to these funds there may be a third, in small communities, comprising all the workingmen who are members of neither of the other two.

3. Payments of the Sick Funds:

(a) The minimum assistance given by the communal sick fund consists in: free medical treatment, free medicines and for 13 weeks a payment of one-half of the usual wages paid.

These compulsory accident and sick insurance laws thus brought important results in the avoiding of unmerited accident by portions of the people who had no capital to fall back upon in time of need. But such legislation still lacked its crowning feature, the invalid and old age insurance. And it was a long time before a bill of that kind was presented to the *Reichstag*. More than once Bismarck attempted to provide the necessary funds for the imperial treasury which would enable it to embark on this expensive project, but without success. The *Reichstag* began to ridicule Bismarck and his "old age schemes," and the friends of the measure became greatly worried over the situation. But on the sixth anniversary of the speech from the throne at the end of the 13 weeks the law governing accident insurance takes effect. (See page 208.)

(b) Higher payments are made by the other sick funds; a larger sum to the sick; payment of three weeks' wages to women after childbirth, and a substantial amount in case of death to the family.

4. The Funds and Their Supply:

(a) One-third of the premium must be paid by the employer, two-thirds by the employees; the employers are responsible for the payments made, and must deduct the premium each week from the wages.

(b) The premiums must not exceed two per cent. (2%) of the wages in the case of the communal sick funds; in the case of the other funds they can be fixed at not more than 3% of the wages.

the throne in which Bismarck had forecast the insurance bills he presented to the *Reichstag*, after the successful passing of his tax on spirits, the detailed plan of an invalid and old age insurance fund.

The old emperor William had the joy and satisfaction of seeing this law passed by the *Reichstag*, shortly before his death in 1888, but it was not sent to the *Bundesrat* until after his death. The *Bundesrat* accepted it during the ninety-nine days of Emperor Frederick III, while the completed law did not reach the *Reichstag* for final reading until November 22, 1888, with a message of the new emperor, William II. This message was worded extremely carefully and expressed the conviction that the new law, despite enormous preparation, merely intended to show the way to the attainment of the far-distant goal. This greatly disappointed the enthusiasm of the chancellor, who is reported to have exclaimed: "I want to see those 700,000 little capitalists, who draw their pensions from the state and who will say at all times: 'If the state goes to pieces, I lose my income!'" The passage of the law through the *Reichstag* in its new form met with no resistance; the people in general had come to appreciate compulsory insurance in the past few years, and the bill was accepted with 185 against 165

votes. During the years 1890-1891 the law went into effect gradually.

From a political standpoint it is important to know that in this law the "Iron Chancellor" forced through the *Reichstag* after many years of hard work his favorite scheme of making the empire a fatherly protector of the people. In no other way could he solve the enormous financial difficulties. The expenses of the empire, for invalids alone, under this law amounted to 62,500,000 marks annually. But the center party managed to insert in the law, as finally passed, a provision which took the central power from the empire, by establishing a number of district bureaus, with mutual equalization of funds and payments, instead of a central bureau handling all receipts and expenditures. This amendment rendered the installation of the administration features exceedingly slow and complicated, and has been a serious handicap to the best results.

The system of this tremendously important law deserves presentation in full:

1. *Principle:* All working people above sixteen years of age, including servants, lower officials and salesmen who are paid in cash wages or salaries, must be insured against permanent disability and old age, in such a manner that they are entitled to a life income in case of disability, or after the age of seventy years. The

law can be extended to cover other fields of employment, and persons who are not compelled to enter it may become insured voluntarily.

2. The provision for age becomes effective when the insured has paid thirty years of premiums; that section affecting permanent disability, in five years. A year in the sense of this law should be considered forty-seven working weeks, which need not follow in unbroken line, but which must not be interrupted by a term of more than four weeks without payments.

These rules, of course, were only effective after the law had been in force for some time. At the beginning much shorter periods were accepted.

3. For the carrying out of the insurance provisions the following organization was created:

Bureaus were opened in the various states, districts and provinces; all working people within such a district or province must be insured in the respective bureau.

At the head of each bureau is an official of the state insurance department, with a committee of employers and employees, and a state commissioner and a court of arbitration.

Above all the bureaus is the Imperial Insurance Department as the court of last resort.

4. *The Collection of the Funds:*

(a) The empire pays a certain sum annually,

takes over the payments of money to persons who happen to be in the army organization at the time, and places the post office facilities free of charge at the disposal of the insurance bureaux, for the payment of premiums as well as the payment of pensions.

(b) Employers and insured contribute in equal shares, the employees being divided into four classes, according to their income. The first class comprises those earning less than 350 marks annually; the second class from 350 to 550 marks; the third class from 550 to 850 marks, and the fourth class above 850 marks. The premiums were fixed for a number of years in advance; for the first ten years somewhat higher, because of the necessity of creating a fund big enough to take care of the payments of the first years. These premiums were put at 14 pfennigs for the first class; 20 for the second; 24 for the third, and 30 for the fourth class.

5. *Collection of the Premiums:*

Every employer is responsible for the premiums to be paid by his employees; he should deduct them from the wages. The premium is considered paid when the employer fastens the respective stamps on the card of the insured. These cards are made out by the first insurance bureau which the insured joins; when filled they must be mailed to this first bureau, regard-

less of whether the insured has moved into other insurance districts in the meantime. Under this arrangement the original bureau has the complete history of the insurance of this particular person. The insured receives a receipt for stamp cards handed over to the post office. No postage is charged for the cards or the receipts.

6. Payment and Amount of Pensions:

The pensions depend upon the class of the insured and the number of completely filled cards which the insured possesses—that is to say, the number of weeks he has been paying premiums. These pensions are paid out by the post office. They amount to:

Class I	II	III	IV
Disability payment after five years of insurance premiums:			

114.70	124.00	131.15	140.55 marks.
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Disability payment after fifty years of insurance premiums (maximum possible):

157.00	251.00	321.50	415.50 marks.
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Old age pension at the age of seventy years and thereafter till death:

106.40	134.60	162.80	191.00 marks.
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The establishment of these insurance laws against the cares of old age and disability in earlier life was the last great accomplishment of Bismarck. He himself considered his social-

economic policy completed with the old age and invalid insurance law. Of course, since then many other plans for general insurance have been proposed, some of them even during the lifetime of the aged chancellor. The steps that were taken in 1888 have been a tremendous social and economic success, although in some of the details a few improvements and changes were found advisable, aside from the extension to all the working classes of the people. The sick insurance law had to be revised in 1892, the old age and invalid pension law in 1899, while the present accident insurance law dates from 1900. Attempts have been made to unite the three types of insurance under a single central administration, in order to save "overhead charges" and to obtain a clearer survey of the whole field. But these ideas are still far away and there seems no present chance of realization. It had been Bismarck's hope some day to unite all the sick funds, benefit funds, benefit associations and the like under a single control, to the advantage of the insured and the better use of the enormous sums of money paid in. An idea of the tremendous cash payments coursing through the insurance department may be had from the following few data, regarding the operation of the law in the first few years.

Ten years after the laws went into effect there

were 21,700 sick insurance funds, with 7,500,000 insured persons; the accident insurance covered 18,000,000 individuals in 112 trade guilds and benefit associations; the number of persons drawing pensions under the insurance laws were 230,000, while the total number of insured under the old age and invalid law was 11,250,000. The 18,000,000 accident insurances attended to 600,000 injured in the course of a year, paying between 70,000,000 and 75,000,000 marks indemnity; the sick fund section attended to an average of 4,000,000 sick people in each year, paying more than 140,000,000 marks to them. The invalid insurance comprised 13,000,000 persons, while the number of pensioners had increased to 650,000, drawing annually more than 70,000,000 marks from the insurance fund.

It is unquestionable that the material circumstances of the very poor have been greatly improved, while there can be no doubt regarding the moral effects. The dread of hunger and poverty in old age is no more. There is no man nor woman over seventy years of age that need worry: the state has taken care of them! And besides, there has been a noticeable increase in the good feeling between employers and employees, due to the absence of accident lawsuits; the opposing interests are being fused into a homogeneous mass.

CHAPTER VIII

THE KULTURKAMPF

SO far we have looked to the social and political organizing of the empire under William I, as guided by his mighty chancellor; we must now turn back to consider its political struggles. First and chief of these was Bismarck's struggle with the Roman Catholic Church, the *Kulturkampf* (fight for culture).

The history of the Catholic Church government or "curia" at Rome during the last two decades before the *Vaticanum*, the decision of the infallibility of the pope in 1870, had been a remarkable one. Externally, in matters of foreign politics, there had come disaster after disaster. The causes of this sudden decline were found in the gains of liberalism and nationalism, and later subjectivism, or "naturalism" as it has sometimes been called. Liberalism had rendered the papal government of the ecclesiastical states almost impossible. Nationalism had united both Germany and Italy; and Italy's struggle for unity had destroyed the temporal

power of the pope. Germany's unity took place after a series of disputes and debates with Austria, in consequence of which the latter became estranged from the curia for a lengthy period. And under the new conditions a Protestant Prussia was the leading power in Germany. All these were events which naturally filled the curia with distrust for liberalism in general and for the liberalism of Prussia and Italy in particular.

On the other hand, and in the same period of external disasters, the curia had managed to add to its control over the bishops, which had secured for it the concordats of the time of the Restoration, and which it had succeeded in strengthening and increasing by all sorts of means. The curia had also full control over the democratic portions of the Church, the lower clerical officials and the poor laymen. In this manner the curia was on the point of becoming as strong in the field of spiritual power as it had been weakened in temporal and territorial matters. And the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, the *Syllabus*, and the infallibility of the papal office were successive steps in this development which reached to the highest point and which yet emphatically expressed the idea of centralization, the principle of authority against the subjectivism of the revolution.

It was now the question how the various states and temporal authorities would look upon this new development in the Church; and here again the deciding problem was the infallibility announcement. Here it seemed as if there could not be any doubt possible: Papal infallibility and state sovereignty were two things which seemed mutually to exclude each other. The opposition bishops in the *Vaticanum* had declared: "We teach that the sovereign of a state, as a member of the Church, stands under the power of the latter; that the latter, however, has not the right to depose the former and to release his subjects from their oaths of allegiance. ~~The power to judge empires and kings,~~ which the popes of the Middle Ages exercised, was given to them because of the peculiar wording and construction of the general laws; with the changed conditions in public and private life, this claim had to be abandoned together with the basis on which it was built up." In contradiction to this statement of the opposing bishops, the Vatican presented as a dogma the infallibility of the pope. The actual result of this teaching was, as the Catholic French government had predicted before it was announced: "The more we examine this dogma, the more we understand that in its basic principles it

means the complete subordination of civil power to the power of the Church."

It therefore seemed a foregone conclusion that all the states would protest against this declaration of the infallibility of the pope, and that they would take steps against the introduction of this dogma, before its actual pronouncement. This was the standpoint of Fürst Hohenlohe, the Bavarian prime minister, a brother of Cardinal Hohenlohe. On April 9, 1869, he requested the powers to come to an agreement concerning the new papal plans. It was without success—Austria and France declined all participation in the plan.

Bismarck, however, who had followed the events in the Catholic Church with no little concern, grew much more worried when he heard of the Hohenlohe proposal. He declined a direct intervention in church affairs, it is true, but in coöperation with the other German governments he attempted to influence Rome in an indirect way, and called attention to the undoubted grave consequences which the declaration of the infallibility dogma would have throughout the world. He found the warnings of the French government couched along lines similar to his own, and could honestly second the warning which the French forwarded to Rome.

Neither the warnings of the powers, nor of

the opposing bishops, could stop or stay the declaration of infallibility. This matter, which was a serious and difficult one at the best, was greatly complicated for Germany because of its war with France, and by the action and sentiment of the German bishops. On July 17, 1870, they had left Rome, declaring their firm opposition to the proposed *Vaticanum*. In September of the same year, with the exception of Bishop Hefele, they issued a general pastoral letter which stated that the infallible high office of the Church had decided, the Holy Ghost had spoken: therefore all men, and particularly all the bishops, should accept the decision as a divinely revealed truth, firmly believing it, and confess it with a joyful heart and spirit.

With this action of the bishops the Vatican movement had been transplanted to German ground, accepted in the German Church; there could be no doubt about that. It was now the question whether the Catholic laymen would follow their bishops. In the answer to this question the fact that Germany was then in the middle of a terrific war with France was of the utmost importance. All prayers in Germany went to heaven for the victorious armies; nobody had the time or took the time to follow the ways of papal politics.

Only after peace had been signed between

France and Germany, the Catholic part of the nation took up the church questions in a more detailed and careful manner. Even then thoughts were mainly turned toward the reestablishment of trade prosperity and the straightening out of the new situation in the empire, with the result that the solution of church problems was left to the clergy and the clerical officials throughout the state.

Nevertheless a strong spiritual counter-movement against the *Vaticanum* began on the Rhine, in the Catholic parts of East Prussia and in Bavaria. It was most powerful in Bavaria. There Döllinger became the spiritual leader. One of the learned circle around King Ludwig I, in the forties of that century, always a good Catholic and strongly opposed to the Protestant belief, Döllinger had fought against the edict with all means in his power during the Vatican council. Later, on August 25, 1870, some professors of Catholic theology published, under his leadership, a resolution against the infallibility, and demanded the assembling of a free council in some place north of the Alps. On April 6, 1871, he accepted an address supporting his stand, presented by his colleagues from Munich University, in which the decision of the pope was called "a product of force";

and in August, 1871, he was elected rector of the university amid great demonstrations.

In the meantime a committee had been formed in Munich for the purpose of opposing the new dogma; noted men of the intellectual part of society belonged to it, King Ludwig was favorably disposed. On July 22, 1871, a change of ministers took place, which brought the minister of justice, Lutz, into the foreground, and this promised favor to the committee. It was under this lucky star that the anti-*Vaticanum* movement began.

This situation prepared the ground for the so-called "Old Catholicism" of people who wanted to remain loyal to the old Roman Catholic Church, but disapproved the new. On August 5 and 6, 1871, a meeting was held in Heidelberg by a number of these Old Catholics, with the lawyer Winscheid as chairman, and including members of both clerical and lay professions. It was followed by a general congress of Old Catholics in Munich, on September 22-24; and a resolution was passed, according to which Catholic parishes were to be formed, opposed to and independent of the papal bishops. The following years brought the execution of this plan, after the Bavarian and several other German governments had recommended the plan. In the Bavarian Palatinate, in Baden, the Rhine

province and in Bavarian Franconia, a number of parishes were founded. The Catholic section of East Prussia, Posen, West Prussia and Silesia, with the exception of Breslau, remained non-committal.

All in all, it became clear to observing people as early as the end of 1873 that, despite the gradual extension of the formation of new parishes, the whole movement would not be able to stir up the vast mass of indifferent Catholics, nor defeat the adherents of the papal policies. And by electing their own bishop on the synod in September, 1873, the Old Catholics admitted this condition to a certain degree, calling themselves merely a religious community among others, not a fermenting principle in the universal Catholic Church. A national opposition against the infallibility dogma, such as might still have been thinkable in 1871, had become impossible two years later.

Taking further into consideration that the Old Catholic Church in 1878, at the time of its full strength, comprised but 52,000 communicants, and that in 1882 about the time the *Kulturkampf* was finished there were but 35,000 left, it becomes clear that even as an independent religious or clerical power it could not command attention, when compared with the Vatican Catholicism. Moreover, Old Cathol-

icism lost much of its possible influence because of the internal dissensions regarding the dogma of the Holy Trinity, the celibacy of the priests, and other dogmatic teachings of minor importance.

Under these circumstances the German states could find a real helpmate and assistant in their fight for political independence and development in "culture," only in the Protestant Church. But even this assistance did not amount to very much in the purely Catholic states, such as Bavaria; while in the other states it was considerably hampered and lessened by the peculiar development of the Protestant faith after 1850. In the years that had elapsed since the 1848 revolution, the state Church had been held down and utilized by the political powers of the state, with the result that Protestantism in the early seventies had no longer the force and energy to inaugurate a struggle with Catholicism, or to accomplish any results whatever in carrying through such a struggle inaugurated by other interests. Wherever purely Protestant clericals mingled with political matters they argued and worked for reactionary principles; and in the last analysis this stand could only be in favor of the pope and his medieval attitude.

The state therefore was compelled to fight

the growing power of the reactionary clergy without the valuable assistance of the religious and ecclesiastical leaders of the nation. Only the spiritual forces of political liberalism, no longer the well-organized democracy, and the grudgingly granted assistance of the small band of religious liberals, who concentrated their activities in the Protestant Union and the Old Catholics, *Bund*, could really be counted on to show a sympathetic attitude toward the efforts of the state. Nevertheless, the state was forced to take up the fight, despite the disadvantageous conditions in which it started, for the new papal movement had begun to take root in Germany and was mobilizing all its extensive forces with the utmost rapidity.

The great wars of the past ten years had stirred the circles which come chiefly under consideration in a much smaller degree than the purely national population. It is even possible that many of the individuals who were soon to throw themselves into the movement against liberalism followed with thinly disguised dislike the victorious march of the German armies. And these individuals were ready for a rapid and thorough organization of their various societies and associations, because of the numerous attempts to form political parties on a Catholic basis. The large number of religious societies

naturally utilized their far-reaching influence for the preparation of clerical elections, and from this foundation there arose those Catholic factions which began to appear in the legislative assemblies of the German states as early as 1852, after a few Catholic delegates had been elected in 1848. These delegates soon organized a special party of their own, which considered the furthering of Catholic plans their special duty. As early as 1854 this party had acquired an importance which caused Minister von Manteuffel to speak of a "faction which looks upon the existence of the state of Prussia as an abomination and will continue to do so."

During the fifties and sixties these smaller groups consolidated their interests, especially in Prussia, where they were strongly supported by the peculiar provincialism of the Catholic provinces, Rhineland and Westphalia, which did not seem ready to merge themselves fully with the state organization. And there can be no doubt that the endeavors of these groups were strongly supported by the anti-Prussian politicians who dreamed of a "Greater Germany" and the South German Catholics. These developments, after having been rudely interrupted by the events of 1866, began to take a more definite form under the preparations for and the announcement of the *Vaticanum*. As early as

1870 there appeared a political agitation for delegates to the Prussian *Landtag*, who openly classified themselves as "Catholics," and who announced as their platform the sovereignty of the Church and the establishment of confessional public schools, with a strong opposition against the further extension of the unification of the North German *Bund*.

When the war with France began with such a rush of victories for the German armies, and Italian troops simultaneously occupied Rome, the leaders of the movement decided to manage the elections in such a way as to force the government to assist the pope. Every candidate for election by this party had to take an oath to join the special Catholic faction, and men of undoubted religious spirit and known support of Catholicism in general were refused nomination by the party leaders because they refused to take such an oath.

The most significant part of this whole movement was the ~~tendency to join forces with the~~ most anti-Prussian faction in the *Reichstag*, the Guelphs, and also the strictly Bavarian "particularists." The action of Windthorst finally became the deciding factor in the movement. Windthorst originally was a thoroughly German and conservative Hanoverian, who because of negotiation with the Prussian officials in con-

nection with the disposition of the Guelph fund had been greatly embittered against the Prussian government. Highly educated and talented, he soon placed himself at the head of the disconnected and scattered factions in Hanover. Rich in experience and possessed of an unusual ability to unite and organize diverse factions, he had utilized the old parliament of 1868 in forming a firmly organized opposition, composed of Catholics, particularists, liberal-progressives, social-democrats, conservatives, living in the several new provinces of the state; and it was due chiefly to the opposition of this strong group that the parliament of 1868 did not develop into a real parliament for the whole of Germany.

The warlike spirit of 1870-1871, of course, destroyed most of this opposition, but the mass of the people had been stirred by the propaganda. When the *Vaticanum* was announced, with its accompanying opposition from all sides, the Windthorst group placed itself absolutely on the side of the pope. And the mass of the people, headed by a strong faction of the Catholic nobility, could not lack leaders for very long. The situation was ripe for a powerful man to take charge, and Windthorst realized his advantage to the full extent. In the fall of 1870 he called a secret meeting of Bavarian particu-

larists, chiefly members of the nobility, and this meeting decided to nominate special candidates for a clerical party for the new *Reichstag*.

When in the meantime the elections for the Prussian *Landtag* were held, this group succeeded in placing sixty delegates in it, as members of the new clerical party. These sixty did not realize at that time that they were to form a separate church party, and most of them were opposed to such an idea; Peter Reichensperger, who was one of the leaders, even declared it a mistake and a misfortune for the Catholic Church to have entered German politics in this manner. The members of this new party were not yet secure in their position; Windthorst himself was really more of a Guelph than a clerical; he still doubted, although a pious Catholic from his early youth, the doctrine of the infallibility of the pope. He was far more interested in the possibility of wrecking the constitution of the new empire, which he hated with all his might.

And in this connection one should not forget that the sentiment among Catholics and conservatives at that time met in many respects on common ground. Even the Protestant conservatives were in opposition to the sudden new development of the imperial German power. It was not until the *Reichstag* elections of March,

1871, clarified the situation that the clerical faction attained the standing of an actual party organization in parliament. Their relations with the Protestant Guelphs, the Prussian particularists and the Poles became more and more cordial; the moderates among the laymen disappeared. The bishops, and with them the last remainders of the old Roman Catholic aristocracy, withdrew into the background; the Catholic democracy of pulpit and confessional lifted its head. The clerical press expanded.

Despite all these influences the new party contained many heterogeneous elements. Radicals, such as Dr. Krebs of Cologne, who made it a habit to vote against the budget every time it was discussed in the *Landtag*, sat alongside high-conservative Junkers and Bavarian noblemen. But this was only a seeming contradiction; for it was precisely for this reason that conservatives and liberal extremists came to know each other better and entered into closer relations in this new party. The democratic principle was preponderant in it.

It was due to this peculiar condition within the party that the following two resolutions were introduced in the *Reichstag* by its spokesman. The conservatives demanded emphatically that the new German empire use all its

influence to restore the temporal power of the pope, which to the minds of the conservatives seemed a very reasonable and sensible demand. When the papal secretary of state, Antonelli, asked the ambassador of the North German Federation in Rome, Count Arnim, whether or not the pope could find an asylum in Prussia, if driven out of Italy by the king, he obtained an affirmative answer. And subsequently the archbishops of Rouen and of Posen petitioned Bismarck to intervene in favor of the holy see against the "robber of the *patrimonium Petri*"; for, they reasoned, if Prussia would give the pope an asylum, it followed that it was in favor of retaining him at the head of the Catholic Church. Bismarck flatly refused to interfere in Italy; whereon the conservative elements of the new party took up the same argument, and presented it in the form of a resolution to the *Reichstag*. The radical elements, on the other hand, tried to drive the new party to a policy of attempting to change the constitution so as to include property rights in the election laws; and this despite the fact that they well knew that such a law could not even be considered, as the constitution in its present form represented an international agreement between representatives of the various governments of the empire. It was not exactly suited to the introduction of

amendments of this sort at the bidding of a small new party.

The clerical party as a whole demanded the introduction of the property rights which had proven so satisfactory to the development of the clericals since 1848; the unlimited and unabridged right to assemble wherever suitable; unlimited rights to form societies, associations and clubs; and, above everything, the right of the Catholic Church to manage its own affairs absolutely independently and without halt or hindrance from the state. Behind these demands one could clearly distinguish the papal propaganda. In the course of the discussions Windthorst exclaimed: "If you don't want to intervene for the reestablishment of the papal possessions, why don't you come out openly and say, 'We want to do everything just and right, except in this particular matter?' That is just the point: you would have to admit that the interests of your Catholic citizens do not appeal to you!"

The other parties in the *Reichstag* well understood the situation and the extreme opposition expressed by the new party at its very first opportunity. Römer, a lawyer-delegate, shouted at Windthorst during the debate, referring to the members of his party: "The sovereign head of your members is not an emperor, but a priest;

not a German but a foreigner. Your home is not Germany, but Rome!" The resolutions introduced by the new party were defeated. The party itself remained colorless; its interests were manifold and nowhere sharply defined. Even its very name was colorless. It called itself "The Center," because the seats of the first delegates happened to be placed in the center section of the *Reichstag*, between the conservatives on the right and the liberals and radicals on the left.

In the meantime, the opposition between the clerical party and the state made itself felt in matters of administration. In Prussia the archbishop of Cologne had forbidden certain professors of the University of Bonn to exercise their priestly functions, because they had refused to sign a document purporting to express their satisfaction with the infallibility declaration of the pope. Not only the professors were punished, but students of theology who attended the lectures of these professors were forbidden to listen to them. In January, 1871, the prince-bishop of Breslau requested the Prussian government to dismiss twelve teachers in the Catholic seminary at Breslau who had denied the dogma of infallibility, or to obtain a retraction of their statements from them. The archbishop of Cologne and the bishop of Ermland pro-

ceeded in a similar manner against teachers in the grammar and high schools of their districts.

The complaints and objections of the archbishops and bishops brought a declaration from the Prussian government, in which the latter stated that it could not and would not hinder the free expression of opinion regarding infallibility on the part of Catholic believers; that it must refuse to be made a tool to force Catholic teachers who did not believe in infallibility to change their opinion, under pain of dismissal, the more so as this dogma of infallibility was one which must be considered as exceedingly dangerous and pernicious to the good relations between Church and State. In order to secure for itself that freedom of action which was necessary in the handling of this dispute, the government promptly dissolved the Catholic division in the ministry of education and culture, on July 8, 1871, declaring that since its inception in 1841 it had proven nothing but a hotbed of Jesuit activities and propaganda.

Bishop Krementz of Ermland protested vigorously against this action in a pastoral letter issued on July 22, 1871, to the clergy and communicants of his diocese. He characterized the action of the government as an attack on the Catholic Church, a violation of the present state laws, and a fatal step on a slippery steep in-

cline, which could only lead to perdition. Soon all the other Prussian bishops followed with pastoral letters of their own, couched in similar terms, and a mass meeting of the clergy at Fulda, September 5-7, passed a resolution of protest addressed to the German emperor. The emperor answered as follows: "Nothing shall prevent me from watching in the future, as I have done in the past, that each and every religious confession shall have and retain the full measure of liberty and freedom of action, provided it is compatible with the like liberty of every other confession." The basic principles of opposition were thereby clearly defined in Prussia.

In a similar manner, although one more perilous for the safety of the state, events shaped themselves in Bavaria. There the government had been undecided in the beginning; the bishops had announced everywhere the infallibility of the pope, without the permission of the government, and even against express orders to the contrary. On the basis of this announcement the bishops then pronounced a number of excommunications; and in May, 1871, the bishops of Bamberg and Regensburg declared formally that all oaths which did not conform to the papal dogma were null and void.

The state did not have an opportunity to combat this reactionary proceeding until the change

in government took place, July 22, 1871, in consequence of which the handling of the episcopal propaganda was turned over to Minister Lutz. Lutz sent a peremptory order to the archbishop of Munich regarding the actions of the bishops, and explained his standpoint in the Bavarian chamber of deputies, on October 14, 1871, as follows: "The government will protect with all its power those members of the laity and clergy who refuse to acknowledge the infallibility of the pope, and who therefore are threatened with abuse on the part of the church powers." This announcement placed the Catholics in Bavaria on the same plane as those in Prussia. The situation demanded a vigorous defense against Catholic attack, and in order to make this defense successful, coöperation between the larger federated states, and later by the entire empire, was absolutely necessary.

The next step toward opposing the clerical position was made by the Bavarian government and led to action throughout the empire. Ever since the rise of the clerical party, the Center, attempts had been made, with some degree of success, to use the pulpit in the dissemination of political views. The very first elections in the Rhineland brought complaints along these lines, stating that the pulpits were being used to indorse certain candidates for election. From

Bavaria came reports telling of direct excitement of the people against the authority of the state. It seemed therefore necessary to find a way to prosecute this abuse of the pulpit under some state law, and Bavaria introduced in the *Bundesrat* an amendment to the criminal code. The resolution was passed unanimously; and on November 28, 1871, it was passed by the *Reichstag*. In later years Bavaria rarely took the initiative in actions affecting the whole empire. In June, 1872, after the death of Prime Minister von Hegnenberg-Dix, Bavaria even underwent a short period of uncertainty and vacillation in her resistance to the clericals, until the country again came under the leadership of an anti-clerical minister, von Pfretzschner.

Prussia, in the meantime, could not but realize that the state required a strengthening against the ever-increasing attacks of the Church. The *Landtag*, which was assembled on November 27, 1871, therefore took up at once the debate regarding a new educational law, which placed the supervision of the schools in the hands of state inspectors, and which provided for the establishment of a civil service law for all teachers. Matters did not progress, however, without considerable friction. It soon became evident that a legislation which would draw distinct lines between the rights of the state and the

Church would meet with opposition in the conservative-orthodox ranks of the Protestant Church. These were strongly represented in the *Landtag*, they had a powerful influence in the administration circles and even held the sympathy of the wearer of the royal crown.

Thus it happened that the school supervision law, which was introduced in the *Landtag* on December 14, 1871, passed the cabinet council against the vote of the minister of education and culture, and it became a certainty that the law would remain a dead letter until a new minister of education was appointed. The beginning of the new year brought relief to this situation, for Minister von Mühler followed the urging of all the liberals and free-conservatives and sent his resignation to the king, on January 12, 1872. In his place Privy Councilor Falk became minister of education.

Falk withdrew the various bills concerning his department, with the exception of the proposed law regulating school supervision, in order to have them revised. The school supervision law was then passed by both chambers of the *Landtag* in February and March. The debates in connection with this law brought a clear declaration from the administration concerning its plans and aims. Much as the government recognized and desired the necessity of a gen-

eral ~~transfer of the school supervision to a state department, as against the interference of the religious administration,~~ it still admitted that a complete elimination of the supervision of the lower school by the parish clergymen was undesirable, except in districts in which the state administration stood in direct opposition to the alliance between the Church and anti-German parties, as in Posen. The law has since actually been handled along these lines. Prince Bismarck stated emphatically that he did not like to see any increase or strengthening of the enmity against the empire, as expressed in the particularistic circles, by forcing these circles into an alliance with the clericals.

For this reason the chancellor endeavored to separate the Center from its leader, Windthorst; he shouted in the open *Reichstag*: "You members of the Center would find it easier to make peace with the rest of the state if you would shake off your Guelph guides!" The attempt was in vain, for the Center clung to Windthorst with all its power, as their one and only "pearl." The first skirmish between the government and the Center, in the great *Kulturkampf*, therefore ended with a decided quickening and strengthening of the opposition and a union of the clericals, Poles and extreme particularists.

Events now occurred within the empire which brought the first actual warfare between state and curia. The latter so far had maintained a conciliatory stand toward the new empire. The pope had congratulated the German emperor with dignity and fervor on the reestablishment of a united Germany, and for a long time Papal Secretary Antonelli decidedly disapproved of the energetic and hostile actions of the Center. But later evidence accumulated which suggested that the center party in Germany was working in full accord with the holy see in Rome. And following the policy of the party through the later years, one particular thing stands out clearly from the maze of events: every attempt to formulate extreme demands was always started by the parliamentary representatives of the curia, rather than by the diplomatic agents. After the parliamentary group had attacked the hostile position, the central attack was launched by the highest authority of the Catholic Church, except when a parliamentary defeat had accomplished the downfall of the government without the final assault of the diplomats.

In this first case, the uncompromising attitude of the center party was not approved by the curia until Cardinal Hohenlohe, a brother of the Bavarian prime minister, was appointed ambassador to the pope in Rome, in April, 1872.

The holy see declined to receive the new ambassador, as being unsuited for the position! This was regarded as a deliberate insult, and caused a bitter attack in the *Reichstag* and sincere regret in Berlin. The most conciliatory of the speakers in the *Reichstag* was Prince Bismarck, who declared that despite this regrettable incident he would continue to work for satisfactory diplomatic negotiations between the empire and the curia; for only a continuous exchange of ideas and opinions, and not a concordat, could lead to an improvement in the relations between the state and the Catholic Church.

Such a policy of conciliation and negotiations from case to case could only be undertaken by a statesman of the very highest ability, such as Prince Bismarck. "Don't worry!" he exclaimed when his standpoint was severely criticised; "we shall not go to Canossa!" He referred to the humiliating journey of the German emperor, Henry IV, who had once stood barefoot in the snow before the gate of Canossa, where Pope Gregory held court.

In this situation it was naturally necessary to define and establish the rights of the state by legislation and administration. And this was the road which now was taken with all possible energy. This was the really significant fact in

the great struggle between Church and State which now began. The first steps were taken in the summer and autumn of 1872. The *Reichstag* took the initiative in a new law, which placed the "dangerous activity of the religious orders, in particular that of the Jesuits, under criminal statutes." Another law was quickly passed, July 4, 1872, which excluded the Jesuits and affiliated religious orders from the territory of the German empire, dissolved their organization, closed their establishments and expelled those of foreign nationality from Germany; those of native birth were placed under the control of the government administration.

This was a heavy blow to the mobile troops of the curia. The ordinary clergy was controlled by means of existing laws and by ordinary measures of administration. The Catholic priest Namszanowski, bishop *pro tempore* in Agathopolis, was suspended from office because of insubordination; the bishop of Ermland, Kremenetz, who had time and time again been pardoned by the government for his continued attacks, was finally sentenced to suffer the loss of his salary, on September 25, 1872. In this manner the defensive position of the state administration was strengthened in some of the territories.

Rome, however, sounded the trumpets to a

new attack. In June, 1872, the pope declared to a deputation of German Catholics that Germany had started a persecution of the Church; that he had notified Prince Bismarck that a campaign against truth and Church was absolute insanity, and he had closed with: "Who knows how soon the little pebble will be loosened from the heights which will smash the foot of the colossus."

These words were far surpassed in an allocution which the world accepted as an open declaration of war, December 22, 1872. In this allocution the pope included all the states which were hostile to the holy see, such as Italy, Germany and Switzerland. Especially Germany, he declared, had started out to demolish the Church by force and trickery. "Men who do not confess to our holiest religion, who do not even know it, take it upon themselves to expound the teachings and dogmas of the Catholic Church. Yet, despite all their oppressive tactics, they have the impudence to assert that no damage is done by their action; they do not even hesitate to say that the persecutions are caused by the Catholics themselves, just because clergy and communicants refuse to place the man-made laws of the state above the sacred laws of God and the Church."

The publication of this allocution was for-

bidden in Germany; the newspapers which printed it were suppressed and confiscated, and on December 30 the diplomatic representative of Germany in Rome was recalled. The year 1873 thus became from its very first day a year of struggle for the "culture" party. In the campaign literature of the progressive party, dated May 23, 1873, Virchow explained: "The struggle now has become a great battle for the culture and civilization of mankind." These words supplied the title for the political crisis which now came over the country. As viewed by its German leaders, the fight was not for Church or State, not for or against Catholicism of the *Vaticanum* type and the political achievements of the second half of the nineteenth century, but for the modern life and civilization of the German nation, ~~as opposed to the system of~~ the Middle Ages; yes, even of the whole Romano-Germanic races of peoples.

The tendencies which the Catholic Church had carried with her through the centuries from the time of the Middle Ages—subordination of the personality under the formality of the church service, obedience to the clergy, in all matters pertaining to mental, moral and spiritual development instead of subjective and freely acquired conviction—were battling with that modern view of life and the world, which con-

siders individuality, initiative and mental independence of the person as the highest ideal attainable. The youth of the nation struggled with full-grown manhood.

Where the fight appeared in a smaller degree, this was chiefly due to the presence of but a small percentage of Catholics among the population. In Baden, however, the main questions under dispute had been decided in the early sixties; while a very peaceable and peace-loving bishop ruled in Württemberg. In Hesse the unexpected happened: the bishop of Mainz remained quiet despite energetic legislation on the part of the government. There, as in Switzerland, the curia seemed ready to make a number of concessions. It saved its main efforts for the battle in the larger states. As such Prussia and Bavaria loomed largest; and behind them stood the empire as a whole.

Prussia launched the first offensive movement. The minister of education, Falk, introduced a law in November, 1872, and four other laws in January, 1873, which were intended to place the clergy under the discipline and supervision of the state, and to regulate the relations between the clergy and the laity, according to the conditions in a modern liberal state. In the first place it was announced that no foreigner should be appointed to a clerical office or position, that

every applicant for such an office should possess the graduation diploma of a German college, should have studied for three years in a German university and passed a special examination concerning his general scientific knowledge. Under certain restrictions it was permissible to obtain the early education in a parochial institution of learning. Whenever a theological student was appointed as priest, or was transferred from post to post, the state demanded the right of confirmation and objection. And in order to prevent the clerical authorities from declining to fill vacancies under these conditions, the law provided a fine of 1,000 thalers for refusal to appoint a priest where a vacancy had occurred. The disciplinary rights of the superiors of the Church over their lower clergy was retained under the supervision of the state authorities, and the proceedings intended to lead to punishment of the clergy for infraction of rules had to be carried on under regulations resembling those of the criminal code of the state. The punishments could not exceed a certain limit set by the state. The defendant in these disciplinary actions had at all times the right to appeal against the decision of the clerical tribunal, which appeal would come before a special state court for clerical matters.

The relation between laity and clergy was

regulated on the basis of the fundamental rights of the individual. Every communicant had the privilege of withdrawing from the Church. The rights of the Church to inflict certain punishments on the communicants also was regulated by this law. The punishments could only be of a religious or churchly character, and could not be inflicted for any misdemeanor or crime which was punishable under the laws of the state. They could never be inflicted for actions in connection with the carrying out of public or civic duties or the participation in certain elections. All these were regulations which really had been in force as long ago as the reign of Frederick the Great, and which had been taken over into the General Civil Code of Prussia; most of them were in force in South Germany, without in any way interfering with the rights and privileges of the clergy.

Nevertheless, the attempt to include these regulations in the Prussian laws loosened a veritable storm of protest; it had to be admitted that some of the regulations did not agree with sections of the state constitution which, it will be remembered, had been formulated along lines that were highly advantageous to the Church. The majority of the *Landtag*, however, showed not the slightest intention of dropping the idea, but turned its attention to the consti-

tution, which was to be revised to fit the new law. A resolution to this effect was introduced on January 23, 1874, and the government declared its approval of the step. The amendments to the constitution were passed first, and immediately afterward the laws cited above.

In the meantime, the opponents of the new regulations had mobilized their forces outside the parliament. The matter was exceedingly simple as far as the clergy was concerned. The Prussian bishops presented a unanimous resolution protesting against the new laws, which was delivered to the ministers on January 30, 1873. Obedience to the new laws was stated to be incompatible with the official duties of the bishops. The same signers presented a second petition in February to the *Landtag* and the king, in which they explained that no true believer in the Catholic Church could possibly fulfill these laws, except by violating his conscience. In a far more violent manner started the attack of the clerical press, especially the periodical *Germania*.

Strangest of all in this turmoil was the work of the Prussian conservatives. It can only be understood and appreciated by examining its connections. The conservative party had followed the development of the national idea since 1866 with distinct uneasiness, and finally with a bitter hatred against the leading statesman,

Bismarck. Dwelling on the ground of the East Prussian nobility, sustained by its ideals and opinions, the conservative party feared the merging of Prussia into Germany. In the old Prussia they had been an important, and often decisive, factor in public life; for the interests of the large section of the Prussian state east of the Elbe could not be ignored by a Prussian government. A merging of Prussia in Germany threatened a shifting of the political center of gravity toward the West, and this was equal to a dispossession of the East, the home of conservative thought and ideas. The West, at this time, was chiefly liberal in its views on politics, and the immediate result was that the territorial antagonism changed to a political antagonism. Anything that the conservatives favored the liberals opposed, and *vice versa*. This situation, and this alone, explains the deep hostility which existed in the new empire from the very beginning between the liberals and conservatives.

In this struggle Bismarck naturally leaned toward the liberals, because to him the unity of the nation was the main object and chief aim of his life. The decisive moment arrived at the end of the war of 1866, and the deciding event was the request of the Prussian government for an indemnity covering the finances of the years

preceding the war. Every one who knows how closely related the king considered himself to the conservatives and the nobility can imagine what it must have cost him to approve of the introduction of this law in the *Landtag*.

The opposition of the conservatives against Bismarck dated from that moment against him who had come from their own ranks! At first it was secret, but soon, February, 1868, in connection with the debates covering the Hanover financial matters, it came to an open break. The great national events of 1870-1871 patched the rent for a short time, but even in these months the proclamation of William I as German emperor was as a stab into the heart of the conservatives—as it also was to that of the old emperor himself. The proclamation sealed once for all the doom of the old Prussian isolation; it heralded the dawn of a national, that is to say, liberal, era.

As this liberal era developed, the break between chancellor and conservatives was unavoidable. Bismarck attempted to postpone it for a time, by retiring as prime minister of Prussia, January 1, 1873, turning over this post to Count von Roon, minister of war, a great friend of the chancellor and at the same time a conservative of the oldest type, as well as a confidant and close friend of the emperor. But

even this could merely retard developments, it could not prevent them. Tired, disappointed and disillusioned, Roon resigned his high office on November 9, 1873, and Bismarck could do nothing else but take it back again. Then the conservatives, no longer restrained by a personal friendly feeling for the leading statesman within Prussian borders, opened the battle without more ado.

Count Arnim, until February, 1874, ambassador in Paris, was selected by his conservative friends to succeed Bismarck as chancellor. They anticipated an early vacancy in the position. A short time later Count Arnim was found guilty of the forgery of a document in connection with his official duties and dismissed from all political service. Meanwhile, a secret society was formed in certain conservative circles whose sole aim it was to worry and tease the chancellor by public insinuations of all sorts to such an extent as to cause him to resign his office. Some of the members openly admitted that it was their chief aim to irritate the chancellor every day so much that he would get sick and quit his duties. The *Kreuzzeitung* and a number of pamphlets, together with the *Deutsche Eisenbahnzeitung* (later called *Reichsglocke*), formed an alliance against the chancellor. They continued the vicious attacks until 1876, when the courts inter-

vened and stopped the miserable proceedings altogether.

In the course of the trial a letter was read, sent by the clerical Freiherr von Loe, who had been secretary of the legation at Paris under Arnim, to Gehlsen, editor of the *Reichsglocke*, in which he said: "I propose to utilize the next issue of the *Reichsglocke* as a benefit performance for the chancellor. From a psychological-medical point of view it seems to me most important to arrange the sequence of the articles so as to bring first the pathetic and later the comical. The main thing is to try and disturb his digestion for a few days: You can only do this by exciting him passionately." The letter itself served to show the meanness of Bismarck's opponents and also the connection of the Catholic clergy with the propaganda.

Bismarck finally attempted to overthrow these enemies, working in the dark and trying to stab him in the back, by suddenly handing his resignation to Emperor William, in April, 1877. He could take this course with at least some chance of success, because the moderate conservatives had in the meantime become more friendly to him, and a thorough reorganization of the conservative party itself had taken place in the summer of 1876. Bismarck at that time had, as we have seen, far-reaching plans for a complete

reorganization of economic affairs, which he could only hope to carry through in a clear field and on a clear track. The scheme succeeded. During the ten months which the chancellor passed in his country home at Varzin, preparing his new policies, the conservative insurgents became silent. When the emperor insistently declined to accept his resignation and the chancellor returned to his post with his new legislative programme, he produced proposals which were intended to change completely the attitude of the conservatives toward him.

From this general review it must be clear that in the early part of his chancellorship, in 1873, Bismarck had to count on a long-continued hostility on the part of the extreme conservatives. In the discussion regarding the laws against the clergy this fact was particularly prominent. Simultaneously with the introduction of the new legislation against the clericals, mentioned above, a new law regulating the county administrations was proposed by Bismarck; a law which because of its liberal spirit would naturally interfere seriously with the old order of things in the territories east of the Elbe. Both these views of legislation were attacked by the conservatives with all their might. In the matter of laws against the clericals, the conservatives of East Prussia considered them as

blows against their own interests; because these laws applied to the Protestant Church in school supervision and appointment of pastors as well as they did to the Catholic Church. Conservative ideas regarding church matters were forced to follow in orthodox directions, particularly after the experiences of the Protestants in the fifties and sixties. Strange to say, the orthodox section of the Protestant Church had seen the salvation of their Church along practically the same lines as the clericals among the Catholics—namely, in the evolution of pastoral popism.

The fight against the extreme clericals in the Catholic Church therefore hit the orthodox Protestants with equal force, and with them the extreme conservatives. Aside from this difficulty there was still another for those members of the conservative party who had privileges in pastoral appointments, in East Prussia especially. These conservatives had lived with their pastors under a sort of understanding which recognized the nobility as the chief court of appeals in matters pertaining to church affairs. The patriarchal privileges were rudely disturbed by the new order of things, and the extreme conservatives considered it a personal insult and a direct infringement of their rights. The clergy themselves frequently shared this feeling.

One can easily understand, therefore, that the conservative party attacked and fought the anti-clerical legislation with all its power. The conservative and Protestant-orthodox organs of public opinion entered the series of discussions of the new laws with a violence hardly less than that of the Catholic press. The laws were passed in the lower house of the *Landtag*; but their acceptance by the upper house (*Herrenhaus*) was still in doubt in March, 1873. The strong clerical-conservative faction exerted all its influence and power to defeat the bills there.

The government, which was at that time presided over by Minister von Roon, who in his own person united some of the most antagonistic influences, succeeded in calling to its assistance the connection between clericalism and particularism. When, for instance, the administration announced that the Polish archbishop, Ledochowski, had ordered his people to pay no attention to a regulation of the ministry of education, providing for the instruction in religion in the higher schools of Posen in the German language, the East Prussian conservatives suddenly remembered the dangers of Polish-Catholic particularism in the east provinces. They thought the matter over and passed the laws with a big majority.

The new legislation was announced on May

15, 1873. The effects of the laws were remarkable. The Prussian bishops protested immediately, from their conclave at the grave of Saint Boniface; it was self-evident that they would not obey the laws. The pope hoped he would be able to turn the hearts of the "new persecutors of the Church of God" by his personal intervention, as Leo I had hoped when Attila appeared before the gates of Rome. He utilized an alleged dissension in the ranks of his opponents. On August 7, 1873, he wrote a letter to Emperor William in which he called attention to the actions of the Prussian government, which he characterized as intended to destroy Catholicism, and in which he said: "I am also advised that Your Majesty does not approve of the actions of your government and the severity with which these regulations against the Catholic Church are being carried out. If this is true, cannot Your Majesty realize that these proceedings can have no other result than that of undermining the throne of Your Majesty? I am speaking freely, for my banner is Truth, and I fulfill my duty to tell the truth to all, even if they are not Catholics. For all who have been baptized are connected in some way with the pope!"

The answer which Emperor William sent to the pope expressed the writer's pleasure in hav-

ing received a letter from His Holiness, as in times of old, the more so as he thereby obtained an opportunity of correcting the pope regarding conditions in Prussia, which must have been maliciously misrepresented to His Holiness. These errors particularly concerned the personal position of the emperor in this clerical legislation. In concluding, the emperor used the following expression: "I venture to hope that Your Holiness, after being informed as to the actual situation, will use your great authority to correct these misrepresentations, and to forbid this agitation which is carried on in my country by priests under regrettable perversion of the truth and abuse of priestly dignity. The religion of Jesus Christ, as I can assure Your Holiness, has nothing to do with this agitation, nor has the banner of Truth to which I also acknowledge homage any significance in it. There is one expression in the letter of Your Holiness which I cannot overlook without contradicting it; namely, the statement that every one who has been baptized belongs to the pope. The Protestant faith to which I belong, as Your Holiness must know, and to which all my ancestors belonged, and the majority of my subjects, does not permit us to recognize in our relationship with God any other mediator than our Lord Jesus Christ."

These were words which in their forceful expression reminded one involuntarily of the memorable letter of Emperor Henry IV to Pope Gregory VII, but which far exceeded it in the strength of their proud humility. The German people subscribed to these expressions by the laws of the fall and winter of 1873-1874. The Prussian elections of November 4, 1873, resulted in utter ruin and discomfiture for the orthodox-conservative party of the type of the *Kreuzzeitung*; the number of its representatives shrank to only *six*. In place of the objectionable representatives, the people elected 22 "new-conservatives," 40 "free-conservatives" and 251 liberals of varying degrees of liberality. The Center remained powerless, even though the number of its members had increased by 20 and it obtained the assistance of 18 Poles and 2 Guelphs. The elections to the new *Reichstag*, January 10, 1874, had a similar result. National-liberals and progressives controlled an absolute majority, and the strict conservatives of the orthodox type had disappeared.

The new legislative programme therefore could be used to strengthen the defensive position against the clericals. The first batch of the noted May laws, so-called because chiefly passed in May, were built up in Prussia; and similar laws in the other federated states of the empire.

The only disputed point awaiting orderly regulation by these laws as to the relation between Church and State was in connection with the laws regulating marriages, the same trouble that had arisen in the first half of the century. Since the proclamation of the *Vaticanum*, conditions had grown worse than ever; for the celebration of marriages was completely in the hands of the clergy, and the Catholic priests combined the ceremony with a question concerning the belief of the contracting parties in the infallibility of the pope. In mixed marriages the promise to educate the children in the Catholic faith was made more binding than before. It was now possible to attack these difficulties by state laws, and Prussia began by introducing a law in the *Landtag*, November, 1873, which provided for obligatory civil marriages and a personal register of them as well as of births and deaths. This bill became law on March 9, 1874. In Bavaria this method could not be followed; for there the *Landtag* showed a majority of two Catholic votes, and this situation of course precluded any civil marriage law from passing. Here it became necessary to call the aid of the *Reichstag*.

The Bavarian delegate Völk, after an unsuccessful attempt to bring this matter to the attention of the *Reichstag* in 1872, renewed his proposal in 1873. A bill was introduced and de-

bated, and on March 28, 1874, the civil marriage law was passed with an overwhelming majority. Following the initiative of the *Reichstag*, the *Bundesrat* took up the question, although it refused to give its consent to the bill which had passed the *Reichstag*. Instead it worked out a much better project, which became law on February 6, 1875. This law regulated the entire matter of personal record, under control of the empire; it required public records of birth, engagement, marriage and death, and acknowledged the legality of civil marriages, regardless of whether or not they were afterward solemnized in or by any church. This was a blow of which most people were frankly afraid. They thought that all religious life would now be lost, and churches would fall in ruins; a majority of civil marriages were confidently expected. Experience showed that nothing of the kind did happen. The legality of the civil marriage was simply a club in the hands of the civil authorities to force the Catholic Church to be more considerate of the public opinion of the majority. A priest could no longer prevent a young couple from marrying because the prospective bridegroom disagreed with the priest on the infallibility of the pope.

With the fully regulated personal records law, particularly that section covering the civil mar-

riage, the pending dispute between Church and State had been settled. Together with many other abuses, the old trouble regarding mixed marriages was wiped out. The state now permitted any couple to marry, if necessary, under the civil law. But the resistance of the Catholic Church against the whole standpoint of the state was now fanned into the flames of open rebellion. The bishops were far from recognizing or obeying the new laws, and particularly omitted the notice of all marriages performed by them, which they were supposed to file with the civil authorities of their district, and the notice covering appointment of priests to vacant positions.

The consequence of this disobedience was that the states gradually chose harsher means of compelling obedience, inflicting severer punishments. The archbishop of Posen, Ledochowski, was deprived of his salary for insubordination; and later he was accused of other irregularities which led to his dismissal and imprisonment. In the Rhineland, the archbishop of Cologne and the bishop of Trèves were placed in a prison because they refused to pay heavy fines which had been inflicted on them. The remainder of the bishops in Prussia faced the same fate and the situation for a time threatened to become desperate.

If the various episcopates were abandoned, or their incumbents held in prison for indefinite terms; or if the bishops were dismissed by the state authorities and the dismissal ignored by the holy see, which thereupon refused to appoint another bishop and would prevent the episcopal chapters from proceeding with an election, then it was clear that the administration of the Church had to suffer, or must be continued in an illegitimate manner. Both seemed highly objectionable to the state authorities, for it was to the interest of the state that the inhabitants of the country should receive the consolation which religion could give them. If the lay population could not get religious consolation when and where it wanted, there was a likelihood of the population itself turning against the state and its policies. Both possibilities had to be avoided.

This was accomplished by means of a new law, regarding the administration of abandoned episcopates, which went into effect, together with a batch of other minor laws regulating some of the difficulties encountered since the passing of the first set of anti-clerical laws, in May, 1874. This series of laws was called "the second batch of May laws." It was settled that an acting bishop, or bishop's representative who managed the affairs of a bishopric without hav-

ing taken the oath of allegiance to the state, would be punished with imprisonment up to two years; and a chapter which refused to elect a proper acting bishop or manager, on demand of the state, would be punished by the withdrawal of all public subsidies which the state paid to this episcopate.

In the meantime, open hostility was rampant in Catholic circles. After listening to the inciting sermons of the Catholic priest in Stendal, a journeyman cooper by the name of Kullman attempted to kill Prince Bismarck in Bad-Kissingen with a revolver shot. The assault miscarried, but the Catholic press actually attempted to defend the crime. The paper *Germania* even wrote: "Prince Bismarck' should not be surprised if the hatred against him translates itself into criminal attacks in the head of this or that poor ignorant man."

The climax of the struggle with Rome was reached in February, 1875. The pope on this date issued an encyclical which requested the bishops to announce everywhere throughout the world that the new laws of Germany "demolished the divine constitution of the Church and destroyed the sacred rights of the bishops." The encyclical thereupon pronounced the laws as illegal and void; it expressed the opinion that

evidently such laws were not made for free citizens but for slaves, in order to force obedience by the power of terror. It finally excommunicated all priests who had obeyed the laws, and warned all laymen from attending their services, partaking of their sacrament or even keeping company with them.

The state could not do anything but answer with similar blows. It immediately confiscated the newspapers which published the encyclical, and started criminal proceedings against them for treason. It stopped all payments of state funds to the clergy, unless the latter promised expressly to obey the laws passed. It declined to assist the Church in raising the so-called church tax in the small communities and parishes of a diocese where the bishop had refused to take the oath of obedience to state laws. It abolished the articles of the Prussian constitution which the Catholic Church still persisted in citing in its disputes. And it ordered the dissolution of all clerical orders and congregations. This was a series of tremendous legal steps which were not carried out in their entirety until June, 1875.

The result was not wholly satisfactory for the state, but the damage caused was mainly to the Church. In Prussia, whose legislation is chiefly mentioned here because all the other states fol-

lowed closely in its footsteps, there were only four bishops in 1877, Kulm, Ermland, Hildesheim and Osnabrück. Without active heads, either through death or dismissal, were Posen, Breslau, Cologne, Paderborn, Münster, Trèves, Limburg and Fulda. In Bavaria the sees of Würzburg, Speyer and Munich were without bishops; in Baden so was Freiburg; in Hesse so was Mainz. More than half of the German bishoprics were vacant.

By 1879 matters had reached the point where Prussia showed fourteen hundred vacant parishes; all Catholic normal schools and seminaries had been closed. The number of priests who had taken the oath as required was not small; but a great many people had to forego the consolations of religion because of the conditions in Germany. This was a situation which the Church could suffer for a while, but not nearly so long as the state. The Church was hit the hardest.

Besides, the state had obtained during the protracted fight with the Catholic Church a majority among the united liberals, free-conservatives and progressives, which gave the government in this situation a strong liberal backing, firmly determined to resist to the last the attitude of the Church. The last few years had shown that these three parties were even more

inclined to fight the Church than was the state as a whole.

On the other hand, the resistance of the Church had not yet been broken. Although all the diplomatic moves of the curia against the empire remained unsuccessful, because of the ability of Bismarck, it was true that the Catholic clergy and population in the empire remained true to the pope. In the reviving atmosphere of this bitter fight, the mental and spiritual powers of the Catholic Church increased enormously, and in the same manner as the Jesuit educational system and science became more comprehensive and thorough, including a number of famous names, Germany began to produce a typical clerical Catholic literature, poetry and science. And this virile life found its expression in the political party, the Center. The votes cast for the party declined from January, 1874, to January, 1877, by 149,000; but the political power of the party was still growing. It drew together all the particularistic forces, and an attempt to split it into two parts by means of a sudden shift in economic policies, and to draw one section into closer affiliation with the government, miscarried completely.

At the time when the *Kulturkampf* was at its highest point, and the temper of the fighters had reached the boiling point, Bismarck's oppo-

nents found reason to believe that he was preparing a *rapprochement* with the conservatives. In the spring of 1876, Delbrück, a representative leader of liberal ideas in the government, resigned his post. The idea of suddenly changing the entire inner policies of the empire by a change in economics took hold of Prince Bismarck with renewed vigor. The bond which united him with the liberals gradually worked loose, hastened by an unsuccessful attempt on their part to obtain a more important share in the actual administration of the government, or at least to reorganize the system of the state along the lines of the liberal party platform.

There were many reasons which finally brought the victory of the conservatives, despite all the attempts of Prince Bismarck, to accomplish the change by means of a reorganization of the liberal party. And the victory of the conservatives naturally rendered the clericals more conciliatory and peaceable, for the origin of the clerical party, as we know, lay in the conservative party. In the meantime, that is to say in 1876 and 1877, the state prepared a number of regulations and rules, while openly delivering tremendous blows against the clericals, which new regulations were destined to accomplish an early understanding between the warring factions.

The most important of these rules was the publication of a new law covering the financial administration of Catholic parishes. This was under debate in the early part of 1875, and was passed by the *Landtag* in June of that year. This law provided that the administration of the finances of a parish should be placed in the hands of a committee of not less than four, nor more than twelve members, the majority of whom were to be laymen; this committee was to decide on all ordinary matters; the most important and far-reaching decisions being reserved for a larger financial committee of not more than forty members of the parish. The parish priest was not permitted to act as chairman in either of the committees. The committee, however, stood under the supervision of the bishop of the diocese to which the parish belonged, as long as the bishop fulfilled the duties of his office in a manner agreeable to the laws of the state. Where the bishop was dismissed or refused obedience to the state laws, the supervision of the finances was turned over to a state representative.

The tendency of this law is clear: it strengthened the communal spirit in the Catholic parishes, as against the autocratic sway of the priest and bishop. From bishops who were disobedient to the laws it withdrew the right of

supervision of all incomes and expenses of parishes and the lower clergy. It therefore placed the bishops in the position of either losing the greater part of their influence over church finances, or submitting to the laws of the state.

Bismarck seemed to have struck the right plan, for the bishops submitted, although under violent protests, to the new regulations. Within four weeks after the law went into effect, the prince-bishop of Breslau, the other bishops of Silesia and the majority of the episcopal representatives and administrators expressed their readiness to obey the new laws and regulations. This attitude broke the stiff line of resistance of the clericals, and further promises of an ultimate understanding became evident when the conservative elements in the party of the Center, under the leadership of Windthorst, gained the ascendancy over the radical clericals, and an important change occurred in Rome.

On February 7, 1878, the energetic, passionate pope Pius IX died after a short illness. He was succeeded by Leo XIII, a man of entirely different character. Not that the new pope lacked energy or enthusiasm for the advancement of the Church, or the conduct of important international affairs, but his way of obtaining results was different. He was a shrewd diplomat and his intercourse with the temporal

powers of the world always moved within recognized forms of modern diplomacy. Besides, the new pope considered it essential for the welfare of the Catholic Church to regain at least the little territory which it possessed in Italy before 1870, and as he believed Bismarck to be the only man who could be of assistance to him in this plan, he was ready to meet the German chancellor more than halfway in the establishment of better relations between the curia and the German empire. It was therefore only reasonable that the pope, instead of hurling anathema and excommunication, sent a conciliatory representative to Berlin.

The first signs of a coming peace between Rome and Berlin were contained in a letter which the pope sent to Emperor William on the occasion of his election to the papal honor. In this letter Pope Leo notified the kaiser of his election, adding regretfully "that he did not find the pleasant relations which formerly had existed between Prussia and the holy see" and suggesting that negotiations be started looking toward the establishment of a *modus vivendi*, even if it did seem impossible to solve the problem of antagonistic principles.

These negotiations were handled with supreme tact and skill by the Bavarian count, Holnstein, who in 1870 had arranged for the con-

ferring of the title "German Emperor" on William I of Prussia. Holnstein acted as buffer and intermediary between Bismarck and the papal nuncio at Munich, Cardinal Masella, and the first steps discussed were: the holy see would admit that Prussia was right in demanding the notice of all changes in the clergy made by the bishops and archbishops; Prussia would again take up diplomatic relations with the holy see. The negotiations at first struck several snags; after a few weeks they progressed more cordially. After the attempt to assassinate Emperor William, the pope wrote an exceedingly cordial letter of congratulation on the lucky escape, which was delivered to the emperor by a special envoy. When the pope's nuncio journeyed to Dresden to be present at the silver wedding anniversary of the royal Saxon couple, he received an invitation to come to Berlin. Finally, a privy councilor of Baden was sent, in semi-official capacity, to the holy see. Again there came an interruption in the negotiations, and Bismarck took the opportunity of a visit to Bad-Kissingen to have a special confidential talk with Cardinal Masella. Things progressed very smoothly for a time, when suddenly Cardinal-Secretary Franchi, who handled the Roman end of the negotiations, died, August 1, 1878.

Just about this same time the center party

came again to life in Germany, and the particularistic forces, which saw an advantage in the continuation of the war with the Church, rallied strongly to the banners of the opposition against Bismarck and his new policy of conciliation. In order to remove all doubts as to their intentions, the delegates of the center party introduced a resolution in the *Landtag*, asking that the laws expelling the Jesuit order be repealed and the abolished articles be again included in the constitution of the state of Prussia. The agitation of the clericals suddenly became dangerous.

During the winter, however, the tension relaxed; chiefly because of the chancellor's increasing friendliness toward the conservatives, which again sent a number of the center party to his support; and on March 31, 1879, it actually came to a personal meeting between Windthorst and Bismarck, in which financial and tax matters were discussed. On May 3 of the same year Windthorst even attended a parliamentary reception of the chancellor. And on July 14 the minister of education, von Falk, was dismissed, after he had asked for this dismissal several months before.

After these changes had taken place in Prussia, Cardinal Nina reopened the negotiations, September, 1879. At first he asked nothing less



The Congress of Berlin.

Bismarck and the Austrian Envoy welcome the others at Berlin, June 13, 1878.

From the official painting by Anton von Werner.

than the repeal of the various "May laws," above mentioned. It was natural that with such a demand as a starting point, the negotiations could not proceed very far. On the contrary, they ended in a deadlock. Pope Leo then intervened personally by sending a *breve* (papal brief) to the archbishop of Cologne, in which he declared that he would agree to the notice of clergy changes, or, as he expressed it, "that the government of Prussia be furnished with the names of those priests who had been chosen by the bishops to share their sorrows and labor in the religious work in their dioceses."

Did this letter admit the right of the Prussian government to demand the notice? Optimistic persons thought so. But an order issued by Cardinal Nina soon showed that such was not the case. In this order, issued on March 23, 1880, the cardinal restricted the papal brief to certain special instances; and when the Prussian government showed no inclination to repeal the May laws, the cardinal withdrew entirely the concession made by the pope. Matters had therefore reached once more the deadlock stage. The Church had shown, so to say, two central points around which it performed its gyrations: the pope and the center party! Both had been skillfully used by the papal secretary, Cardinal Nina, to obtain either all or nothing—a continu-

ation of the fight, under more favorable conditions for the Church, for a repeal of the May laws.

Bismarck did not remain long in this uncomfortable position; he cut the Gordian knot by publishing the full text of the entire negotiations with Rome, in order to establish his future position, in the light of justice and truth. He desired a free hand in his coming reorganization of Prussia's legislative code. He was aided in his work by the change in the ministry of education, when the pedantic and strict Putkamer was succeeded by the mild and gentle von Gossler, on June 17, 1881.

The new plans of the government for reorganization of the state administration had become necessary because of the chaotic conditions in the Catholic population, due to the effects of the May laws. The clergy had resisted these laws so vigorously that out of the 4,604 Catholic parishes, with their nine million souls, 1,103 with 2,085,000 souls, were "orphans"; in other words, one-fourth of all the Catholics in Prussia were without priests, bishops and churches! This condition did not seem to feaze the Catholic clericals in the *Landtag*; on the contrary, it appeared to them a reason for further attacks upon the government; for in this chaotic condition lay sleeping those forces which at any

time might come to life and upset the government. The state, for the same reason, looked upon the clerical chaos with considerable apprehension. While the movement did not show any signs of interfering with the work of the government in the purely German parts of the state, it was used by anti-German agitators in the great Polish provinces, which were entirely Catholic in their religion. The terms "Polish" and "Catholic" were used interchangeably and came to mean the same thing, opposition to the government. The dispute between the Catholic Church and the state created conditions in Poland which had a serious, if not decisive, influence upon the development of that "Polish-national" feeling which later became such a thorn in the flesh of the Prussian state.

The state was therefore inclined to make peace; the part of the laws which had brought the religious attendance of the masses to a standstill had to be repealed or amended. The government took the courageous step and introduced "Amendments to the laws governing the Church" in the *Landtag*. The bill provided particularly for the restitution of such conditions in the parishes as would guarantee to the people the necessary religious consolation and services. It also planned the establishment of an orderly administration in the episcopates which were

without bishops, and the permission of settlement to religious orders which were devoted solely to charity and hospital work. This independent step on the part of the state was exceedingly inconvenient to the curia and the party of the Center. In order to come to an understanding regarding the steps to be taken by the opposition, a member of the center party journeyed to Rome and another to Vienna, during the parliamentary vacation, there to discuss plans with the nuncio, the papal secretary and the pope himself. The advice of the pope was not followed in all points by the party.

The Center worked for a time as if it supported the government, while secretly opposing it with all its influence. It endeavored to impress the country in general with the idea that there was an absolute majority in the *Landtag* for the repeal of the hated May laws. Luckily this plan succeeded only in part. The net result was that the new proposed laws went into effect on July 14, 1880, although considerably mutilated by the amendments and changes of the opposition parties. The regulation providing for an orderly administration of the parishes and dioceses which were without titular heads, by appointees of the state, was amended considerably, leaving only the paragraph which provided for a continuance of the functions of the priests under

maintenance of the laws regulating the Church.

The extent of the success of the government was shown quickly. Before the end of January, 1881, 953 parishes, with 1,900,000 souls, had been provided with regular priests; in the remaining 150 parishes which had been without a head, the 170,000 souls were given religious services at least now and then by voluntary assistance from neighboring priests and parishes. Only three per cent. of the parishes and two per cent. of the communicants remained without religious services at that time.

The law of July 14, 1880, had been passed with an amendment which held it in force only during the years 1880 and 1881. This condition naturally demanded the introduction of a new bill in the first few weeks of 1882, fathered by the minister of education, von Gossler, which practically continued the rules and regulations of the 1880 law, but which, in addition, inserted the paragraph covering the administration of the dioceses, which had been deleted by the *Landtag*.

The center party was now in a difficult and disagreeable position, and even now its actual relationship at this time to the pope and the state is not quite clear. Its reiterated statement that the May laws must be repealed as a whole did not help matters; the government remained firm, hinting at negotiations then pending with

the curia, and succeeded in having the law passed again, with the new paragraph added, and extended to April 1, 1884. All that the party succeeded in obtaining was the abolishment of the state examination for priests. The results of this new law, as affecting internal peace, were far-reaching. In the first place, the episcopates were now reestablished, and new bishops were elected in Osnabrück, Paderborn and Breslau. Finally nine of the twelve Prussian bishoprics had regular bishops at their head.

All in all, these results were of the highest importance, compared to the precarious position which the state had occupied in its fight with the Church since 1875. It had retreated of its own volition and with dignity from this position, without surrendering any of the more considerable points in its contemplated legislation. Naturally, however, the liberal parties accused the government of having been too lenient; and the Protestant Church, in so far as it was not quite absorbed by the orthodox section, began a mobilization against what they termed the victories of the Catholic Church. Moreover, the clerical party also claimed a victory and gloried in its alleged triumph over the state. The party had to take this stand in order to maintain its political position and influence. At the same time it endeavored to force the state to new

concessions by threats which were published in the press and uttered in parliament. Here and there the newly appointed bishops attempted to second the actions of the former bishops of Paderborn, Ermland and Posen; the prince-bishop of Breslau especially distinguished himself along these lines. He even dared to bring up once more the old question regarding mixed marriages.

The situation now resembled that of 1879, when Cardinal Nina began the negotiations with the Prussian government, which finally came to naught because of the exorbitant demands of the curia. Once more negotiations were begun with the curia, the possibilities for such negotiations being given by the latter itself. For Bismarck, despite his independent actions, had never omitted the possibility of a direct understanding with the curia: it was for that reason, chiefly, that the laws of 1880 and 1882 had been passed with the peculiar time element added. The government not only considered the possibility of an understanding with the curia, but had inserted in the law a series of discretionary powers which it could choose to apply or ignore, as conditions might warrant.

With the idea of coming to a final and complete understanding, Bismarck selected the German ambassador to the United States in 1881,

von Schlözer, as a special envoy to Rome, because of the ambassador's familiarity with the Roman situation and friendship with members of the curia. The plan succeeded admirably: von Schlözer was appointed ambassador to Rome, and officially designated as "royal Prussian ambassador at the Vatican" on April 4, 1882. The pope now was able to carry on negotiations with the Berlin foreign office in a more direct manner than heretofore. Leo XIII utilized a speech from the throne, on the occasion of the opening of the *Landtag* in the fall of 1882, in which the king of Prussia referred to his great joy at having once more established diplomatic relations with the holy see. The pope thanked Kaiser William for the words, in a message dated December 2, 1882, adding that "the Church is the best protection against socialism." For this reason the Church ought to be able to develop its full power; and this could only be possible in Prussia after a revision of the present anti-clerical laws.

The emperor answered the letter on December 22, 1882, in a conciliatory manner. In return for concessions covering the recording of nominations of the clergy, he was ready to submit the May laws to a revision by the *Landtag*. The reply of the pope to this letter was extremely hopeful (January 30, 1883). In this

letter Pope Leo assured the emperor that he would instruct the bishops to notify the government authorities of the names of all persons who were appointed to the head of parishes; this concession on the part of the Church was to go into effect immediately, without awaiting the promised revision of the May laws. But even before this letter reached the emperor, Cardinal Secretary Jacobini had given it an interpretation, in a note to the bishops, which could only cause serious misgivings, which further discussions with the cardinal secretary increased still more. This attempted cordiality between pope and emperor again came to naught, as had the first attempt under the secretaryship of Cardinal Nina.

Bismarck now took once more the old proven road of independent legislation. In a law which passed the *Landtag* with a large majority he freed the Church from the necessity of reporting the names and antecedents of such priests and clergy as had subordinate positions, merely compelling the registration of those who were placed at the head of the parishes. This clever dodge appealed to the Church as a happy way out of a difficulty, and the bishops accepted this principle with the full consent of the curia.

There now remained but one real cause of friction between Church and State, a cause

which had been promised careful attention in 1880, when a revision of the harshest of the May laws was discussed. This was the treatment of the religious orders under the Jesuit laws of 1875, which hindered and practically destroyed all activities of the Roman Catholic Church in the line of organization of orders. These laws were revised, again by means of "independent legislation," the favorite method of the Iron Chancellor. On April 29, 1887, Emperor William signed the last of the peace laws, which permitted the Catholic Church to send and maintain within the confines of the state of Prussia such religious orders as had for their object the consoling of the bereaved as assistants to the parish priest; the works of charity, teaching of girls in higher schools and girl seminaries; and those orders in which the members led a life of absolute piety and seclusiveness. Each new admission and settlement in a certain district, however, was made dependent upon the special permit of the minister of education.

With the passing of this law the Prussian government had obtained what it had desired since 1880: the possibility of an active life of the Catholic Church in Prussia, under the full control and supervision of the state authorities. Of course there still remained a number of details to be attended to, and in some points the

government may have been more conciliatory than contemporary critics thought necessary. In general, however, it can be said that the government had succeeded in laying down proper foundations and proper boundaries, fixing the limits of clerical and state activities.

Even externally the relations between the Church and the state had become cordial. In December, 1883, the crown prince of Prussia visited the pope. In 1884 the bishops of Ermland and Fulda were given seats in the Prussian *Staatsrat*. In the beginning of 1885 the archbishops of Cologne and Posen, the leaders of the insurgents, resigned their posts. In the latter part of the same year Bismarck asked the pope to become referee in a dispute between Spain and the German empire, concerning the Caroline Islands in the Pacific Ocean, and both parties accepted the judgment of the pope without a murmur. In the museum at Schönhausen there still hangs a portrait of Leo XIII, a present of the pope to the chancellor as a souvenir of the occasion.

When we consider these things from all sides, we can say that in 1885 the state had won the victory in the *Kulturkampf*, after some mistakes and some excesses on its own part. On the other hand, it seemed as if the successes of the Church were just as great, and even greater than

those of the state. Granted that the Church as an entire institution had submitted to the state, the clergy and clerical spirit had not been reduced to submission. On the contrary, in the struggle its spiritual, mental and moral importance had gained immensely. Before the great struggle with the curia there did not exist in Prussia a spiritual life of pronounced Catholic character; and its later energetic progress, its endeavor to reach a plane just as high as that of the Protestant men of intellect, was due to the tremendous impetus given it by the *Kulturkampf*. In this increased mental and spiritual activity of the Catholic clericals there appeared hidden the seed for a second struggle in the near future, in which the clericals would be better equipped, better prepared and have better chances of ultimate success. Sensing these various tendencies, the state government considered it good policy to form an alliance with the center party by granting it many a request; many a favor.

What were the nourishing forces which supported this seemingly invincible clericalism? They were hidden so deeply in the whole spiritual and mental life of the nineteenth century that no diplomacy could locate and isolate them and no modern spiritual reform could suppress them. Considering the surging, progressive

movements of the intellectual section of the Prussian nation, the policy of the clericals must be termed the most ultraconservative. Clericalism, at that time, acted like a valuable and powerful brake on the rushing car of modern progress, which was then threatening to plunge ahead at a most dangerous speed.

If it can be said that the tremendous desire for personal advance, the pronounced subjectivism of the modern Prussians threatened to destroy that feeling of union which had built the empire, and to dissolve the nation itself, then it must be admitted that the action of any agency, even one of the opposition, which gathered the loose strands and collected them in a compact whole, must be a blessing for the country.

CHAPTER IX

ALSACE-LORRAINE

OUR narrative has reached a point where it must pause. We have seen the German empire strengthened and rendered independent of its component states. The movement toward unity, made stronger than ever through an increasing centripetal movement of economic life, had reached a conclusion, at least within the limits of the *mikro-German* ideal. The Germans had attained not merely an intellectual but also a stately fatherland.

Yet would not one of the happiest duties of German historiography remain unaccomplished if we did not salute especially that member of the new German empire which the *mikro-German* movement toward unity had once more acquired for the German empire beyond the expectations of many after a long lapse of time? Let us salute Alsace-Lorraine by narrating its original history in the empire.

Of course there were men in Alsace, and even a few in Lorraine, before 1870, who faithfully

clung to the old German spirit and hoped the two provinces would return to German lordship. They felt with the reviving Germany east of the Rhine, and foretold even during the most difficult period of German impotence the future picture of an independent Germany comprising their countries, too.

Yet it is known that such sentiments began to grow rare in 1870 in the Alsace-Lorraine of today. The later generations had gradually succumbed to the French spirit, above all the educated classes; whereas those few who still clung to Germanism were in danger of sinking into a quasi half-mummified German spirit far from the great stream of German life beyond the Rhine. Thus it was interesting to watch how all the scattered classes would find themselves when once more within the old paternal house. For the manner in which their reunion could be accomplished, the love of the old Fatherland was highly important, as was also the courtesy of the empire and its organs as well as of the entire nation toward those returning homeward.

Alsace-Lorraine was now called the imperial province, as the first acquisition belonging to the empire as a whole. This imperial province was acquired at the Peace at Frankfort for military reasons first of all. Southern Germany once for all had to be freed from the constant danger

of suddenly being attacked by France, because of the Rhine border. That took place by removing the border to the Vosges Mountains. For whereas the Black Forest is a twin brother of the Vosges Mountains, and contains in the higher and mightier south a number of valleys, mountain chains and passes suitable for defense, the Vosges Mountains form one of the German mountainous parts most difficult to cross. Barely a pass, few roads, short, steep valleys, these make a wonderful military frontier. And was not that frontier at the same time the dividing line of great nationalities that had struggled against each other? These strategic calculations took place during 1870 and 1871. The large public sentiment in the empire, however, demanded the region for national feelings rather than military reasons. With happy enthusiasm and hoping fidelity, the long lost fraternal races were again admitted to the paternal hearth.

A most delicate question, however, was soon raised. What character, based upon political law, should the imperial province receive? Three opinions were current: one party demanded that it should be united with Baden and the Palatinate; others would unite it with Prussia; a third party demanded that it should become an independent imperial province. The Alsatians most stoutly protested against the first

sentiment. The second opinion voiced by many loyal citizens was approved of by the confederate council which desired no evolution of an imperial land to the expansion of which the German dynasties might perhaps succumb. The last opinion was in accordance with the desire of the inhabitants themselves and the imperial chancellor. Meetings called by distinguished members of Upper and Lower Alsace openly expressed their idea in April, 1871. These meetings expressed also a great number of very natural desires, which they asked of the government of the empire.

The question was decided by a project laid down by Bismarck before the confederate council on the 1st of April, 1871. According to that project Alsace-Lorraine was to become an imperial province: at first in the sense of receiving the personal government of the emperor, to last till January 1, 1874, with the aid of advisers and the consent of the confederate council in more serious affairs. January 1, 1874, an imperial constitution was to be introduced in the province. That project was in all its essentials sanctioned by the imperial diet, only that the constitution was to be introduced in one year less than originally determined.

Thereupon the first Alsace-Lotharingian government was developed. It was closely con-

nected with the previous government, as was to be expected from the conservative character of the technic of German government. The three old departments, Haut Rhin, Bas-Rhin and Moselle, were retained as governmental districts; they were headed by one district president. The privileges of the old prefects were almost wholly dispensed with. For the rest many changes were made with regard to the government, all in a German manner. From September 6, 1871, the government was headed by a supreme president, the first being Herr von Möller, the much distinguished governmental president of Cologne and supreme president of Hesse-Nassau. The supreme president was supervised by the imperial chancellor. For the sake of communication between the latter and the supreme president, a special department was established in the imperial chancery at Berlin.

Upon the whole the supreme president was to a high degree independent in governmental matters; he was assisted by a native board, the "Imperial Council of Alsace-Lorraine." The result was that the affairs of the country were mostly decided at Strasburg, instead of Paris, where they were carried on previously. As to the lower government, the old constitution, according to which the three departments were

divided into twelve *arrondissements*, was abolished while the war was still raging; the *arrondissements* were too large for an intensive government according to the German conception. In their place twenty-two districts were created, each headed by a district director, corresponding to a Prussian country counselor, yet enabled to exert more intensive influence. It was an innovation which has proved successful.

Soon afterward further plans were arranged, in accordance with the already furnished triple division: district director, county president and supreme president. Just as the latter was assisted by the imperial council, the lower officials were aided by county and district diets as organs of self-government, in accordance with a law established January 23, 1873, their members being elected by the people.

In addition to the provincial government, an imperial government and German governmental principles were also introduced. With regard to the imperial government it soon became obvious that the governmental change with regard to transportation was highly favorable. Even the most determined Francophiles appreciated the precision of the post offices, telegraphs and railroads. The German governmental principles also proved very profitable, especially with

regard to the benevolent treatment of all losses caused by war. All the inhabitants were greatly impressed by the strict impartiality and incorruptibility of the officers. The new governmental principles soon brought upon the country great and positive advantages: lower taxes, splendid accounts of the budget of the country, care for agriculture and cultivation of the vine, new places of exportation of the native industries into Germany. French depots for exportation still remained open in accordance with an amendment to the Peace of Frankfort. Profitable days these were, of a Germanization which worked slowly and quietly.

Aside from this quiet Germanization, we notice a large number of measures destined to revive the German character of the country. First of all a complete separation was needed of the peaceful population from those restive classes from whom nothing could be expected. Next was needed the submissiveness of the restive Francophiles, inasmuch as they remained in the country, to the outward demands of the state and the empire to which they now belonged. Both aims were sought by means of the treatment of the question regarding option. In accordance with the Peace of Frankfort all adult persons born in or emigrated into Alsace-Lorraine should either leave the country on Oc-

tober 1, 1872, or agree to fulfill all the obligations and duties of a German citizen, and above all be subject to military service. Notwithstanding a vigorous French propaganda, only one-tenth, that is, 164,633 persons, decided in favor of France; and only one-thirtieth, that is, 38,000 native Alsace-Lotharingians and 12,000 French immigrants, actually left the country. Of these immigrants a great number returned, not having found the warm reception they had expected and which they had been promised by France. Thus this option had furnished a clear insight into the sympathies of the country, and was very favorable to Germany, despite the furious raging of the French press.

In the same manner that this question was solved, for in France it had been believed that the Francophiles would be permitted to work in the country undisturbedly, other means of Germanization were adopted. The most important of all for the coming generation was the introduction of compulsory military service. It was announced soon after the conclusion of peace, in 1871, and carried out despite the protest of 47,000 Alsatian women. Yet in order to please the new fellow-citizens, conscription did not commence until the following year, 1872. The results were highly satisfactory; and this military service it was which brought the broad

masses, especially those of the country population, into more intimate contact with old Germany.

The coming generations were carefully considered and cared for by the old Fatherland with respect to education. Till 1870 there had been no compulsory education; and the existing schools had been controlled by the clergy, and chiefly by the Catholic ones. Of course all ecclesiastical teachers, monks and nuns were neither specially trained nor examined for their profession. In Upper Alsace, for instance, there were only 90 trained male teachers out of 127, and only 3 trained lady teachers out of 606. Thus unsatisfactory education of the teachers was combined with the clerical character of the school. And since Catholicism sympathized chiefly with France, almost all the schools were anti-German in sentiment. Energetic intervention was therefore needed.

Amid the severe criticisms of the clergy and the Francophiles, compulsory education was introduced on the 18th of April, 1871. Soon afterward laymen were made teachers of the schools. In 1872 their salary was doubled, the minimum being 900 francs; seminaries were established to train school teachers. In 1873 the entire school system was controlled by the state through the school law established on February 3. At that

time, during the struggle for civilization, this meant the independence of all schools of the country from the clergy. Through those measures the entire school system was controlled by the state, and went hand in hand with the general reform in the sense of favoring German nature and the German language. As early as April 14, 1871, an edict was issued, in accordance with which the German language should be employed in all schools situated in German-speaking districts; only in the middle and upper classes of the elementary schools French should be taught for four hours a week. October 1, 1873, another edict was issued, doing away entirely with the French language in German-speaking districts; while in French-speaking districts German was to be taught for five hours a week.

The result of all these measures was the development of a splendid and rich German tongue as a means of communication, instead of the previous dialect. An entirely new, rhythmically and phonetically distinct High German has been created in Alsace-Lorraine, especially in Alsace. Of course for decades the French language continued in vogue among the educated classes. Furthermore, elementary education was not sufficient. To solve the problem of Germanization among the educated classes the secondary

schools had to be reformed and a really German college life had to develop.

At an early time, with great enthusiasm for the necessity of developing the German spirit, the question of a university was discussed, especially since the Alsatian nobles desired the establishment of a university at Strasburg instead of the old medical and Protestant-theologian faculties that had existed formerly. May 24, 1871, a decisive resolution was adopted by the imperial diet; and on May 1, 1872, the solemn establishment of the new university at Strasburg was celebrated, although a large part of the Strasburg population did not participate in it. This was one of the most genuine German festivals of rejoicing over the result of the war. All the German nations contributed most excellent teachers to the new German university. Under the protectorate of the former minister of Baden, Roggenbach, a select number of professors were employed. The first president of the university was an Alsatian of the former Protestant-theologian faculty, a venerable old man, Professor Bruch, whom many called a renegade because of his firm stand in favor of the new conditions. During the festival the orations of many Alsations clearly showed how many loyal hearts were still beating for the old Fatherland after so many years of waiting.

The new university was at first frequented chiefly by students from old Germany; by and by Alsatians and Lotharingians registered. The first of these were almost exclusively sons of Protestant pastors, who had always held to Germany. Thus the theological faculty was most active, and became very important as a hearth of reconciliation and mutual understanding. The law faculty was frequented chiefly by Alsatians who wished henceforth to serve their country. The other faculties, too, took an active part in the labors in behalf of Germanization.

All were curious to learn of the spontaneous attitude of the country. Soon two great movements set in: one was Catholic-French, the other was carried on essentially by Protestants, primarily Alsatian, autonomous. The former was anti-German; the latter not exactly pro-German, yet influenced by a thoroughly German feeling of independence and filled with confidence toward the new government of the country.

The Catholic-French movement was backed chiefly by the clergy of the country. Bishop Räss of Strasburg was especially active. He was the son of an Alsatian peasant, had received a German education of a thoroughly clerical character, and in his youth had helped the French clergy exert their influence on German

Catholicism. He was assisted by Rapp, the general vicar, who was of a wholly French attitude. March 17, 1873, Rapp had to be deported because he headed a secret organization of French clergymen who planned to aid France in the imperial province. At Metz Bishop Dupont de Loges, a genuine Frenchman, was at the head of the ecclesiastical government.

Worst of all, however, was the fact that the entire Catholic ecclesiastical government still clung to the French system of dioceses. The bishops of Metz and Strasburg were controlled by the archbishopric of Besançon, and the French bishoprics of Nancy and St. Dié contained territory in the imperial province, chiefly in the districts of Chateau Salins, Sarburg, etc. The result was that the two bishops of Metz and Strasburg must take their orders from their archbishop to whose chapter they belonged; and that the priests of the diocese of Nancy and St. Dié were very badly circumstanced because of the commands of their bishops. For instance, on August 3, 1873, the priests of the diocese of Nancy were asked to read a pastoral letter of their bishop, which demanded that all Christians should pray in behalf of the reunification of Metz and Strasburg with France. The bishop was nominally imprisoned for two months upon a verdict of the country court of Zabern; but he

resided safely at Nancy and did not pay the penalty, whereas his priests had to go to jail.

It was obvious that such conditions must be changed. They were corrected as late as 1874 through negotiations with France and between France and the pope. But of course French clergymen were not silenced in the imperial province; on the contrary, they obtained fresh strength through the struggle in behalf of civilization which was raging in old Germany. Through press and organizations they highly influenced public sentiment, especially since their powers were not hindered by participation in the government of the country. They regarded this government as something transitory because of the confidence they placed in France.

The Francophiles were opposed by autonomous, Alsatian-German circles. Among them there was already a small group of loyal Germans, aged priests of ancient faith, members of the native Alsatian school of poets, and several others. A law established January 23, 1873, regarding the establishment of county and district diets gave them an opportunity to display their attitude and their power: elections were to take place on the 21st and 22nd of June in all parts of the imperial province. Events which had previously taken place at Strasburg inspired the pro-Germans to grow active. Mayor Lauth had

very naïvely proved himself to be a Francophile while being visited by Supreme President von Möller. He was deposed April 7, 1873, and the board of aldermen who aided Lauth was also suspended for a period of two years. Even the advisers of the mayor were deposed on April 17. Commissioner of Police Back, in conjunction with an imperial assessor, controlled city affairs. Could such procedures benefit the city? No, said the autonomists, but in order to avoid them we must partake in the government. From that point of view a number of loyal German-Alsatians issued a manifesto regarding the elections of June, 1873, which read in part: "Whoever advises us to take no part in the election, or whoever advises us to elect men who see their task in vain demonstrations and not in energetic work, does not sincerely love our Alsace-Lorraine. He places other purposes above the inner peace and fruitful development of material and intellectual interests of this country. Let us take care for our own interests."

The voters fully appreciated these words, primarily those who resided in the city. Only at Mühlhausen and partly at Colmar did the populace demonstrate their opposition by taking no part in the election. At Strasburg only a small minority sided with the deposed city council. The oath of loyalty which the newly elected

representatives had to take in accordance with a French law that was still valid was taken by the majority. Thus fourteen country diets out of twenty-two, and at least one of the district diets, the Lower Alsatian, could be opened. During the discussions a quiet, matter-of-fact and serious attitude was observed.

The experiment to let the people control their own local affairs was quite successful and specifically Germanic; and German qualities were displayed thereby. Thus the question was raised whether the same satisfactory attitude would be taken with regard to higher politics. Of course many were doubtful: for during the French period the German regions had been left without obvious political restrictions. None was needed, since they possessed only a severely censored press, and the members of their parliament were elected upon the orders of Paris. Yet here, too, the experiment might be profitable.

The elections for the imperial diet held on January 10, 1874, furnished the experiment. They were the first to take place in Alsace-Lorraine after the period of the personal rule of the emperor was over. The result, which was by no means influenced by the government, was very peculiar. There were elected five liberals who went to Berlin only in order to pro-

test against the Peace of Frankfort, and who intended to return home immediately afterward; and there were elected ten clergymen who protested too, yet would take part in further discussion during the session. Among them were the two bishops of the country and five priests.

On February 16, 1874, this group entered the imperial diet, on the ground that they had to come to some sort of an agreement. Their entrance was very solemn. The bishops were clad in episcopal garments, as were also the priests. After the delegation was seated, the liberal member Teutsch, from Wingen in Lower Alsace, moved: "The imperial diet should decide that the population of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been annexed to the German empire in accordance with the Peace of Frankfort, should be permitted to discuss openly that annexation."

The motion was opened for discussion February 18. Ere the discussion had begun, Teutsch moved anew that all Alsace-Lotharingian members of the diet who knew no German should be permitted to talk French. President von Forckenbeck, however, declared that in accordance with the statutes of the house a new motion could not be discussed instead of the main one, if any member of the diet protested against it. Immediately Braun of Wiesbaden rose and uttered the fatal words, "I pro-

test." Then Teutsch, using fluent German, but with many French phrases interspersed, explained his reasons for having made his main motion. His dialect, as well as his being unfamiliar with matters relating to the law of the nation, caused hearty laughter among the members of the diet.

No sooner had Teutsch declared that his people regarded as illegal the cession of the imperial province without the consent of the population than another odd incident occurred. The aged Bishop Räss of Strasburg, the leader of the ecclesiastical branch of these fifteen new members of the diet, rose and spoke as follows: "In order to avoid an unpleasant misunderstanding which might affect me and my coreligionists, I find myself compelled to utter a simple statement. The Alsace-Lotharingians of my faith by no means intend to question the Treaty of Frankfort, which has been concluded between two great powers. That I would declare at the outset."

Where, then, was the frequently announced union among the members from the imperial province? General laughter concluded the scene. The five liberals, highly astonished at their reception, withdrew, and left the large cities by which they had been elected unrepresented in the diet for more than three years. So

that the people of Strasburg, in order to see their affairs attended to, appealed directly to the imperial chancellor. The ten Alsatian clergymen remained and joined the center party to which they belonged in accordance with old German conceptions.

Thus it grew obvious that from the standpoint of politics the imperial province would furnish only childish theorists and by no means independent clergy. Of deeper conception of the entire political state of affairs in the imperial province and in the empire there was no trace whatever. That was shown by the motions of the ecclesiastical representatives of the imperial province, aided by the Center. One motion was to abolish the rights of the supreme president and to announce a state of siege, as the condition of the province endangered public safety, a privilege which Priest Guerber most peculiarly called an "unlimited right of dictatorship." Another motion urged the establishment of a press law, that is, the placing of the press in the hands of the French and ecclesiastical parties. Of course both motions were defeated.

Those who had made the proposals received a lesson from Prince Bismarck which is well fitted to show the political condition of the people's minds in the imperial province, and the impression which that condition had made upon influ-

ential persons in Berlin. The prince congratulated the speakers of the group upon the fact that the complaint of the Alsatians was discussed before the German imperial diet and not in the French national assembly. "Let us imagine the contrary had taken place; that, had the war ended otherwise, perhaps a part of the Rhine province, or what would be still more probable, a part of Belgium, had become French, and the members of the parliament elected in those regions which had been annexed contrary to their will were to speak in the assembly of Paris. We need only read of any meeting held at Versailles in order to assure ourselves that the president, if not a majority of the parliament, soon would render illusory the freedom of speech of those who complained. Still more doubtful would be proven the freedom of speech of these members of parliament on the streets of Paris and in the hotels. The entire police force of France might be needed to protect the speakers who gave vent to their feelings against France and to save them from non-parliamentary maltreatment. Our government is sufficiently strong to listen quietly and openly to strong expressions of discontent and to notify the whole of Europe that it tolerates that criticism. The gentlemen from Alsace complain because we have not rendered them happy through that

period of three years, not considering what they were under French supremacy, but what they would like to be. We wish we could have been successful in pleasing them; but that was not the purpose of the annexation. We did not enter Alsace with the hope that these gentlemen forthwith would become enthusiastic patrons of our German institutions, friends of our new officials that were sent there, and would aid them through kindly criticism and childish confidence. We were not deceived with regard to the struggle we might have to undergo ere we could succeed in winning over their loyalty, which we do desire, but which we do not possess at present. That time is not far off. After the gentlemen have belonged to Germany for at least 200 years, as they belonged to France for 200 years, I am convinced that they will live more pleasantly with us."

Bismarck's recognition of the political immaturity which was to be expected from such a race as the Alsatians after a period of political minority had been forced upon them for about six generations did not prevent Prince Bismarck from appreciating the ability of the imperial province in the government of its own affairs. From the further development of political experience the evolution of political maturity was to be expected in accord with Ger-

man conceptions. Thus the further development of the German spirit was primarily confined to those institutions in which the land participated in its own government. To aid the province in taking part in its government became the chief problem.

Happy progress was speedily made in that respect. In 1874, at the county and district elections, the autonomists received a majority of votes. All country counselors and all representatives of the districts then obtained executive power, and all worked faithfully in order to better their conditions. The district diets unanimously adopted a decision which went beyond their competence, in accordance with which the government was directed to give to the country common representatives superior to the district diets. The government did not protest against this since it considered it very likely that it would of itself proceed with that as the next step toward self-government.

On October 29, 1874, a provincial committee was therefore established for Alsace-Lorraine in accordance with an imperial edict. That committee was to comprise ten members from every district diet, and it was incumbent upon it to sanction more important governmental measures and the budget of the province as well as such laws as the imperial legislature might

afterward pass. On April 5, 1875, this provincial committee was elected for the first time from the district diets; and on June 17 it convened, for the first time, at the city of Strasburg. Its discussions, chiefly in behalf of the country budget for 1876, were characterized by a matter-of-fact policy: President Schlumberger proved to be an able leader, as he understood how to express distinctly the autonomous idea, and to cling firmly to existing political facts. After being thanked by the government, the committee adjourned July 17.

The year 1876 brought a further development of the power of the committee, because of its previous sensible position. On the 10th of May Bismarck proposed a law before the *Bundesrat* of the empire, in accordance with which laws for Alsace-Lorraine might be ordained by the emperor with the consent of the *Bundesrat*, yet without the assistance of the *Reichstag*, provided the provincial committee should approve those laws. The provincial committee gladly accepted this proposition, yet wished to add the amendment: "The imperial province might obtain representatives with executive rights, whereby the center of gravity of legislation might be removed from Berlin to Strasburg, as the capital of the imperial province. Furthermore, Supreme President von Möller, who enjoyed the full confidence

of the province, was to be granted far-reaching privileges, whereby the greatest part of governmental business might be carried out by direct communication with the province and its people.

Several months after that petition Emperor William visited the imperial lands in September, 1876, for the first time. He came to attend the maneuvers of the cavalry held in the region near Weissenburg. He was received with sincere enthusiasm, chiefly by the country population. In May, 1877, he again visited the country, stopping at Strasburg and Metz. His reception was equally cordial. Meanwhile, on the 10th of January, 1877, new elections for the *Reichstag* had taken place, which brought full victory to the autonomists in Lower Alsace and which clearly showed the progress of the autonomous policy. Thus there was no cause for delaying a further autonomous development. The *Reichstag* accepted the amendment of the provincial committee on March 23, 1877, and Strasburg became the center of government, notwithstanding the opposition of the remaining Francophiles and clergymen of the imperial province.

Some years afterward a further step was taken by the *Reichstag*. A motion by the Alsatian representative Schusegans to the effect that Alsace-Lorraine should obtain a government of its own was carried unanimously on the 27th of

March, 1879. Soon afterward the imperial chancellor laid a proposition before the *Bundesrat* which was in full accord with the above motion, and which was accepted by the *Reichstag* with the consent of the German Center, despite the protests of the Francophiles. By this proposition the Berlin imperial chancery for Alsace-Lorraine, as well as the supreme presidency in Strasburg, were abolished, and instead thereof a governorship was established at Strasburg. This assumed all the responsibilities which had hitherto lain upon the imperial chancellor, and comprised a cabinet with a secretary of state and a number of undersecretaries of state. In behalf of advising the government, a state council was organized which was to consist of the secretary of state, the undersecretaries of state, the president of the supreme court of the country, the general state counselor, and eight additional members chosen by the emperor, every one of whom was to be a judge or an ordinary professor in the University of Strasburg, while three were to be recommended to the emperor by the provincial committee. Secondly, the provincial committee was increased to fifty-eight members, and through a well-organized system of election it was made to represent the leading classes of society in the country. This is the constitution

which still exists and owing to which Alsace-Lorraine has risen to flourishing inner conditions.

From this juncture on our narrative need no longer pursue the fate of Alsace-Lorraine within the empire. Till the beginning of the eighties that fate was filled with characteristic exceptions—albeit it already showed the type of the development of every individual German province. Yet it was natural, as the decades passed down to our own time, that this fate gradually became the fate of a German confederate state—although the imperial land had not yet attained all political rights of a confederate state. Once that had taken place, further interest in Alsace-Lotharingian affairs dies away from our narrative. The guest had become a native and a friend and no longer needs special attention.

CHAPTER X

FOREIGN AFFAIRS LEADING TO THE BERLIN CONGRESS

AFTER the Franco-German War the position of the new empire in its relation to the rest of Europe was peculiarly strained and unpleasant. The whole European world expected that the German movement toward unity would still progress as it had done previously, by means of force. Everywhere it was known that the intrigues of the years 1867 till 1870 between the courts of Paris, Florence and Vienna had threatened German territory. Would not Germany retaliate? Above all it was obvious how little Herr von Beust, premier minister of Austria, had cared for German interests at that period. Would the new empire not desire to punish the policy of the ancient state on the Danube?

The minor states near the frontier of the empire, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, all once parts of the ancient empire, and all filled with Germanic inhabitants, dreaded immediate seiz-

ure. Above all was this feared in Switzerland. There the new German unity was much hated by the masses, who had hitherto with the utmost contempt looked down upon their neighbor's feeble dismemberment. Notwithstanding the influential position of German Switzerland in the intellectual and artistic life of the Germans, and notwithstanding all the inclinations of far-seeing men, such as Conrad Ferdinand Meyer or the valiant military priest Albert Bitzius, some imperial Germans who celebrated the Day of Sedan in the music hall at Zurich in 1871 narrowly escaped death.

As to the great powers outside Central Europe, the new empire would have regarded as especially important the friendship of the two mighty opponents, England and Russia, or of one of the two. Yet England had always been hostile to the German movement toward unity. Even at the beginning of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute she had thought with the shrewd scent of the merchant of the possibility of German future greatness on the seas, in case of a solution favorable to Germany. Her attitude never afterward changed; during the war of 1870 and 1871 all Germany had to observe with great sorrow that English neutrality was distinctly in favor of France, contrary to international law. Now, England could not help ac-

knowledging the completed facts, despite their unpleasant nature. But her acceptance of Germany's increased importance was brought about with difficulties and slowly; for thousands of firmly established prejudices against the continental cousin had to be conquered. Moreover, the inner development of Germany was soon afterward such as to increase rather than diminish the possibility of future competition on the seas, both commercial and political.

With regard to Russia, all Russian statesmen who clung to the old Muscovite ideals regarding the conquest of Constantinople, and all pan-Slavists, thought that the czar had committed a great error by maintaining strict neutrality during the war. Russia, by her Prussian agreement, had used the course of events in order to free herself from the heavy fetters imposed by the Crimean War. But even among the pro-German parties in Russia friendship for the new empire soon grew indifferent. There were practically no hostile parties formed; but neither were there any common aims to cement the momentary friendliness. There was no common field, equally important for both parties, within which there might develop the policy of a partnership. The German aims were directed toward peace; Russia, however, was about to follow once more the doctrine of the testament

of Peter the Great, to resume the old warlike path leading to the Balkans on which Germany could not follow either directly or indirectly. Thus the Russian friendship which was still existing was only Platonic, that is, of little political value, although monarchs and courts entertained very intimate relations between them.

Under such circumstances the young empire, the princes and inhabitants of which rejected every idea of further warlike efforts to enlarge the area of the state, the empire which was "saturated," and whose inner conditions regarding its power urgently demanded peace for a long time, this empire had to protect itself. It had to see that France should not be given an opportunity to avail herself of the almost general antagonism toward Germany. For France virulently shouted for vengeance, and began that condition of armed waiting which lasted for almost half a century, and which could not have been avoided even had the German strategical frontier renounced Alsace-Lorraine and remained on the Rhine, instead of being moved to the upper Meuse and Moselle. Thus the aim of isolating France diplomatically was combined with another aim, to keep dry the gunpowder in the new empire.

In this respect it was of utmost importance to rebuild the new line of defense of the empire in

the Southwest so that it should actually become impenetrable. Strasburg and Metz were strong, but there still was a gap which could become dangerous, Luxemburg. That gap had to be covered before anything else. In March, 1872, therefore, Bismarck was already negotiating with regard to buying the Luxemburg railways, when about to take over the French railways in Alsace-Lorraine. The control of Luxemburg by the French Eastern Railways still existed at that time and was equivalent to a constant threat against the Moselle segment around Trèves. In regard to that a treaty was concluded in June, 1872, in accordance with which the Luxemburg railway was to be controlled by the imperial railways till the year 1912 in return for the payment of 54,000,000 marks. Luxemburg was also taken into the German Toll Association up to 1912, and the German empire promised, on its part, to respect the neutrality of the country in case of war.

While the direct frontier against France was thus established satisfactorily, it became of utmost importance to reestablish war material at home, and to secure more firmly the country against any foreign enemy. All this could be accomplished conveniently by means of the milliards of the French war indemnity. Thus a large sum of cash was deposited in the Julius



Emperor Frederick.
The beloved and much mourned hero of all
Germany.

Tower of the stronghold of Spandau, to be used in the first days of an eventual mobilization of the entire army. The most important fortresses were rebuilt and enlarged. A great number of strategical railroads were planned and actually established. And, first of all, the army was newly equipped in accordance with the menace of new perils.

In addition to that there lay before the German people the extremely difficult task of influencing inner conditions in France as much as possible, so that the flames of warlike passion might not be roused to fury. Owing to the character of the French nation, Bismarck regarded it as especially important to prevent the rise of any influential, ambitious leader who could carry all with him. From that point of view he regarded the establishment of any monarchy as an extreme danger, whereas a republic seemed to offer guarantees of peace. Thus he was determined—and the resolve was surely loyal toward the whole of France—to facilitate the existence of the republic in every respect, and chiefly of the conservative, peaceful one of Mr. Thiers. In order to strengthen this he first of all allowed considerable reductions of the terms of paying the war indemnity. Thus the republic gained French approval and financial confidence in its existence was essentially strengthened. In many

other respects, too, Bismarck stoutly favored the liberal-bourgeoise republic as the least dangerous state organization in France, contrary to the attitude of Ambassador von Arnim, and contrary to the legitimate inclinations of a Berlin court party favored by the Empress Augusta. Bismarck even sought to obtain success in foreign countries for the Thiers government, wherever these could not impair German interests, or where they were apt to further them.

Soon, however, the Thiers republic came into difficult perils from the inner French evolution. On German soil clericalism seemed to be deprived of its best hopes because of the establishment of the closer Germany with her Protestant empire. The new rulers, as we have seen, did not even show themselves willing to undertake a diplomatical expedition in order to regain for the holy father his lost Italian territory. On the other hand, since the *Vaticanum* clericalism in Germany was implicated in a pertinacious struggle with the powers of the empire and the individual states as well as with those of the essentially Protestant liberalism. Under such circumstances it goes without saying that curia and clericalism once more saw their best instrument for the future progress of the papal church in France, the ancient state of the most Christian kings of all. Thus an especially intimate

alliance had been concluded, the programme of which for France planned the overthrow of the bourgeoisie republic, and the establishment of a clerical-feudal kingdom of the Bourbons. In May, 1873, the clerical party in the French parliament overthrew President Thiers; his place was taken by Marshal MacMahon, nominally as president of the republic, actually, however, as lieutenant for the much-longed-for legitimate clerical king, Count Chambord. The negotiations of the clerical-feudal party with Chambord grew more active and obvious; they succeeded in the national assembly in appointing a committee of nine whose duty it was to prepare his ascension to the throne as King Henry V. At that juncture it became evident what results the change would bring with it in regard to foreign administration. While only a few dared talk of another Franco-German War—the horrors of 1870-1871 had not been forgotten as yet—the genuine Catholic aims of the future foreign policy were at the same time announced so much the more loudly. Thus the era of the *Gesta Dei per Francos* would renew itself; a holy war must be waged, a genuine French war against Anti-christ, against the spoiler of Rome, against the king of Italy.

That change of French fate was of especial importance to the German empire; for French

clericalism compelled monarchic Italy to ally itself with the empire at once, even if there had existed no other motives for her friendship with the country of the struggle in behalf of civilization. In the year 1870 Italy had wished to proceed against Germany in conjunction with France. The Italian parties of the right had agreed with Victor Emmanuel II in his sympathies for France, whereas the party of the left constantly communicated with Berlin, and was even represented by Representative Cucchi, a special envoy to the German headquarters in the course of the war. After the speedy and unexpected victorious drive of the German armies through northern France, Italy owed to those victories the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome and the capture of Rome by Italian troops. Nevertheless, this achievement was by no means apt to better the relation between Italy and the new empire, owing to the especial character of the Italian policy of defiantly grasping all it could.

The two nations were really brought together immediately after the war, following the mobilization of clericalism in Germany and owing to their mutual opposition to it. Prince Frederick Charles, the victor of Metz, found, therefore, an enthusiastic reception in Rome, in February, 1872.

These sympathies needs must grow as soon as the aims of French clericalism were strongly directed toward inducing Italy to join the mighty new clerical empire, and as soon as the position of Italy concerning the papacy was appreciated in Germany. In both countries there was a rising enthusiasm for the struggle in behalf of culture. Late in the spring of the year 1873 the Italian prince and princess, the later King Humbert and his wife Margaret, a granddaughter of King John of Saxony, arrived at Berlin. The city celebrated their presence with a cordiality the warmth of which was by no means misunderstood in France. In September, 1873, while France was expecting the conclusion of the negotiations regarding the restoration of her monarchy, King Victor Emmanuel himself traveled to Berlin and Vienna. His meeting with Emperor William was peculiar. The first words King Victor Emmanuel spoke were: "I must confess to Your Majesty that I was about to take up arms against you in 1871." The emperor responded gently, "I knew it." Victor Emmanuel was accompanied by his minister of foreign affairs so that more important negotiations could take place.

The acute peril because of France's monarchy meanwhile disappeared. At the critical moment Count Chambord rejected the throne,

and the disappointed clerical-royalistic party, which formed the majority in the chamber, prolonged, in the month of November, 1873, the power of Marshal MacMahon for a period of seven years. Yet it was sufficiently clear that the crisis had only assumed a slower and more chronic character. The danger of a clerical French kingdom still menaced; and Italy had for a long time to reckon with it. Thus the intimacy between Italy and the German empire continued, although occasionally interrupted. In October, 1875, Emperor William repaid King Victor Emmanuel's visit, and was received with enthusiasm by the population of Milan, which was especially pro-French and, of course, also especially republican.

Meanwhile, the relation between the empire and the two neighboring imperial powers in the East had also grown more favorable. In the same manner that the memory of the Prusso-Italian Alliance in 1866 was revised at the time of the German-Italian negotiations, so here reference was constantly made to the old idea of the Holy Alliance. Bismarck had once remarked: "The continental policy down to the sixties was for a long time based upon the union of the three eastern powers, Austria, Russia and Prussia. This union, because of the effects of the Holy Alliance, had shown itself as a coalition

against France." The position of the German empire had been thought of from the same point of view, and was employed for the strengthening of this coalition rather than the live, inner development of Germany. With regard to Prussia, however, the inner development of the last fifty years and the real interests had in many respects brought the country nearer to France, yet it none the less clung through all those years to the treaty with Austria because of the assumption, which was perhaps a mere fiction, that the chief danger could emanate only from France. "This conception," Bismarck proceeded to state, "has more or less controlled the policy of Prussia since 1815, and compelled her to follow the *makro* and South German policy of Austria, strengthened by the conservative interests of Russia."

This severe criticism of the Prussian policy during the pre-Bismarckian era shows why a simultaneous alliance with Russia and Austria could not have pleased the chancellor. But things had changed considerably from that attitude which belonged to the year 1865. There was no longer cause why Austria should interfere with the inner conditions of the German empire, provided the diplomacy of the empire took no especial care of the Germans in Austria. The hopes for a *makro-German* empire which

the House of Hapsburg continued entertaining even after 1866 were buried forever, together with the events of the years 1870-1871, as appears to be proven by Austria's inner, anti-German-Slavic policy since that period.

Prince Bismarck, however, had, as we have already learned, as early as 1866, been thoroughly convinced of the necessity of a future, intimate relationship between the northern Confederacy and Austria. He always clung to that view. In his famous oration of February, 1888, which well might be termed his political testament, he spoke as follows: "Just imagine Austria taken off the map of Europe, then we are isolated, between France and Italy, on the continent, and are situated between the strongest military powers next to Germany; we, uninterruptedly, and all the time, one against two, as is very highly probable, or at least alternately dependent on one or the other. The state of affairs, however, is not such. One cannot fancy Austria taken off the European map: a state like Austria vanishes not. . . . If we wish to avoid isolation, which owing to the assailable condition of Germany is especially perilous, we needs must have a sure friend."

Out of all these conceptions, out of the memories of near relations regarding the Confederacy, there arose for Bismarck, some weeks

after the battle near Sedan, at the time when Thiers was seeking to induce the powers to intervene, the important idea of a future alliance with Austria and Russia, and probably with Italy, too. At Meaux—so he has told us—he already planned the conclusion of such an alliance. The “faithful friend” which he needed he sought above all in Austria, especially since relations with Russia did not seem very favorable. In the middle of December, 1870, he notified the Viennese cabinet about the conclusion of treaties with the South German states, and closed his report with the sentence: “We have reasons to hope sincerely that Germany and Austria-Hungary will now be able to look at each other with feelings of mutual benevolence, and go hand in hand with each other in behalf of the welfare and the prosperity of the two countries.” And after the Austrian chancellor Beust had responded satisfactorily toward the end of the year, the fact of a future intimate agreement between the empire and Austria could already be foreseen. It was mentioned at the meeting of the Bavarian chamber, in January, 1871, in regard to the conclusion of a treaty between Bavaria and the empire, and the suggestion was approved by old *makro-Germans* and young clericals as well.

In accordance with this general attitude of

the leading spirits of the empire and Austria, Emperor William and Emperor Francis Joseph met at Ischl in August, 1871, while Beust and Bismarck convened at Gastein. Of course Count Beust's past was no longer of assistance to him. He was remembered as the anti-Prussian Herr von Beust of 1866 and the Saxon period; and in November, 1871, Count Andrassy was made minister of foreign affairs in the imperial state in his stead. Andrassy was a Hungarian who knew well what advantages his closer fatherland had owed, in regard to its relations to Austria, to the events of 1866 and 1870. From this juncture the relation between the new empire and Austria-Hungary could be regarded as permanent and as destined to preserve permanent peace in Europe.

It was only natural that this intimate relation should also include Russia. In the middle of 1871 Count Beust had already told the Austro-Hungarian delegates that it would be highly unlikely for Austria to become the enemy of her friend's friend. Of course Russia was still indignant over Austria's position during the Polish upheaval in 1863. On the other hand, Russia saw that a cordial understanding with Austria might perhaps prevent the existing Polish sympathies from spreading any further. Furthermore, did not the natural necessity of

a strong monarchic view unite all three empires of the East against the various destructive tendencies of the time? It was a motive of mutual agreement which appealed to the breasts of the rulers, and to which Bismarck incessantly referred.

In September, 1872, the three emperors met at Berlin for the first time. On that occasion the ministers Gorchakoff, Andrassy and Bismarck discussed together the difficulties which existed among the three empires. A common understanding was reached which tended to bring about a more intimate alliance in case of any violation of peace in Europe. The three emperors guaranteed to one another their present possessions in accordance with former treaties; they also promised to attempt to solve in common the difficulties which might arise on account of the Oriental question; and they were willing to undertake measures to suppress the new socialistic upheaval.

This took place one year prior to the attempt of a clerical-monarchic restoration in France. While that attempt was still being prepared Italy was obliged to seek a more intimate agreement with the German empire. Thus, at the beginning of the year 1874, the German empire had by means of its diplomacy achieved a position in Europe which might well be regarded

as leading. Yet it indulged in no sort of war-like adventures, and so gradually began to fill the public with confidence regarding those solemn guarantees of future peace under which three years ago the empire had arisen.

The minor kingdoms also recognized Germany's mild justice and welcomed her hegemony. In Switzerland, which the new empire had greatly aided by contributing to the building of the Gothard Railway, the sentiment became quieter. Belgium and Holland no longer feared for their independence; the king of Holland visited the emperor at Ems. In the Scandinavian North, Sweden obviously sympathized with the empire because of her old antipathy against Denmark; young Oscar, King of Sweden, could be regarded as an admirer of everything German. Yet wherever the dignity of the empire was not preserved, Bismarck proceeded with merciless severity, as he did, for instance, in Spain, where he stood up against the anti-German Carlists, who in 1874 had shot a German reporter. That is the era during which the dignity of the German name grew immensely in foreign countries, the era during which Germans beyond the frontier once more reminded themselves of the German name and the German Fatherland.

This favorable situation was brought to an

end chiefly by the desire which arose in Russia for a new expedition against Turkey and the conquest of Constantinople. The reason for this probably lay in the German successes during the Franco-German War of 1870-1871. The first actual discontent was due to procedures of quite insignificant character which are now regarded as wholly explained. They are mentioned here once more only because of the conclusions drawn from them by antagonistic parties, which are still revived from time to time.

Toward the end of 1872 France introduced general compulsory military service. In the following years its results began to be felt in the constant and strongly increasing military ability of the French nation. Furthermore, from about 1874 the clerical-monarchic confusion had been brought to an end. The era of extensive constitutional legislation in a republican sense set in, and was successfully concluded in February, 1875. The result was the constitution which is still in existence, and the establishment of peace among the antagonistic parties. Thus France seemed to have attained a new stage of inner development, a stage which made her ever stronger from day to day.

In the empire, on the other hand, all the military gaps which war had created had by that time been closed; and there were other signs of

a strong evolution. In every respect the empire considered itself equal to a great war. Hence the attitude arose among the general staff, not without the participation of Moltke, regarding the inevitableness of another war with France. It would be more profitable, or so the general staff thought, to choose the opportunity rather than permit France to do so; the blow should be struck. These attitudes, or, at least, attitudes connected therewith, were brought before the public by an editorial of the *Post* on April 8, 1875, under the alarming heading, "Is War in Sight?" Although this was critical enough, the situation grew still more complicated through the fact that a German statesman had spoken in a similar manner to the French ambassador at Berlin, contrary to the attitude of his master. This had been immediately reported to the French administration. From here the news spread among all the European courts, especially that of St. Petersburg where the people were aroused hardly less than they were at Paris.

Owing to the Russo-German relations which meanwhile had cooled off, it was of little avail that Prince Bismarck asked the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to respond to the editorial in the *Post*, to the effect that "a sorrowful view regarding the present and an almost melancholy

conception of the future were by all means out of place because of our present international relations." The fact that the semi-official *Provinzial Korrespondenz* spoke in a similar manner about the fears regarding the outbreak of war (April 14) was also of no avail. On the 10th of May Czar Alexander II arrived at Berlin and soon paid a visit to Bismarck. He apparently easily convinced himself that Bismarck did not think of war; and it is possible that the czar's presence helped Bismarck to make his views fully victorious in other circles, where he had been opposed before the czar came to Berlin.

At any rate the Russian chancellor, Prince Gorchakoff, characterized the result of the negotiations as a triumph of Russian diplomacy, using words which helped spread the idea that France had been delivered from the gnawing teeth of an assailer desirous of booty. The implication was that she had been saved by the czar, who had speedily come to France's aid, and above all by Gorchakoff.

That was the first sign of a break of the Russo-German relations. Many others followed quickly. The cause most probably lay, to a certain extent, in Gorchakoff's jealousy of Bismarck, his "pupil," as the present, leading diplomat of the European state of affairs. Yet the

friction was more important than the previous discontent because of the German successes in 1870. Thus the first quiet intention of once more declaring war upon Turkey, which had apparently been very far from fulfillment because of the Germans' love for peace, now gradually began to turn Russia toward open enmity. Other motives were added which lay much deeper, and which were therefore destined to work more permanently and more strongly.

For almost two centuries the Germans had been the teachers of the Russians, aiding them in the absorption of European civilization, a fact of extraordinary importance, in the history of which the Germans of the Russo-Baltic provinces of today have largely participated. Of course this rôle had created for the Germans, and above all for the Baltic nobility, an eminent position in Russia in almost every respect. Germans had filled all parts of the empire, almost like a host of well-placed and well-paid intellectual colonists. Now, however, the time seemed to have come when Russia was able and, at any rate, about to act independently in her further absorption of European civilization. Russia therefore naturally turned against the foreign element. The Germans, a blessing previously, now seemed a plague. An attempt was made to free the country from their influ-

ence; and their most noble house within the empire, the Baltic provinces, was, by means most severe, forced toward speedy Russification.

Alongside with this destructive efficacy went a building one. An independent Slavic civilization flourished more and more, and with it a Russian, nay, a pan-Slavic common feeling. As this development coincided with the intellectual rise of other Slavic nations also, the Poles, the Czechs, the Baltic Slavs, a concrete system of political ideas and political aims, a pan-Slavic solidarity was finally begotten. How could that solidarity possibly seek an understanding with the Germans, the rulers and former oppressors of so many a Slavic race? As the Slavs still needed intellectual connection with Europe, and at the same time a prop against the Germans, they sought this rather in French civilization which, owing to many inner affinities, had ever entertained some relation to the Slavic countries. Thus there ensued during the seventies, culturally as well as politically, that quiet collaboration of French and Russian interests which had already been expected by noble minds in the year 1800, and afterward once more, during the Polish upheaval in 1863. Now, however, this took place in the form of an intimate alliance which was to be realized.

These connections, far-reaching as they were,

began to change only slowly toward feeling and reality; and meanwhile Russia had for a long time been determined to resume once more the old crusade against Turkey in accordance with the political attitudes of the day. The situation in Turkey demanded such an enterprise very much indeed. In the years 1875 and 1876, not, of course, without strong Russian influence, upheavals took place in Bulgaria and the Herzegovina. Between June and the end of August, 1876, two sultans were dethroned by force at Constantinople. Russia therefore believed she could successfully take up arms in the following year against her old enemy. In order to be protected in the West, she began to negotiate with her neighbors, Germany and Austria. As far as the German empire was concerned, the negotiations began in June, 1876. At that time the czar met Emperor William at Ems, and questioned him as to whether he would remain neutral. The emperor, however, not having Bismarck with him, made no definite statements, so that the czar arrived at no conclusion. The czar fared similarly with Emperor Francis Joseph, whom he met at Reichstadt. It was obvious that distinct statements were demanded, and first of all from Berlin. In autumn, 1876, while reviewing his army in Livadia, the czar asked the Prussian general von Werder,

who had been attached to him, to telegraph to Bismarck and inquire whether he could reckon with the neutrality of the German empire in case of the Russo-Austrian war which would probably break out should war be declared upon Turkey.

Bismarck had foreseen such a question. None the less, it grieved him a great deal to be placed before the choice between Russia and Austria. Yet he had decided in favor of Austria. After considering for some time, he authorized the German ambassador von Schweinitz to notify the Petersburg court: "It is the first and foremost duty of Germany to preserve peace between the first continental powers of Europe. In case of a Russo-Austrian war, therefore, Germany will remain strictly neutral if battles are only won or lost. Yet she will not permit a severe defeat of either of her two friends."

This was a policy of reservedness which Russia, sure of defeating Austria in case of war, regarded as a threat to intervene. Was that interpretation, however, really possible, after it had been learned that Bismarck had refused to enter into an alliance with England, the worst enemy of Russia at that time? Germany then possessed no strong interests in the Orient. Bismarck in one of his famous speeches, on the 7th of December, 1876, said that those interests

"were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer."

Nevertheless, the policy of Germany induced Russia to seek to negotiate with Austria, since she was uncertain as to whether she would be able to defeat both Austria and Turkey. January 15, 1877, an agreement was concluded, the conditions of which were very severe with regard to Russia. Austria promised to maintain neutrality if Russia would permit all the great European powers to take part in discussing terms of peace, would establish the integrity and independence of Roumania, would respect Constantinople, and finally would permit Austria to occupy the Turkish western provinces.

Under such circumstances, nay, conditions, Russia took up arms; and it is obvious that public sentiment in Russia must now become hostile to Germany. This was especially the case after the war had been carried on not very successfully, despite all the valor of the troops, and despite the final advance against Constantinople which the Russian general staff hesitated to capture. Russia was then compelled to call a general congress, as agreed upon before the outbreak of the war, owing to the menacing position of England and Austria. As early as January 16, 1877, England notified the Russian government that any future treaty between

Russia and Turkey, inasmuch as it would affect the conditions of the treaties of 1856 and 1871, would need the consent of the European great powers as participants in those treaties. Austria, too, had at a very early date emphasized the necessity of a European congress. She expected to obtain orders from it to invade Herzegovina and Bosnia, in accordance with the treaty concluded with Russia in January.

The congress was to be held at Berlin. It was like a symbolic expression of the hegemony over Europe which the German empire held at the time. As early as February 19, 1878, Bismarck declared in a famous oration before the diet that he would not avail himself of that hegemony in the old Napoleonic sense, but merely as an "honest broker." He still sought to maintain Germany as a strictly neutral power, and therefore again refused the offered offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, of which he was told by his friend Shuvaloff. He refused it in a friendly, yet perfectly distinct manner.

Thus the end of May, 1878, drew nearer; on June 13 the congress was to begin. Russia could do nothing but negotiate with England as well as possible, prior to the session of the congress. Shuvaloff and Lord Salisbury actually discussed the conclusion of a treaty before the congress could meet.

The congress itself was opened at Berlin on the 13th of June sharp, although some of the Turkish participants had not yet arrived. During the first meetings it grew obvious that very grave differences of opinion still existed between England and Russia, chiefly because of the fate of Bulgaria which, owing to the situation of the country, was closely connected with the future fate of Constantinople. Discussions reached a state which induced Lord Beaconsfield, who personally represented the British interests, to threaten the congress that he would return home. Bismarck was the mediator. He omitted nothing to soothe Russia's wrath by means of thorough and faithful services. He was right indeed when he stated afterward that he had thought of his rôle during the negotiations, as much as it was within his means, as if he had been the fourth plenipotentiary of Russia.

The sting of defeat, however, remained for Russia. She obtained only a very insignificant portion of her aims regarding the Bosphorus; and she saw herself, very much against her wishes, pushed aside from any influence upon the western Slavs. Her exasperation found expression in severe editorials in her press, directed against German politics and German nature. Bismarck acted throughout for peace; yet just on that account his attitude was contrary

to Russia's interests. In addition to the Bulgarian problem, the question concerning the fate of the Turkish western provinces chiefly interested the three imperial powers of the congress. Andrassy introduced the drawing up of the decision of the congress by demanding for Bosnia and Herzegovina a government through a strong and impartial power. Salisbury consented to it: such power could be found neither in the Turkish monarchy nor in the Slavic neighboring empires. Thus only occupation and administration by the Hapsburg monarchy was left; and Bismarck now recommended the acceptance of that solution as a common duty. It was a brief and excellently planned discussion; its solution corresponded, upon the whole, with the treaty between Russia and Austria. None the less, it created painful feelings among the Russians. And their wrath was not softened by the fact that new discussions commenced while the congress was already in session, although not officially, discussions which led to England's acquiring Cyprus and France occupying Tunis.

Although the relation between Russia and the German empire thus grew more strained, the empire profited by the congress despite all the official reservedness of Bismarck. The German empire obtained a far clearer knowledge with

regard to its next and even later future foreign foes. Russia was likely to join its enemies. Austria was won, at any rate, and had taken a huge step toward the Southwest. France, seeking to acquire colonial possessions in the Mediterranean, needs must act contrary to the interests of Italy, so that little was to be feared from her, even though she should enter into an alliance with Russia. England's influence upon the main questions regarding the Near East had helped Austria's progress, so that Germany was not likely to be hindered in the peaceful, especially commercial, development of Turkey.

And if one looked beyond the frontier of the German empire so that the criticism of the situation was removed to the more general standpoint of central European fate, one already foresaw that an alliance of the three great central European powers would slowly come into existence. The relation between the German empire and Austro-Hungary was the nucleus of the formation of that alliance. Italy had to join it, for fear that, being isolated, she might lose her supposed claims upon Tunis, because of the expanding Mediterranean colonization of France.

CHAPTER XI

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

THE congress of Berlin, while it emphasized Germany's leadership in Europe, emphasized also the dangers of that leadership. Germany alone had gained nothing from the congress, yet she was held responsible for everybody's discontent. Russia in particular, thwarted in her eastern schemes, developed toward the German empire that hatred which has since swayed her actions and brought her policies to such contrast with her ancient Prussian friendship of two hundred years. It was Russia really which compelled the Triple Alliance.

This situation grew more difficult for the German empire, because of the evolution which had meanwhile taken place in France. We left off the tracing of events in France at a moment when all her sons were striving after a stronger inner policy. In the beginning of 1875 the constitution had been concluded and the army was thoroughly reorganized. Still more favorably, and at the same time in accordance with Ger-

man ideals, did French conditions develop after the first elections under the new constitution in the beginning of 1876. Both chambers possessed a republican majority which threatened to proceed against the clerical party. Thus there stood up equally strongly against Rome France and the German empire, which was still in the midst of its struggle, the *Kulturkampf*. For France, however, there ensued, as long as the thoroughly clerical MacMahon remained president, a period of inner feuds which did not permit the country to take part in foreign affairs. These circumstances, very favorable for the German policy of peace, continued through 1877, growing more critical from day to day. In the middle of December, 1877, France seemed to stand immediately before a clerical political stratagem for overturning the republic. This was avoided only through the conscientiousness of MacMahon. Meanwhile, because of that policy of highly treacherous purposes and his lack of efficacy, MacMahon lost all his prestige, so that he was compelled to tender his resignation in January, 1878. A blameless republican, Grévy, was elected. Thus the republican form of state seemed firmly established; and French strength, always inimical to Germany, began to increase by leaps and bounds.

This development took place at the very time

when Russian hatred against the German empire and Austria as well became more and more obvious. Soon afterward the threads of intercourse between Paris and St. Petersburg began to be woven hither and thither. Foreign antagonisms to Germany were further increased by a distinctly German occurrence. In June, 1878, the aged George V of Hanover died at Paris. His son Ernst August notified the emperor that he would maintain all claims upon the kingdom of his father, and that he would meanwhile assume the title of Duke of Cumberland. He thus openly renounced the empire. Next, in December, 1878, the duke of Cumberland married Princess Thyra of Denmark, a daughter of King Christian, the protocol prince of the fifties and the Danish king at the time of the Dano-German War. Thus a Danish-Guelph alliance against the empire came into existence.

Of course the empire had already prepared a counter attack. In October, 1878, the article of the former Peace of Prague, concerning the votes of the population of the northern districts of Schleswig in regard to their belonging to Schleswig-Holstein or to Denmark, was abolished with the consent of the two powers which had signed that treaty, the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia. The abolition was made public in the *Reichsanzeiger* in February,

1879, and affected both Denmark and the whole world, by making them fully realize the especially cordial relation between Austria and the German empire.

The Danish ruling family entertained very intimate relations with Russia; for a sister of Princess Thyra, very energetic and full of enterprise, had become the wife of the Russian heir apparent, Alexander. Thus the German blow against Danes and Guelphs was bitterly felt in Russia, too. Furthermore, the regulation of the question of succession in Brunswick after the death of the last German Guelph, Duke William of Brunswick (October, 1884), considerably increased the ill feeling between the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. The regency of Brunswick was given to Prince Albert of Prussia.

All these hesitations and discontents became for the first time highly acute, at the time of the carrying out of the decisions of the congress of Berlin; at first, as it usually happens, for petty reasons. The Russians believed that the German plenipotentiaries paid little or almost no attention whatever to the Russian interests during the delimitation of a more definite frontier in Novibazar, which was undertaken and participated in by the great powers. In August, 1879, Czar Alexander II personally complained

before Emperor William about the partiality of the German commissioners while Bismarck was staying at Gastein. The czar's complaints contained almost unconcealed threats of a declaration of war. Emperor William discontinued corresponding personally with the czar for the sake of an official settlement, yet sent the especially intimate General von Manteuffel, who had rendered valuable service in many a political mission, to the czar in Alexandrovno in order to pacify him. This was done without the knowledge of Bismarck and of the emperor's own accord. Moreover, he even underwent the journey himself, despite his age, in order to discuss personally the hostile attitude which existed between the two empires. Was this, however, possible with the antagonism of the political aims after which both were striving? Emperor William seems to have attained only the revival of a better personal relation between the two rulers.

Prince Bismarck distinctly saw that the Prussian and Russian interests must henceforth be greatly at variance with each other. And he acted accordingly. Forced to choose between the friendship of Russia and Austria, he decided finally in favor of the latter. Prenegotiations at Gastein, with Count Andrassy, made the situation very clear, so that Bismarck could go to

Vienna in September and, amid the great joy of the inhabitants, bring to a conclusion the treaty with the old enemy. Items of this treaty of alliance were held secret, and the consent of the aged Emperor William to it was obtained only with immense difficulty. He did not approve of this diplomatical change which he saw must be decisive for a long time. He had opposed the prenegotiations, and he now hesitated to sign the treaty. His conscience was aroused, primarily with regard to Russia, his former intimate friend and ally, whose aid had accompanied him from his early youth down to his advanced age, and whose alliance he had regarded as one of the most valuable bequests of his father. Finally, on October 7, 1879, the treaty was ratified, after an intrigue by Russia, which had sought to induce France and Italy to stand up against the empire, had failed. France refused to take up arms against the empire, as an ally of Russia alone. This treaty of 1879 was the first great step toward the famed Triple Alliance.

Nearly a decade later, at a time when war seemed almost inevitable because of the Franco-Russian alliance, on the 3rd of February, 1888, the contents of the Austro-German alliance were made public. The first article obliges both contracting parties to assist each other with the

entire strength of their empires, and to make peace only with the consent of and in conjunction with each other, in case one of the two empires should be attacked by Russia, contrary to the expectations and against the sincere wish of the two contracting factors. Article 2 runs, that if one of the two powers, entering into the treaty, should be attacked by another power, the other treaty-concluding party is obliged to refuse assistance to the assailant against the ally and to maintain, at least, a strict neutrality toward the ally. If, however, in such case, the assailant should be aided by Russia, whether in the form of active participation or in the form of military measures which should threaten the attacked party, the obligation of article 1 of the treaty becomes valid, assistance must forthwith be rendered, and the war of the treaty-concluding powers must be followed by a common conclusion of peace.

Thus the treaty is directed against Russia first, and only second against France; for the second article is directed chiefly against the latter. The situation of the year 1879 was quite in accordance with that character. It was Austria which after 1878 had to fear a Russian onslaught, and after 1879 the German empire found itself in the same state of danger. From that time on France ranked second. Yet since

that treaty was, upon the whole, opposed to unquiet desires in the East as well as in the West of Europe, it was a real treaty of peace. This character it gained still more after Italy also joined it.

We have learned that Italy, after 1873, was brought into a more intimate relation with Germany, chiefly because of the increasing importance of the clerical interests in France. This stand had been interrupted once, in the year 1875, in the time of the higher republican fortunes in France after Count Chambord had refused to accept the crown. An episode of this year included certain plans regarding a Franco-Austro-Italian league. These were, however, done away with as soon as Emperor William arrived at Milan, in October, 1875; and once more did clerical feudal movements in France cause the pro-German attitude of Italy. When French clericalism began to grow less important after the overthrow of MacMahon, it became obvious that a more intimate relation between monarchic Italy and republican France had become almost inconceivable for other reasons. Republican sentiment had grown considerably in upper Italy, especially in Milan; the republicans sought and found moral assistance in France. Thus both the Italian monarchy and the neighboring countries as well had to guard

carefully against the spread of republicanism. Moreover, the French, who had grown stronger than ever previously, yet not sufficiently strong to wage war against the empire, began to exert a profound influence upon the coasts of the Mediterranean. Their colonizing plans did not even spare those places upon which the Italians possessed old and legitimate claims. And how was it possible for Italy to assume a firm stand against France, otherwise than by joining the Central European Dual Alliance?

In the elections of 1882 Italy almost entirely freed itself from radical republican representatives, and also from the "irredentists" who sought to take from Austria the Italian-speaking lands east of the Adriatic. Freed from these distracting forces, Italy joined the Dual Alliance, immediately afterward, in the year 1883. This Triple Alliance was afterward repeatedly renewed. Everybody admits now that it preserved the peace in Europe for more than three decades. It came to be regarded as an indispensable inventory of European politics, of which little was said in later years, except when it was about to be renewed once more, or when it had come to an end.

Meanwhile, the powers which had been opposed to the Triple Alliance also entered into an agreement—France and Russia. True, from

1884 to 1887 Russia had once more come nearer to the great monarchic neighboring states. It almost seemed as if the olden times of the friendly relations of the three emperors were about to be renewed once more. Then suddenly a crisis in the Orient very severely tested peace in Europe. The year 1887 drew nearer, the most dangerous of all through which the foreign policy of the new empire had previously gone; no one doubted any longer a common attack of France and Russia upon the opponent between those two countries. In France the Chauvinistic party, guided by General Boulanger, was exerting profound influence upon the people. Yet once more did the incomparable diplomacy of Prince Bismarck prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The conclusion of the Dual Entente, however, could no longer be prevented. In the year 1891 the formal treaty between France and Russia was signed, secretly though, so that as late as 1897 they were not officially spoken of as "united" nations.

At this juncture we need no longer discuss in detail the future fate of the Triple Alliance. Its European functions for a time grew of less importance owing to entirely new phenomena of foreign politics, tasks which since the middle of the eighties have placed before diplomatic art a new scene, enlarged to a world horizon. It suf-

fices to emphasize that the importance of the Triple Alliance had been recognized even by antagonistic European powers, as for instance by France. Even after the conclusion of the Dual Entente, the diplomatical circles of France spoke of the Peace of Frankfort, which at the beginning had openly been regarded as an armistice, as of a *paix voulue* (voluntary peace) which had taken the place of the former *paix subie* (submissive peace) that had existed before the conclusion of the Dual Entente. Similar was the situation in Russia with which the German empire entered into an agreement after the Peace of Shimonoseki had for some time withstood many a complicated feud between the two neighboring empires. In Russia the systems of the Triple Alliance and Dual Entente were regarded as supplementing each other and preserving the peace of the continent, a conception which on the part of the Triple Alliance was first voiced openly by Caprivi.

Even within the treaty-concluding states themselves there prevailed far-reaching contentedness because of the results of the treaty after it had lasted for nigh two decades. Austria perhaps had more reason to be contented than anybody else; for she was enabled by the Triple Alliance to regulate and maintain as regulated the difficult situation of the European Orient,

with the consent of Russia. In the year 1902, when the Triple Alliance was renewed for the last time, Prinetti, the Italian diplomat, fully explained the advantages of the treaty for his country. Naturally the Mediterranean affairs had become of utmost importance; a fact on account of which the Triple Alliance brought about Italy's especially friendly relation to England,—which relation enabled England to possess herself of and hold Egypt without difficulties. Prinetti also remarked that “Italy, if the maintenance of the present state of affairs in the Mediterranean should ever be distributed contrary to her will and despite her activity, would be at safety, and find no one who could prevent her from acquiring her lawful possessions.” With regard to the Oriental question which in recent years has interested a great many Italian statesmen, he added, that in the Balkan states no combination could be possibly realized without Italy's knowledge or contrary to her interests, not even in Albania, the closest neighbor of Italy. It was the general and common ascertaining of the aims of European politics by the Triple Alliance and Dual Entente, which found perhaps its most resolute expression in that speech. The Italian minister emphasized again and again that it was the common programme of the powers to solve peacefully problems the

solution of which was usually left to the vicissitudes of war. He added emphatically that the fate of the nations would henceforth be controlled and decided chiefly by combinations of peace. For the many-sidedness and the complicated connection of problems which affected the whole world generally necessitated a common understanding, without which no one was secure against surprises.

The same language was at the same time heard from the German chancellor von Bülow, who spoke perhaps somewhat more distinctly than the Italian minister. "At the time of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance," said he, "we considered only European politics. Our combinations did not go beyond the Mediterranean. Today the policy of all great powers comprises the entire globe. I believe that as long as history has been existing there never has been a time when so many haughty empires were in existence at the same period. Out of this fact is born, if I may so express myself, the system of counter-balances which naturally, even without special agreements, profoundly influences the preservation of universal peace."

Of that attitude we shall speak once more when describing the evolution of a German "world policy." Here, however, we may emphasize that despite all cosmopolitan efforts, the

worriments of a specially European policy have never ceased. With regard to the German empire they actually could not cease because one of its neighbors, France, was by no means determined to renounce a specifically European policy, that is, a war of revenge against the empire, for the sake of a superior universal policy. On this occasion we would emphasize only how the system of equilibriums was established in Europe and how the beginning of this great new phenomenon was based upon the Triple Alliance. For the Dual Entente is as to its purpose and origin nothing but a counterpart in the sense of an international supplement.

From this point of view one will be enabled to esteem rightly the importance of the whole combination for the German empire. Above all, this importance lay in the field of foreign politics. Experience has taught that owing to the state of affairs in Germany, even Russia and France combined hesitated to attack the German empire. Equally great, however, were the advantages of the Triple Alliance for the inner German evolution, although they were less obvious. A central position like that of Germany is in itself a great advantage for a powerful people: the cultural influences from all sides strengthen the empire without letting it become one-sided. This favorable situation France had enjoyed dur-

ing many centuries of the Middle Ages, at the time when she was the center of European civilization; and it benefited the Germans, also, after they had achieved the great period of political unity, although it was not perfect. Yet owing to the diverging character of the German people it was of great importance if an advantage of foreign politics could be added to an advantage for civilization, which strove toward unity. Could there possibly be any better basis, therefore—owing to the geographical situation of Germany—than the system of the Dual Entente and Triple Alliance? The Triple Alliance led Germany to cling to her allies and friends. The Dual Entente forced her to do so because of her mighty neighbors. These are results which the historian who is versed in the *querelles allemandes* of the past will not easily esteem too highly. In addition to these results there was another one. Was it unlikely that after 1870 the Germans of Austria as well as their monarch would seek anew to exert influence upon the nations and princes of the empire? And was it unthinkable that the imperial Germans would take care of the German-Austrian affairs in a manner which might lead to immense confusion within the jurisdiction of the whole German name? The most cordial and intimate harmony of the Triple Alliance, how-

ever, especially the relation between the empire and Austria, excluded even the idea of such possibilities. It also created for the inner development of the nation that peace which was indispensable after the stormy movements during the sixties and seventies.

One sees how, after a time, inner and outer politics, *mikro-* and *makro-Germans*, Prussians and Austrians, were molded together. How could it be otherwise in a field in which they met in their still common national interests, Germans, although subjects of different states? What was foretold in the forties and fifties, what was desired or demanded while discussing the solution of the German question in the sense of a closer empire; all of this became reality after the foundation of that empire. An especially cordial relation with Austria was established, a relation which the national historian will always regard as something more than a mere business treaty concluded in accordance with international law. The wisdom of Bismarck had established at last the union of all the Germans.

PART III

THE EMPIRE UNDER WILLIAM II

CHAPTER XII

THE CHANGES OF RULERS

THE aged emperor William I, the first head of the great modern German empire, died in March, 1888. He was over ninety years old and the best loved man in Germany. In early childhood he had seen his country trodden underfoot by Napoleon I, and had fled with his mother, Queen Luise, from the French invaders. In middle manhood, as Prince of Prussia, he had faced the Berlin mob of 1848, hooted and execrated and compelled to flee from Prussia, the scapegoat of his feeble, older brother. But he had lived to see mighty changes. He had ridden into Paris at the head of the world's greatest army, the third Napoleon had become his prisoner. He had been acclaimed the chief glory of Berlin, of Prussia, of all Germany. Nay, all Europe had bowed down to him.

And now he was dead, and his eldest son, the much loved crown prince, reigned in his stead as Emperor Frederick I. He was of course king of Prussia also, as Frederick III. Frederick, the hero-commander of the southern army of 1870, victor of Wörth and many another field, was even more beloved than his father had been, was in fact the idol of South Germany. By Prussian statesmen, however, he was a bit distrusted. It was feared he might become *too* liberal, a "people's king" who, seeking to do everything for the masses, might thereby weaken the power of the empire, and so expose it to all the dangers which threatened from without.

Whether there was cause for this anxiety or whether, on the other hand, the wisdom which Frederick had ever showed as prince would have stood by him as king and emperor and enabled him to do justice to all and be strong for every duty—how this might have proven the world will never know. For when Frederick ascended his father's throne he was already incurably ill, dying of a slow disease which few suspected. His brief reign lasted for just ninety-nine days of sorrow and suffering. Then he too passed away and was succeeded by his eldest son, the great Prussian king and German emperor, William II.

At the time of his accession William II was

not yet thirty years old. The long life of his grandfather and the popular character of his father had kept him somewhat from the eye of the world. But Prussians already knew him as a vigorous leader whom they could depend upon, as they had ever depended on the Hohenzollerns. With him, as with all the generations of his family, there was something of a natural reaction. When the king in one generation had leaned too far in one direction, his son naturally swung the other way, learning from the father's errors. William I had been conservative, clinging to the old order. Frederick might have tended to be too radical. William II restored the balance. He desired progress, but it must be the sure and orderly progress of power, not the madness of a rioting mob. He wanted peace, but there again it must be peace maintained by power. He believed firmly in the "mailed fist," in the watchful preparedness of Moltke and his staff.

The passing of the two older emperors was not the only change of those days. The time had come for a German even greater than they to lay aside his staff of office. Bismarck, the aged Iron Chancellor, continued in control of German affairs for yet another two years after the death of the aged master he had served so long and loyally. During those two years, how-

ever, Bismarck learned clearly that William II would not be content to be guided as his grandfather had been. The new emperor meant to act for himself. The differences between them reached a climax in March, 1890. Bismarck refused his approval to an order by which the other ministers of the state were to deal directly with the emperor instead of through the chancellor as before. William thereon demanded Bismarck's resignation from office.

Thus the great chancellor retired into private life. The emperor thereafter paid him every possible honor, but never invited him to return to office. The aged prince and chancellor spent his last years writing the memoirs of his remarkable career. After his withdrawal from the helm of state the emperor had four successive able chancellors, Caprivi (1890-1894), Hohenlohe (1894-1900), Bülow (1900-1909) and Bethmann-Hollweg.

The rule of Caprivi within Germany itself was mainly a struggle against the various political parties in the *Reichstag*. None of these sympathized with him, but by clever balancing of one against the other he retained control for four years. By that time, however, he had alienated every party in turn; and as a leader without followers he was driven to resign. Chancellor Hohenlohe, on the contrary, won a fairly firm

support for building up and strengthening the government. He did this by making concessions to the Catholics of the center party. They helped him to begin the great German navy; and patriotic approval of this new engine of defense kept Hohenlohe in power until he retired because of advancing age.

Chancellor von Bülow followed the tactics of his predecessor. By degrees, however, he found the center party unwilling to follow him in his large plans for the development of German power abroad. In December, 1906, they refused to vote moneys for increased colonial expansion and Bülow broke with them completely. He dissolved the *Reichstag*; and the elections of January, 1907, made the new *Reichstag* a conglomeration of many small parties or groups. Among these Bülow balanced himself for a time, as Caprivi had done. The Center, however, grew ever stronger, and when Bülow had, like Caprivi, been compelled to antagonize each smaller group in turn, he too resigned his office.

Bethmann-Hollweg, the chancellor who, always, like his predecessors under the emperor's dominance, led Germany to the great war of 1914, took warning from Bülow's difficulties. He renewed the government's alliance with the center party. With their aid and that of the conservatives, he carried Germany on to higher

power abroad and richer prosperity at home. Even the liberal party usually supported his aims. Indeed practically the only party to oppose him regularly have been the socialists, who have ever demanded from the government more than any government could give and yet retain its strength to be the nation's defender.

Let us look, now, behind the chancellors to the real rulers of Germany. Will you expect to find here, in this chapter of the transition period from the reign of William the Elder to William the Younger, a sympathetic and detailed story of the last days of the old kaiser, the tearful one hundred days of Frederick III, the quarrel between William II and Bismarck? And that the piquant personal memoirs and court gossip of those months will be related with a wealth of "local" color? And supposing a historian of serious purpose should attempt to describe the intimate details of those days—would he have at his disposal those absolutely necessary facts on which to base his story? The picturesque, in itself, is not the historically important; one ought to realize that the vividly colored outer dress of events does not indicate the nature of the soul within—even though children do prefer to hear fanciful, highly colored *stories* rather than *histories*. True, no harm would be done by following the stormy events of 1888 in such a manner

as to call forth the sympathy of the heart and mind of the reader; to cover the bare walls of history with those pictures which will undoubtedly stir human sympathy for centuries to come.

But have we at our disposal for this purpose sources of information which would yield results of reasonable clarity and truth? No! As the personal feature is in the main secret and hidden, so the reports and documents which are based on personal matters are kept longer in secret archives than all other documents which the historian must consult. The most intimate letters and communications do not become available for perusal, if at all, with years after both writer and recipient have been laid to rest. How, therefore, can a history such as this attempt to describe the personal element of years that are so recent and still so fresh in the minds of people now living? All we can do is to reawaken the memory of those who lived in those stirring times; this should suffice as a welcome interruption in the plain relating of the events as they occurred.

If our story now occupies itself with the inner developments of the nation during the years which completed the old century, and even reached over into the twentieth century, it becomes necessary, in order to understand the evolution of internal politics and national culture, to

examine superficially the further development of the political parties; for this development has been in the time of William II just as much a sign of the social and spiritual changes in the empire as in the reign of his grandfather.

CHAPTER XIII

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

TOWARD the end of the eighties the liberalism of Germany could be considered "saturated." All its early ideals had been fulfilled. As far as these ideals were due to the great evolution of liberalism in the nineteenth century, they appeared to have been gained in the practical establishment of the principles of the Stein-Hardenberg legislative programme. As far as they arose from the later connection of the liberal party, and especially the moderate section, with the social development of industrial enterprise, the social laws of the seventies and eighties appeared to have fulfilled every one of their aims. The party therefore could look back with pride upon its past; and because of this conviction of having accomplished its desires it began to consider itself, and to become, in truth, conservative.

The real conservatives, on the other hand, because of their assistance to Bismarck in his progressive social legislation, had become politi-

cally modernized; that is to say, they were liberalized. Decidedly opposed, in the beginning, to the idea of a united empire, especially the conservatives in Prussia, they had begun to adapt themselves to the new situation. The change was first noticeable in the central states, particularly in Saxony, where King Albert exerted a silent but very strong influence upon them. It was longer in showing itself in Prussia, and particularly in the districts east of the Elbe. All in all, however, the conservative party had become so friendly toward the modern progressive policies of the empire that it never failed to throw its weight in the balance in favor of the administration.

The stand taken by these two large parties naturally led to a closer union between them; it even demanded this close association whenever dangers threatened the empire from within. Such a situation arose in 1887, when the exceedingly tense political situation demanded the increase of the standing army. Under the influence of the dissolution of the *Reichstag*, which declined to grant the desired increase suggested by the *Bundesrat*, a combination was formed between the German-conservatives, the imperialists and the national-liberals, which compelled the adherents of one party to support the candidate of the other two in such districts as were

at all doubtful. The result was extraordinary; the combination of the three parties brought 220 delegates into the *Reichstag*. This surprising outcome, naturally, suggested to the parties in question the permanent establishment of the combination which seemed to work so well at the elections. It was equally natural that the government should assist them as much as possible. In fact, the following years brought a practical coöperation between the three parties in internal politics, too. But when the next elections came around, and the combination was formally renewed for the purpose (December, 1889), the result was different. The outcome of the elections (February, 1890) showed the combination had won only 132 seats in the *Reichstag*. The result was so disappointing that the combination was not renewed before the next elections (1893).

What were the causes of this showing? As early as 1889 the combination proved unsatisfactory to the right wing of the conservative party. In the words of the *Kreuzzeitung*: "The gold of old-Prussian-conservative principles should not be alloyed with the baser metal from the treasury of liberalism!" It was therefore, in the first place, the old idea of particularism which objected to the political combination. And it was really an entirely mod-

ern movement, despite the archaic expression of the *Kreuzzeitung*. It was not a question of old conservative and old liberal principles at all, but rather a clash of interests between the junkers and great landed proprietors of the eastern districts and the leaders of industry and commerce in the central and western districts; the latter being openly liberal in their political ideas. The social opinions of the parties in the combination also clashed openly on many occasions. This was an experience which dated back to the early sixties and seventies, but which only now became sharply defined and important in its influence on imperial politics.

The strangest result of this aversion of the conservative party to remain in a combination with the liberals was the conservative estrangement from the government and even from the emperor himself, a situation which did not seem credible when compared with the old loyalty of Prussian conservatives. Dissatisfaction with the government's treatment of an educational bill, which was convenient to the conservatives, but which was criticized unmercifully by the liberals and all other progressive thinking parties, finally drove the whole party, led by the extreme right wing, into the movement called anti-Semitism. The movement was a thoroughly plebeian one, far from what would be expected from an aris-

tocratic party; but it expressed in a vague, grumbling manner the envy and dissatisfaction of the agricultural interests with the enormous strides made by commerce and industry, and as in the ranks of the latter there were many Jews particularly prominent, the movement took on a racial character. It is typical of the whole movement that it started with the election of a somewhat notorious anti-Semite, the rector Ahlwardt, by the aid of conservative votes. It should be said here at once that this step of the conservative party brought it no luck and very little material gains.

The year 1893 was filled with the demands for a reorganization of the army, in which the chief demand was that for a two-year-service term. And although the conservatives were not at all pleased with the request of the government, and were highly displeased with the idea of a reorganization of the army, it was a foregone conclusion that because of the party's close connections with the officers' corps of the army it could not very well refuse assistance to the government in military matters. The party was compelled to vote in favor of the measure. But when it came to the dissolution of the *Reichstag* over the question, it was shown that the stand of the bulk of the party had not pleased the extreme anti-Semite, and that the latter voted in

favor of the measure only under the strong pressure of public opinion. The new elections brought the conservatives little gains, while the anti-Semitic party increased from five to sixteen members. Did the new anti-Semites intend to be swallowed by the conservative party? Not by any means! They stormed and fought with all the means at their command against the junkers, who were only one degree less objectionable to them than the industrial barons (*Schlotbarone*—chimney barons, as they called them). “Away with them!” they thundered in the press and in meetings; “away with the stuck-up, conceited bunch of money aristocrats and the other aristocrats, too!”

It was more along the lines of conservative development and conservative policies of the past to seek outside the ranks of agrarian interests an understanding with those social strata, which like them were cornered in the vortex of modern social evolution. And among these must be counted as most important the trades, the skilled master artisans. Even at the very beginning of the empire the sympathies of the conservatives for this class of people in the country took a distinct shape; and it became more clearly defined during the debates of the social legislative programme of the succeeding years. But the interests of the conservatives and the

skilled artisans were too diametrically opposed to permit of a real close connection between the two. Furthermore, the trades and guilds were in such a state of unrest and reformation that they had no political influence, no distinct political programme, not even political aspirations which permitted of their expression in formulas or principles. In other words, the guilds and trades of Germany were in such a chaotic condition, politically, that among ten thousand members could be found three thousand different opinions as to what was desirable for them in legislation.

The conservative party evidently could not form an alliance with this turbulent mass of people who had no definite aim or object. There remained for them only the possibility of developing and educating the farmers and working for the improvement of conditions among the small landholders. As we have seen before, the small farmer was not at all favorably disposed toward the conservative policies of the past. How could he be persuaded to vote with his former ruler or landlord? This was not quite so easy as it may have looked. While in a social sense the great landed proprietor, the junker, exerted a tremendous influence, the situation was reversed when it came to the elections. For in the election hall the poor farmer with two

acres was just as powerful with his one vote as the great landowning junker with his vote. It was therefore a dangerous step for the junkers to take: they practically asked the aid of the small farmer.

In this connection it was fortunate for the junkers that the protective tariff discussion and the means for warding off foreign agricultural invasion had established at least some points of interest on which the two social classes could agree. And after the anti-Semitic elections of 1893 could there be any hesitation at all? A farmers' alliance had been formed several years before in Central Germany, Pomerania and Posen, which had decided anti-Semitic tendencies; the Jew has never been a favorite in agricultural circles of Germany. The *Bund der Landwirte* (Union of Farmers) was founded in 1893 and promptly absorbed the older Farmers' Alliance; the number of its members rose in a short time to more than 200,000, and in the fall of that year the conservative party gained a large number of seats in the Prussian diet by the aid of the *Bund der Landwirte*. And as the leading spirits in the *Bund* were also members of the conservative party, the latter experienced a period of agitators, propagandists and expansionists which, in a moment, transformed the quiet conservative party into a huge recruiting

force, which spread its influence in all directions.

Under such conditions it was clear that the old spirit of conservatism had to be discarded. Wherever the government attempted measures which were opposed to the interests of the agricultural population, the party no longer hesitated to oppose the government vigorously. Sometimes the party acted in a viciously selfish manner, as in the refusal to approve the construction of the great canal from Dortmund to the Rhine. It would have been beneficial chiefly to the western industrial districts! The situation of a party which has such inclinations cannot be very pleasant, in its relation to government and court, especially not where it is confronted by an emperor of such vivacity and interest as William II, who on more than one occasion stepped boldly into the fight of the parties and defended what he thought best for the country. The danger of a complete breach with the court was averted only by the agreement on the part of the conservatives to drop their anti-national agitation. The emperor warned them plainly in a speech of September, 1894, to cease their demagogic agitation or take the consequences of a complete breach with the government and himself.

What could the conservatives do in this difficult situation? The unexpected and yet per-

fectly natural occurred. The same extreme right wing of the party which had urged the others to anti-Semitism now frowned upon all agitation leading toward extremes. And it is characteristic of the East Elbian junkers that they suppressed extreme *opinions* in politics rather than extreme *actions*. These opinions naturally referred chiefly to the social conditions since the eighties, and they were especially brought forward by those members of the Protestant clergy who took part in political matters. The two currents within the party found expression in the "Christian-social" section under the court preacher Stöcker and the more radical division under Pastor Naumann. These currents were vigorously combated in 1895 and 1896 by the right wing of the party; and the party succeeded in shaking off these malcontents, even as it had managed to get rid of the anti-Semites.

The conservative party, after this elimination of the undesirables, naturally had a simpler task than before. There was no longer the necessity for it to defend general political programmes or platforms, or serious social ideals. It had become plainly and simply the party of the farming population, both large and small landowners. The German parliaments, for this reason, were dominated by the agricultural viewpoint, beginning with the nineties, at least as far as the con-

servative party is concerned. But could a party which was so purely the representative of agrarian interests remain the representative court party in the sense of the past? This question has arisen numerous times in recent years. Sometimes the agrarian interests gained a decisive victory; then again it became necessary to maintain cordial relations with the court, and the conservative party was once more the courteous old junker aggregation.

The government naturally utilized the situation to its own best advantage, playing the innumerable cards of personal influence through the officers of the army and the leading positions in the administrative forces. Yet, despite the occasional appearance of the conservatives in the rôle of government supporters, it cannot be denied that they lost their old position as the court party.

Who could take their place? The national-liberals? Their time had been fulfilled; only an entire new programme could revive that party. The "left-liberals"? How could a parliamentary majority be established with them, and how could anybody expect positive creative work from a party controlled by a man like Eugen Richter? And the social-democrats? They gained enormously in votes and in delegates; and attempts have been made with some degree

of success to transform their more moderate members into a "citizen-radical" party, which in time might be expected to supersede the socialists proper. But how could so quick a transformation be expected from a party which was based on democratic, elementary principles? It would have been more than a revolution, it would have been a miracle! And even today the party is held together, if somewhat shakily, by the old Utopian ideas of old. The result was that the government decided to reign without a supporting party, especially after the crash of the conservative-liberal combination. As Chancellor Caprivi expressed it: "Let us take the good where we find it!" All this was very well and good, but no government could exist long without a party on which it could rely. And this party soon presented itself: the center party.

If we would understand the development of the center party in the last decades we must look backward into the eighties. The change of front in the center party must be dated from the introduction of the great insurance laws in the *Reichstag*. A party which devoted some of its efforts to the spreading of the teaching of charity, which believed thoroughly in the payment of help to the poor from church funds, collected from all the people, could not oppose the idea of sick and old age insurance. And the

insurance legislation was the most important political achievement of the eighties. And as commercial and financial politics became more and more identical with social advancement and improvement, the center party was compelled to assist in them. The party undoubtedly rendered important services to the government in those years, without compensation of any kind; it was not until later that it obtained reciprocal services from the government which, it must be admitted, made further assistance on the part of the Center possible. The reciprocal services were, of course, confined to religious matters; and the consequence of this was the gradual elimination of the points of dispute which had led to the *Kulturkampf* between Bismarck and the pope at Rome. At any rate, the empire managed to govern during the eighties with the assistance of the center party, and Bismarck's skill in diplomacy succeeded in establishing combinations of parties in such a manner as to have usually a safe majority in questions of internal importance.

When the time came that the granting of clerical demands had reached its utmost limit, the "party combination" (*Kartell*) of 1887 gave the *Reichstag* a much safer and much more convenient majority than the fluctuating majorities of 1881-1887. One need only look over the bills

passed during the control of this *Kartell* to realize the importance of a safe majority for the government. Increased strength of army and navy; more substantial financial regulations, and the final completion of the insurance laws—these were some of the fruits of this period. But as we saw before, the *Kartell* period was but an episode: the constitutional differences of the parties composing the *Kartell* were too great to permit of more than a temporary coördination and collaboration. As mentioned above, the *Reichstag* of 1890 no longer showed a *Kartell* majority, and soon the whole idea of forming such party combinations fell through.

The government now returned once more to the old intention of leaning upon the center party for support; but the lack of further possible clerical concessions demanded a different kind of arrangement. It is one of the last political acts of Bismarck to have understood this situation, and to have come to an arrangement with the Center, despite his personal aversion to some of the leaders of the center party and to clericalism itself. Early in February, 1890, he began negotiations with the center leaders, and in March he received Windthorst in the palace of the chancellor. It is well known that these steps, misunderstood by the young emperor, led to his resignation soon afterward.

Bismarck's successor, perhaps under the influence of the kaiser's antipathy against the center party, attempted to get along without the assistance of the clericals; he distributed his affection and condescension equally over the various parties. This, measured by the events of the past, must be considered a distinct gain for the liberal parties. Soon, however, it became evident that with the conservatives failing it was necessary for the government to be sure of the center party. As it is clear that no government can govern without the consent of the majority of the people, in a constitutional monarchy at least, so it is also clear that where such violently opposed parties as conservatives and socialists, liberals and anti-Semites, are joined in debate on important decisive legislation affecting either the one or the other in its most vital points, neither of these parties can be used in the formation of a government party or majority. Such a position could only be occupied by a comparatively impartial party, such as the Center. A party which in itself combined the principles of progress and conservatism. The Center was that party.

If the center party was to become the decisive power, the "trump card" in the hand of the government during the game of politics, it required the clearing of two points. In the first

place the party had to become more national in its views than it had been at the time of the *Kulturkampf* in the seventies. And furthermore, the countercurrents of progress and conservatism within its ranks would have to be directed and managed in such a way as to obtain a safe margin of preponderance on the part of the former. In both these directions a distinct change did occur in the nineties, although at the end of the eighties the party still seemed opposed to imperial unity and imperial government.

The control of the inner currents in the line of moderate progress was obtained first, but not without some serious, gradually decreasing fights. In 1889 it appeared as if a close alliance would be formed between the conservatives and the center party. Suggestions along these lines were made by several representatives of the aristocratic-conservative wing of the center party, such as von Huene, von Schorlemer, von Franckenstein, von Ballestrem; and the common viewpoint was found in a legislative programme involving schools, public morals and the Church. Soon, however, it became evident that ideal principles, or matters which belonged to the idealistic regions, could no longer—or perhaps not yet, who knows?—be merged with materialistic desires. The only common point in the views of the two parties was in the treatment of

the social-economical questions, and here the center party was not at all anxious to submit to the dictates of a specific conservative-junker leadership.

Full clarity in this matter was obtained in 1893. Several eminent members of the conservative-aristocratic wing of the center party, in connection with the vote on military reforms, placed the leadership of the party in the hands of Dr. Lieber, a democratic delegate from Nassau. And it must be said in this connection that despite occasional differences of opinion with the government in matters of social progress, due to internal dissensions in the party, the progress of the party as a whole during the decade following was generally along the lines of modern healthy advancement of progressive principles, without harming the interests of the trades guilds, artisans and the agricultural population. Still more remarkable were the changes in the national spirit of the center party. Time and again, in the earlier years—in the seventies with a good deal of truth—members of the center party have been accused of non-patriotism; the party itself was referred to as a “crowd of men without a country.” It is certain that the party has changed greatly in this respect. It was natural that a party which held the decisive vote in national matters must grow to possess a national

feeling; it was a reversion of the old proverb, which in this case read: "Where the desire is, there will go the heart." Could a party which passed the important tariff treaties under Caprivi; which refused to accept the first draft of the new civil code; which voted for the expenditure of large sums for the fleet, knowing the importance of its decisive vote—could such a party remain aloof from all expression of national sentiments? And the patriotic feelings of the clericals were also expressed in matters relating to external conditions in Europe. International complications were caused by the curia in Rome, which appealed to republican France for aid, and indorsed emphatically the Dual Alliance. This action of the holy see caused deep dissatisfaction among German Catholics, and it is not too much to say that from this time dates the independent thinking of the Catholics in Germany, which has been so pronounced ever since. A symptom of the approaching crisis was the rebuke administered to Dr. Lieber, the leader of the Center, by the pope, when Dr. Lieber emphatically questioned the infallibility of the pope in political matters. After receiving the rebuke, he protested still more emphatically against its wording and the manner in which it was sent to him by the pope.

In 1893 there seemed to be no further doubt

that the center party was destined to become the "government party," and the succeeding years confirmed this impression. The party represented strongly the demands for national expansion, national developments, and it had ceased to expect reciprocity along purely clerical lines. The last five years of the old century brought the positive assistance of the center party in such national political matters as the great expansion of the fleet and the entrance of Germany on the field of international expansion politics. In this connection it is very natural to expect international understanding from a party such as the Center, which, because of its Catholic affiliations, must have a better conception of international matters and needs than the distinctly Germanic parties. And as if to show the changed position of the center party at that time, the president of the *Reichstag* in 1898 was chosen from its midst, for the first time in the history of the empire.

In comparison with the development which has been described in the past chapters, the changes in the other political parties during the last decade of the nineteenth century were unimportant. The social-democracy, it is true, gained greatly in votes and in representatives, but not in social importance. On the contrary, its inclination to approach a condition of democratic radicalism made its influence less felt in national

affairs. Most of its energy seemed spent in the internal re-formation of its divisions, and a re-shaping of old forms. The social-democratic party, as has been indicated in a preceding paragraph, had lost much of its programme through the social-economic legislation of the government. As a matter of fact, the German insurance laws were further advanced in practical socialism than the demands of the party had been ten years before they were passed. The party actually had to look around for new slogans, new planks with which to build a new party platform; in the meantime it was too often imbued with the spirit of the Irish, who are, in principle, "ferninst the gov'nment!" The liberals showed such a state of exhaustion after the tremendous activities of the two preceding decades that the moderates among them were quite willing to side with the government in most questions; while the radicals split up into several factions which continually warred with one another, so that they did not even retain the name and character of an opposition party. Thus the only distinct government opposition remained with the socialists.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ERA OF TARIFF TREATIES

THE re-forming of the political parties during the last decade of the nineteenth century, and particularly during the first few years of the twentieth, has come to acquire a most important influence on the development of the inner social politics of the empire. In considering this influence we can only mention those factors that have approached completion, but not those that are still in the state of evolution.

In this social-economic policy there was of chief importance the conclusion of tariff treaties, and the establishment of a definite trade policy, under the chancellorship of Caprivi. The years of 1878-1888 had seen a great many changes in the external trade policies of the empire, because of the increase of tariff duties on imported articles. As we have seen before, the results of this tariff legislation were not only a betterment of the finances of the empire, but also wide improvement of conditions in agriculture and al-

most every branch of industry. The empire was at that time the scene of a rapid development of industrial activity, which in its early period of struggling against foreign competition required protection and assistance. In agriculture foreign competition began to interfere seriously with the growing of grain and raising of cattle, both of which commodities were being imported from foreign countries where their production did not have to fight against adverse conditions and such a restricted area as was available for the purpose in Germany.

Without a doubt the German people prospered greatly during those years, even though they experienced a reaction in the later nineties, which was due in no small degree to external influences, caused partly by money panics in foreign countries (United States, 1893, and others). But could this system of Bismarckian policies be continued and maintained in the future without some definite tariff understandings with the leading countries of the world? Was it not perfectly clear that the other kingdoms, as soon as they could find an opportunity, would retaliate by placing high tariff duties on German products? And if this took place, was it not perfectly clear that a continuous increase of duties would follow, a movement the end of which was absolutely indeterminable? Was it not possible

that such a policy might lead to the economic seclusion of each kingdom, a sort of shrinking into its own shell, such as had stultified the growth of Japan? Or, expressed in a more general way, would it not be preferable in this case to make the state independent of its neighbors, and even the rest of the whole world, as far as products of necessity were concerned? Thus twenty years ago the progressive and clear-visioned in Germany realized the need of a self-sufficient country, not so much from a military as from an economic standpoint. The self-sufficiency which Germany has shown in the great war of 1914 is not a creature of the moment; it is a logical development of the economic conditions within its borders.

Whether or not such a course was wholly possible was shown both in the theory and the practice of France in the nineties. In article 11 of the Frankfort peace treaty, the German empire and France had guaranteed to each other the same tariff treatment that was accorded to England, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria and Russia. The German empire, however, signed a series of tariff treaties with other countries, the favorable conditions of which should also have applied to France but did not. On the other hand, Germany in its trade with France obtained all the advantages of the reduced tariff

in force between these countries, and also any tariff reduction which France granted to any other country. The bitter feeling which this advantageous position of the German empire caused in France was one of the reasons for which France abolished her conventional tariff and went over to the side of the high protective tariff. Her law was closely modeled upon the German tariff, with minimum and maximum amounts, which were to be applied respectively in case of such countries as were favorable or unfavorable in their treatment of French products. Of course France had to grant to Germany under the provisions of the Frankfort treaty the minimum tariff. In the same year, 1892, the majority of the other European countries passed new high protective tariff laws. This was done at that particular date, because the old tariff treaties between Germany and those states became inoperative after 1892; they expired by limitation.

But was it possible to establish at that time a complete tariff autonomy, such as had been found possible in the United States of America and Russia? This would have been a severe check upon the development of the industrial and commercial activities of the older nations which wished to sell their surplus products to the younger countries. Could this autonomy be

carried out? No economic nation is at present capable, nor is it likely to be capable, of absolute and complete self-sufficiency—unless it be prepared to retire from the ranks of the civilized states for the time being. Russia attempted this policy in 1893, and despite its remarkably favorable geographical and climatic conditions it failed completely. Considering the German empire, its central position and its necessity for a highly developed export trade make it impossible to even conceive a complete self-sufficient condition—in times of peace.

It was this situation which was destined to interfere with the self-secluding policies of France, directed as they were in the opposite course. Germany realized the advisability of a policy of universal tariff treaties which would regulate international commerce. This was not exactly a new idea or a new principle. The tariff treaties of 1860 between England and France had been based on the realization of such a desirable condition, and the first attempts were soon followed by a whole series of tariff treaties between the western nations during the seventies. It was now a question of adapting the idea of commercial treaties to the protective tariff idea, and it was here that the German empire took the initiative.

Chancellor Caprivi, in proceeding along these

lines, could not help finding their discussion favorable in his other political intentions. The Triple Alliance had been in existence for over ten years and had shown its value on a number of occasions. Would it not be possible to consider the alliance as a basis for international commercial policies; to unite still closer, in an economic sense, the three states belonging to it? The idea of such a close relationship between these three states naturally suggested the including of other central European states in a *Zollverein* or toll union. Belgium and Switzerland were already economic dependents on the empire; Servia and Roumania were within the economic sphere of interest of Austria-Hungary. And if such a union could be accomplished, it would perhaps be even possible to include France in it, thereby forming a continental European economic union which would not only greatly improve the relationship between France and the empire, but which would also be able to successfully withstand any and all attempts at throttling which might be expected to come from the United States of America or Russia.

In 1891 Caprivi submitted to the *Reichstag* the new tariff proposals to be incorporated in commercial treaties with Austria, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. And while he worked for the

constitutional acceptance of the proposals in the *Reichstag*, the position of the political parties in Germany to the government and to each other became greatly clarified, thereby exerting an important influence on the tariff treaties as well as on the whole internal situation in the empire. The commercial treaty debate showed the true relation of the parties in the *Reichstag*, and gave Caprivi the opportunity of accomplishing a great deal of valuable work, because he was able to forecast the line-up of the parties on the basis of their stand in the commercial treaty debates.

He found, first of all, that the leaders of industry and commerce were in full accord with the proposed legislation, chiefly because such work would clarify the commercial situation for years in advance. This meant that he was assured of the support of the liberal parties. The social-democrats, too, were in favor of the proposed treaties, because in the conclusion of such treaties they saw a greater freedom of tariff arrangements than was provided in the high protective tariff legislation which had been passed in the last years of Bismarck's régime. The opposition was now composed of the agrarians and the conservatives, who demanded a much more aggressive protective tariff policy than that expressed in the commercial treaties,

especially where agricultural products were concerned. It was a remarkable change of front to see the socialists support the government policy and the conservatives oppose it.

Yet no matter how violently opposed the conservatives might appear at this moment, it was impossible for them to continue long in opposition. In the first place, their stand was not at all logical at the time. Prices in grain were higher than ever in the summer of 1891, so that a higher protective tariff would have been quite unnecessary. There was furthermore the disquieting knowledge that the government, during the debates regarding the tariff on grain, had distinctly provided for a reduction or abolishment of this protective tariff, in case the prices should exceed a certain height. In the case of rye this limit had been fixed at 180 marks for the metric ton of 2,020 pounds. And here was rye selling at 260 marks per ton! It had been above 160 marks for some time and no one had complained. The opposition of the agrarians drew the attention of the government to these prices and a bill reducing the tariff on rye and wheat was introduced. This was a bitter pill for the agrarians to swallow, and they submitted to the procedure with very bad grace and considerable debate. They yielded at length, and the tariff on rye was reduced from

fifty to thirty-five marks per ton. But the beginning of an agrarian opposition had been made, and there was every reason to believe it would return as soon as grain prices went down again.

Before this happened commercial treaties were signed, in the last months of 1891, with Austria, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland, with a time limit of twelve years. As corresponding treaties were also signed between the countries named, all of which went into effect in the spring of 1892, the safety of commercial intercourse between the countries of Central Europe was thus established for the next dozen years.

The next step, of course, was to try to expand this system over the rest of Europe. Germany was interested chiefly in the extension of the treaty idea to Spain, Servia, Roumania and Russia. The negotiations with Russia especially served to act as a test question for the inner relations of the German parties. The agrarian interests were so deeply involved in the question of Russian grain exports that a vigorous fight seemed assured. Treaties with Spain and Servia were submitted to the *Reichstag* about the end of November, 1893, and accepted in December of the same year. About the same time a treaty with Roumania was signed, not without careful consideration of the Russian situation.

Here matters stood as follows. Russia had at first, in 1892, shown little inclination to enter into any commercial treaties with Germany. Russia's anti-German feeling had even led to an endeavor to force German products out of Russian markets by arbitrarily increased customs duties. Hence a tariff war started. This tariff war was easily carried on by the empire, simply by establishing in the trade with Russia the maximum duty permissible, while all other nations received more courteous treatment under the "most favored nation" clause. The duty on rye, which was the largest single grain export factor from Russia, had been fifty marks per ton; the *Reichstag* reduced it to thirty-five marks in the case of reciprocal countries, but in the case of Russia it remained at fifty marks per ton. This situation was exceedingly uncomfortable for the Russian trade in rye, most of which had found a ready market in Germany. At first Russia endeavored to force Germany to grant better terms by increasing the duties on German products which had found a ready market in Russia. These products were not easily obtained elsewhere and Russia only increased the expense of its own citizens without stopping the import of the German goods.

The German empire also started retaliation proceedings, so that by the time the commercial

treaties were ready with the other nations Russia and Germany were in the midst of a tariff war which threatened to grow worse from month to month. Soon, however, events showed that things were not quite so unbendable as they seemed. The old Russian habit of threatening offhand without a clear basis of facts and investigation had again plunged the country into a situation where it could not maintain itself. Soon there was a distinct easing up of her oppressive tactics, and in October, 1893, Russian emissaries appeared in Berlin to discuss the matter of a commercial treaty. The *Reichstag* seemingly would have to discuss the details of a German-Russian commerce treaty in the spring of 1894. And in this connection the debate regarding the Roumanian treaty in November, 1893, is of special interest.

It will be remembered that in the spring of 1893 there had been formed the *Bund der Landwirte*, which by the time the Roumanian treaty debate occurred had gained complete control of the conservative party. During the year 1893 the price of grain had dropped once more to a very low level, and the hostility of the conservatives came to an open explosion in November. When the vote was counted in December, on the treaty with Roumania, it was found that the government could muster only the dangerously

small majority of twenty-four votes. The conservatives, imperialists and a number of the national-liberals voted against the treaty; while the majority of the national-liberals, the socialists, the freethinkers and one-half of the center party voted in its favor. This was certainly a most peculiar situation for the imperial government.

The negotiations with Russia, which now began in earnest, brought a still sharper demarcation in the political groups. All agrarian interests fought tooth and nail against the proposed treaty, and when this treaty did pass, in March, 1894, the official organ of the *Bund der Landwirte* wrote as follows: "The economic policies of Germany and Prussia must be guided into different channels, and in Prussia the interests of the agricultural population must now be placed in the first rank. Heretofore the interests of commerce and industry have been preferred in the legislation of the past thirty years. Against this present system we shall fight to the last breath; we shall attack it regardless of how highly stationed the person may be who favors this policy!" In bringing this pronouncement on the part of the agrarians, the *Kreuzzeitung* announced a complete division, a sharp demarcation between the interests of the nation. It demanded a fight to the finish with the cap-

italistic liberalism and all that belonged to it or believed in it.

This excited opposition on the part of the agrarians did not interfere with the external economic conditions which now were settled for the next ten years. Gradually the idea of the "most favored nation" clause entered the negotiations with other countries, and before long treaties embodying this proviso were signed by practically all the continental nations of Europe, not only in their relation to Germany but also in their relation to each other. Even France entered the combination by signing such treaties with Spain, Roumania, Russia and Switzerland (with the latter after a tariff war lasting for thirty months).

Under such conditions Germany's future commercial policies were firmly established, and further efforts might confine themselves chiefly to the internal relations between the various states. It was clear that independent or separate commercial agreements, as for instance between Bavaria and Italy, were out of the question. Trade was now a matter of national policy, and in the gradual centralization of its administration the extension of the railroad system was probably the most important factor. Where the relationship between the individual states required a more complete system of transporta-

tion, or better means of communication, the empire as a whole must take a hand rather than the individual states. Such was the case in the policy of canal-building, which now occupied the attention of the government.

Kaiser William had realized the importance of ship canals as additional feeders and carriers of commerce besides the railroads. In his early youth, and still more when he became emperor, he entered on a policy of encouragement and promotion of better and larger canals wherever they were needed. True, he had little success at first, despite his greatest efforts. The important Kiel Canal was finished in 1895; but its building had been approved as a naval rather than a commercial measure. In 1894 the emperor secured approval for the Elbe-Trave Canal. The Dortmund-Rhine Canal, on the other hand, was refused by the same opposition which had endeavored to hamper the last tariff treaties, by the East Elbian agrarians. They were guided in their vote not by general national needs, but by their personal spite over the passing of the Russian tariff treaty, and by their championing of their own particular interests and hostility toward the western industrial enterprises which would have benefited most from the new canal.

However, neither the foolish opposition of the

agrarians nor that of their adherents could prevent for all time the carrying out of such a beneficial national enterprise as the construction of a good canal. That much was indicated in the strong personality of the emperor, and in the policy of canal construction which had been commenced by Austria-Hungary. A new canal bill, therefore, appeared in the Prussian diet in 1899. It provided for two canals: the Rhine-Dortmund Canal, which could no longer be denied by the nation, and the Midland Canal, which led from Dortmund via Minden and Hanover, completing a water connection between the Elbe, Weser and Rhine. With the construction of such a canal it would have been possible for a ship to go from Breslau in Silesia, on rivers and ship canals to Holland and to the sea, touching all the important industrial centers of the empire.

But the old opposition was still there. Again the agrarians could not overcome their jealousy of the western industries, which would gain the greatest advantage from the canals. And although the government attempted to placate the opponents from the eastern provinces by promising them also better transportation facilities, or a respective cash indemnity, it was in vain. The main canal was again refused; only the comparatively short line, Dortmund-Rhine, was

approved. A new bill, in 1901, met the same fate.

But where did the conservative party get this sudden accession of strength in opposition? In the discussion of the grain tariff and canal projects in the preceding paragraph, these two things are merely symbols, so to speak, expressing vastly greater forces which stand hidden behind them. The struggle over these temporary matters of a canal bill or a grain tariff therefore had a far greater significance than merely these commercial-economic measures. It was a question now of whether Prussia was to remain an agricultural state or to become an industrial state; whether the government was to be devoted to national management or international management, Prussianism or imperialism. In short, the entire economic, social, political and educational future of the whole nation was at stake. And these are problems which even to this day keep apart the two camps of political economy. Who can say, even now, with certainty, whether the agricultural interests of Germany are in the majority or the minority; whether the industrial activities of the state have overshadowed the agrarian assets. And who can say, even if figures could give the answer to the above questions, that the political elements back of these conditions must push